After 50 years RI democracy needs reform

As the nation fetes its 50th anniversary of independence this month, noted political scientist J. Soedjati Djiwandono examines our political life and the challenges that lie ahead.

JAKARTA (JP): Half a century is a young age for a nation. As a nation, Indonesia is still in its infancy. Yet over the short span of 50 years, the country has been through strenuous and continuous experimentation with one type of democracy and another in search of an appropriate form.

The result, however, is ambivalent. The Indonesian concept of Pancasila Democracy continues to be ill-defined. In the face of globalization, the nation can ill-afford such ambivalence. It is likely to weaken national unity, which is needed to cushion the nation against the possible adverse effects of development, and at the same time make sure the populace benefits fully.

Democracy is admittedly a matter of degree. And despite the obvious progress under the New Order, such as the regular elections once every five years since 1971, from the point of view of substance, Indonesia's democracy seems at the moment to be at a very low point indeed. There are indications of a tendency toward a concentration of power in the executive branch, and by contrast a continuous weakening of the powers of the legislative bodies. Individual freedoms, particularly the freedoms of expression and assembly, remain curtailed. Criticism, debates, and dialogs, which are essential ingredients of democracy, are considered suspect and discouraged. Transparency is lacking. Openness is uncertain of its effects on the decision- making process.

What the country needs urgently seems to be political reform. This, by definition, is to be carried out within and through the existing system based on the 1945 Constitution, which does provide ample room for reform. And we need reform that relates to the conceptual as well as operational aspects of our democratic life.

We need to free ourselves from our debilitating ambivalence once and for all. On the conceptual side, Pancasila Democracy has been vaguely defined in terms of its supposedly essential difference from western liberal democracy, at least in the way it is commonly understood in this country, with respect to the question of voting and the vague Indonesian understanding of deliberations for unanimity. But an election, for instance, is after all a form of voting. The 1945 Constitution also allows for voting.

Pancasila Democracy should be taken as a safeguard for national unity, for it is on the very basis of the unity of the Indonesian nation that the sovereign and independent Republic of Indonesia has been established, as proclaimed on 17 Aug. 1945.

This should mean that while voting is a natural mechanism for decision making in a democracy, it must not be applied haphazardly to cases in which the unity of the nation is at stake. Such cases are those that involve disintegrative elements which are contrary to our ideals of national unity. A religious issue is one such element.

The other aspect of Pancasila Democracy, which would make it a really Indonesian democracy, is the role of the Armed Forces as a socio-political force. Like it or not, that role has become an integral part of the growing tradition of Indonesian democracy.

But exactly how the role of the Armed Forces in our democratic life is to be integrated into the system of checks and balances needs further study.

But this is important. The system of checks and balances is a vital aspect of modern democracy, which is expected to prevent a concentration of political power in the hands of one or the other branch of government, and thus to minimize possible abuse of power. And the Armed Forces constitutes the mechanism which functions as the state's legitimate monopoly over the means of violence.

The role of the Armed Forces as a socio-political force has been rooted in Indonesian history since the national revolution for independence and beyond. It is not the purpose here to delve into it. Suffice it to say, that without it Indonesia would have been either divided or disintegrated, gone communist or to the extreme right. The Pancasila State would have been dumped into the dustbin of history.

This implies, in fact, that probably, as part of its historical background quite apart from the revolutionary experience, the role of the Armed Forces as a socio-political force with their dwifungsi (dual function) has been enhanced by the failure of civilian groups in the past.

The future role of the Armed Forces, therefore, will also be determined by the advancement of civilian groups, particularly as regards to their ideological orientation and their commitment to the ideals of national unity, quite aside from the necessary leadership qualities, discipline, organization and other forms of sophistication.

On the operational side, the kind of reform needed seems to involve some form of revitalization. That is to say, a number of constitutional provisions have little or no operational value as yet. A mechanism needs to be developed through legislation by which the House of Representatives can exercise control over the executive branch with, if necessary, punitive measures set out for use.

Another reform move would involve a mechanism for judicial review, with the purpose of allowing the constitution to adapt to changing demands and popular aspirations. And perhaps last, but by no means least, is the need for a mechanism for a peaceful change of national leadership.

In the last analysis, this should be the ultimate test of a modern democracy. Indeed, our economic "take-off" should be accompanied by a political one. Only thus will Indonesia be ready to enter the 21st century.

The writer is a member of Board of Directors at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.