Adaptation, not reform, can improve UN's security role

Bantarto Bandoro, Jakarta

The present structure of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) no longer reflects the current reality of world politics. The UN therefore needs reform. On that everyone agrees.

For decades, experts have been talking in seminars and working groups about how to reform the UNSC. Most of the discussions have revolved around technicalities, namely: How big the UNSC should be in order to reflect a membership of more than 190 nations, and how many permanent members should be added, whether they should possess vetoes or whether vetoes should be abolished altogether.

The current drive for UN reform is aimed specifically at the way the UNSC handles international security issues. But which part of it is to be fixed and how should UN members go about it?

People disagree sharply on what kind of reform is needed and for what purpose. Two factors are specifically being mentioned as undermining UNSC legitimacy: Its biased composition and the veto- wielding power of its permanent members.

The Security Council was formed after World War II and the winners of the war gave themselves permanent seats with veto rights. The membership has been enlarged from 11 to 15, but the permanent members have not changed and nor has the power of veto.

UNSC reform is only one aspect of wider UN reform being considered by a high level panel formed by the secretary-general in 2003. The question is whether reform will improve the UNSC's credibility or change the image of some parts of the international community that the UN is geared toward protecting the interests of a certain country?

An international panel of experts was established to study the issue of UN reform. One of the groups formed by the panel was led by Brent Scowcroft, a former U.S. national security adviser, and Yevgeni Primakov, a former Russian prime minister. This group looked at how the world body should combat security, social and economic threats around the world and part of its brief was reform of the UNSC. An international panel on threats, challenges and changes was also established to determine how the UN can reinvent itself to meet emerging security threats.

The establishment of the panel has been accompanied by efforts by countries, acting either jointly or individually, to seek permanent UNSC seats. Potential candidates for permanent seats include Indonesia, Japan, India, Germany, Brazil, Argentina and Nigeria, all of which have their own arguments in their favor.

Indonesia's argument is that moderate Islam must have a voice on the council and Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim- majority nation, would be the right voice. There is a report that Brazil, Germany, India and Japan have launched a united campaign for permanent seats.

This is a question of how one defines eligibility. The Japanese, for example, have the stronger economic claim, but India can point to its population base and historic leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement, while Indonesia points to its moderate Islam base.

Another question, does political or economic power serve as the determinant factor or should seats be allocated based on a regional quota system? Reform efforts will inevitably lead to a debate on whether there should be changes to the UN charter and organizational structures.

Although Article 109 of the UN Charter holds out the possibility of a General Conference "for the purposes of reviewing the present Charter", the permanent five have set the bar high for any substantial changes.

Another issue that has not been addressed by the proposed reforms is the imbalances between seats and actual military capacity outside the UNSC. Instead, it has centered on the imbalances between the total number of countries in the world and UNSC membership as a whole and a dispute over the right of veto.

Despite all the demands for reform, the prospects for meaningful and fundamental changes seem very slim.

What will the alternative policy be, then? Perhaps, adaptations will be more likely to improve the UN security role. The process will have to proceed on the basis of common understanding on the part of UNSC member countries of the central challenges that will be faced in the 21st century.

UN Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan has himself recognized the need for the UN to adapt to the political and strategic realities of the 21st century.

If this adaptation is to be successful and gain the respect of all the members of the UN, the following policies will need to be considered:

First, there is a need for a new consensus on security, meaning that collective responsibility will be indispensable:

Second, the policy actions by the permanent five must reflect the basic interests of UN member countries.

Third, the ability of Council members to identify the internal and external stimuli that are influencing the adaptive behavior of the permanent five.

Fourth, action by the members must either adapt to the needs of all UN members, work to help all members adapt to the environment, or adapt the environment to the needs of UN members.

Such a process will hopefully lead the UNSC to better handle new international security issues and act as objectively as possible. The Council's adaptation should not be geared to protecting the interests of the rich and powerful. Self-help must not rule the adaptation process and mistrust must also be avoided if the UNSC is to gain something substantial from cooperation.

Or just let the members of the international community set by themselves the objective criteria that can be used to determine whether the UNSC is really adaptable in the face of changes in global politics.

The writer (bandoro@csis.or.id) is editor of The Indonesian Quarterly, published by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He is also a lecturer in the International Relations Post Graduate Studies Program, School of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, Jakarta.