Afghan experience shows Indonesia it's OK to rely on outside help

Teuku Faizasyah, Candidate Ph.D, Diplomatic History and Conflict Resolution, Waikatou University, Hamilton, New Zealand

Agreed at last, but will it last? This is the most frequent question raised after the Bonn's talks on Afghanistan, under the auspices of the United Nations.

In Afghanistan, military might and diplomacy -- coercive and multilateral diplomacy -- are being used in tandem. The so-called Realist, who champions power politics, considers a victory in a battlefield essential, because such victory would increase their bargaining position in the negotiating table.

Unfortunately a dictated peace is often fragile. The seeds of discontent among the losers tend to linger. An example was Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailanis, the spiritual leader from ethnic Pashtun, who complained that the composition of the interim government gave little consideration to the Mujahidin.

Although, he has reason to complain, the agreement reached in Bonn should be understood in the context of third party preferences to have a moderate government ruling the new Afghanistan.

The Idealist, the peace loving person, believes in the efficacy of a gradual process toward peace. It is important to make each of the conflicting parties aware of the negative consequences of a prolonged conflict. A neutral third party prefers to let the conflicting parties sit together and help them unravel all their differences. The only constraint for the latter approach is time; and whether the third party and those in conflicts are willing to sacrifice time, for the sake of finding the most acceptable solution to the conflict.

For the coalition forces, time is a luxury. The coalition forces and mediators in Bonn were taken by surprised when they learned of the fall of Kabul to the Northern Alliance in a relatively short interval.

To avoid the Northern Alliance dominating the post-Taliban Afghanistan, the mediators had to expedite the negotiation process and press the factions to find a solution on the most pressing issue, that is, the composition of an interim government.

The Bonn initiative was far from altruistic and the motivation was very much defined by "interests," if not an amalgamation of interests. It was obvious that the Western governments and countries neighboring Afghanistan wished to have a benign government there, a non aggressive partner willing to listen to their concerns and strategic interests.

For the UN, the success of the Bonn meeting was a means to reassert itself as a responsible international organization for world peace, and not simply a rubber stamp for the U.S.

In the case of Afghanistan, conflict resolution at this stage is both a myth and reality. For one thing, the third party has little interest in the fate of the Taliban. They did not attempt to mediate between the coalition forces and the Taliban's government and instead brokered meetings among various factions in Afghanistan, except the Taliban.

The initiative simply suggested that the fate of the Taliban had already been decided before hand, and the agreement reached in Bonn was the last nail hammered into the Taliban's coffin.

Despite some gloomy prospects, the agreement to proceed with the traditional system of consultation (Loya Jirga) can be seen as the light in the end of a tunnel.

The third party is responsible to make sure that: (1) the largest ethnic group should not dominate (domineering) the peace process; (2) the Royalist -- the darling of the West -- should be more wise toward the other factions; and (3) the Northern Alliance should not pressing hard for concession from their the facto occupation of large territory.

What about Indonesia? Are we warmongers or peace lovers? Is it fair to compare recent development in Afghanistan to our domestic problems? Some Indonesians might say that our issues of separatism and communal conflicts are insignificant compared to the magnitude of Afghanistan.

Our problems, they might add, are still manageable and the government always appears optimistic of its ability to manage the problems. To request third party assistance in solving separatism and communal conflicts in Indonesia is a taboo. Indonesians are so zealous in expressing national sovereignty and are deeply disturbed if foreign countries interfere in the internal problems, as was the case of East Timor.

Unfortunately our now borderless makes it difficult for any country to lock up its door and be a master in its own house. We were terrified, for instance, to see before our very own eyes the destruction of the World Trade Center in New York and we were saddened to learn of heavy civilian casualties from the bombing raid in Afghanistan.

In the same way, foreigners who view the cycle of violence, ethnic and religious conflicts as well as unending disturbances in Indonesia from their television screen will be shocked to learn that Indonesia, the well known tolerant nation, is going down hill in the history of civilization.

Afghanistan's fiasco should be a reminder that we cannot close our house and try to deal with internal problems on our own. If the existing mechanism to resolving conflicts, the consultation for consensus approach (musyawarah untuk mufakat) is no longer adaptive to present realities, and given our limitations to solve the problems, we should not hesitate to look for other options.

We should not feel ashamed to request assistance from our neighbors, non regional countries or non-state third parties who have the means, ability and most importantly commitment to render us some assistance in solving our internal problems.

Maybe as an institution, our government no longer appears neutral to the conflicting parties or perhaps the government itself is becoming part of the problem.

If once we were successful in helping our neighbors with their internal problems, such as in Cambodia and the southern-part of the Philippines, perhaps it is now timely if we send them a gesture that we would appreciate their kind assistance in return.

The government should have the political will and strong commitment, because we are now racing against time. We never know what comes next after Afghanistan. We might not be harboring terrorists, but if the international community is getting more and more frustrated with our inability to solve our internal problems, we might face more international pressure in years to come.

In today's world there is a limit to "national sovereignty."

It is also timely for the government to innovate in its approach to internal conflicts. We should look for new impetus to stimulate dialog among conflicting parties and between the government and the separatist movements, and maybe this time we should welcome third party assistance within the corridor of our national sovereignty.

The decision to involve the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) in the dialog process with the Free Aceh Movement is a one step ahead in our attitude. The third party can help our nation in the healing process and to let go past hatred. As Indonesians, we might share similar cultures, but that does not guarantee we can appreciate different interpretations of our shared cultures.

Let us not be the judge of our own conflicts; perhaps non- Indonesians can see the reality better. The path of peace will take time and energy, but hopefully with less casualties. There is no instant solution to the deep-rooted problems and protracted conflicts, but the willingness to innovate in conflict resolution will hopefully open new windows of opportunity.

In entering this new year, we should renew our commitment for peace and rebuild our image of a peace loving people, not warmongers.