After 50 years RI democracy needs reform

After 50 years RI democracy needs reform

As the nation fetes its 50th anniversary of independence this
month, noted political scientist J. Soedjati Djiwandono examines
our political life and the challenges that lie ahead.

JAKARTA (JP): Half a century is a young age for a nation. As a
nation, Indonesia is still in its infancy. Yet over the short
span of 50 years, the country has been through strenuous and
continuous experimentation with one type of democracy and another
in search of an appropriate form.

The result, however, is ambivalent. The Indonesian concept of
Pancasila Democracy continues to be ill-defined. In the face of
globalization, the nation can ill-afford such ambivalence. It is
likely to weaken national unity, which is needed to cushion the
nation against the possible adverse effects of development, and
at the same time make sure the populace benefits fully.

Democracy is admittedly a matter of degree. And despite the
obvious progress under the New Order, such as the regular
elections once every five years since 1971, from the point of
view of substance, Indonesia's democracy seems at the moment to
be at a very low point indeed. There are indications of a
tendency toward a concentration of power in the executive branch,
and by contrast a continuous weakening of the powers of the
legislative bodies. Individual freedoms, particularly the
freedoms of expression and assembly, remain curtailed. Criticism,
debates, and dialogs, which are essential ingredients of
democracy, are considered suspect and discouraged. Transparency
is lacking. Openness is uncertain of its effects on the decision-
making process.

What the country needs urgently seems to be political reform.
This, by definition, is to be carried out within and through the
existing system based on the 1945 Constitution, which does
provide ample room for reform. And we need reform that relates to
the conceptual as well as operational aspects of our democratic
life.

We need to free ourselves from our debilitating ambivalence
once and for all. On the conceptual side, Pancasila Democracy has
been vaguely defined in terms of its supposedly essential
difference from western liberal democracy, at least in the way it
is commonly understood in this country, with respect to the
question of voting and the vague Indonesian understanding of
deliberations for unanimity. But an election, for instance, is
after all a form of voting. The 1945 Constitution also allows for
voting.

Pancasila Democracy should be taken as a safeguard for
national unity, for it is on the very basis of the unity of the
Indonesian nation that the sovereign and independent Republic of
Indonesia has been established, as proclaimed on 17 Aug. 1945.

This should mean that while voting is a natural mechanism for
decision making in a democracy, it must not be applied
haphazardly to cases in which the unity of the nation is at
stake. Such cases are those that involve disintegrative elements
which are contrary to our ideals of national unity. A religious
issue is one such element.

The other aspect of Pancasila Democracy, which would make it a
really Indonesian democracy, is the role of the Armed Forces as a
socio-political force. Like it or not, that role has become an
integral part of the growing tradition of Indonesian democracy.

But exactly how the role of the Armed Forces in our democratic
life is to be integrated into the system of checks and balances
needs further study.

But this is important. The system of checks and balances is a
vital aspect of modern democracy, which is expected to prevent a
concentration of political power in the hands of one or the other
branch of government, and thus to minimize possible abuse of
power. And the Armed Forces constitutes the mechanism which
functions as the state's legitimate monopoly over the means of
violence.

The role of the Armed Forces as a socio-political force has
been rooted in Indonesian history since the national revolution
for independence and beyond. It is not the purpose here to delve
into it. Suffice it to say, that without it Indonesia would have
been either divided or disintegrated, gone communist or to the
extreme right. The Pancasila State would have been dumped into
the dustbin of history.

This implies, in fact, that probably, as part of its
historical background quite apart from the revolutionary
experience, the role of the Armed Forces as a socio-political
force with their dwifungsi (dual function) has been enhanced by
the failure of civilian groups in the past.

The future role of the Armed Forces, therefore, will also be
determined by the advancement of civilian groups, particularly as
regards to their ideological orientation and their commitment to
the ideals of national unity, quite aside from the necessary
leadership qualities, discipline, organization and other forms of
sophistication.

On the operational side, the kind of reform needed seems to
involve some form of revitalization. That is to say, a number of
constitutional provisions have little or no operational value as
yet. A mechanism needs to be developed through legislation by
which the House of Representatives can exercise control over the
executive branch with, if necessary, punitive measures set out
for use.

Another reform move would involve a mechanism for judicial
review, with the purpose of allowing the constitution to adapt to
changing demands and popular aspirations. And perhaps last, but
by no means least, is the need for a mechanism for a peaceful
change of national leadership.

In the last analysis, this should be the ultimate test of a
modern democracy. Indeed, our economic "take-off" should be
accompanied by a political one. Only thus will Indonesia be ready
to enter the 21st century.

The writer is a member of Board of Directors at the Centre for
Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.