Aceh's 'peace' thrives on 'sustainable violence'

Aboeprijadi Santoso, Radio Netherlands, Amsterdam

A year after the Presidential Order No. 4/2001, which commenced a military crackdown, the control of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) seems to have declined, but it is a long, long way before Jakarta could regain the trust of the Acehnese. Meanwhile violence continues unabated.

A humanitarian worker who regularly visited villages in Tiro, Pidie, has described the situation as "calm but unpredictable." She knew only too well how vulnerable the area had been in the recent past. Tiro lies near the Halimun Mountain where the GAM leader Hasan di Tiro proclaimed independence in 1976.

Villagers do not feel safe despite the growing control of the police and the military. Instead, locals were suspicious as Jakarta's soldiers patrolled in civilian cloths. In places like Tiro, it was visible that market and houses were burnt down by acts of revenge.

"The night belongs to those with guns," a resident said, referring to Army units and the police mobile brigade. Elsewhere GAM rebels controlled some areas.

Only the world football matches have made peace possible as members of security apparatuses and GAM supporters often sat together before the big screen in Banda Aceh.

Yet Aceh has changed much since a few months. In interviews with Radio Netherlands, the regional commander Maj. Gen. Djali Yusuf and GAM negotiator Sofyan Ibrahim Tiba recognized the significance of the changes -- albeit in different terms.

"Most public institutions have functioned normally. So we're sure, we have won the hearts and mind of the people," the general boasted.

Equally optimistic, Sofyan believed that GAM's popular support remains strong despite increasing violence on its part. "They will be able to distinguish between GAM's strategic commitment to independence and excesses (of violence)," he claimed.

Interestingly, both sides are eagerly preparing for "all inclusive dialog" of all components of society, which should lead to the general elections in May 2004. While Jakarta insists that the special autonomy law for the provincial State of Aceh Darussalam should be the framework of the dialog, GAM sees it at best only as "a supplementary topic".

Whether the law will be revised, "the main topic should be the three main causes of the conflict," said Sofyan, who is also a top advisor of the Sweden-based GAM leaders.

The three main causes of the conflict, said Sofyan, also a former lecturer of constitutional law at a Muhammadiyah educational institute, are the issue of Aceh's historic sovereignty, social-economic injustice and the crimes against humanity committed by the Army.

Only by addressing these issues, he added, would it be meaningful to hold general elections to choose what the Geneva agreement called "a democratic Aceh government."

"Since GAM is a government, it will not take part in the elections, but there will be one or several pro-independent political parties that will contest the existing Indonesian parties," Sofyan said revealing his plan.

If the pro-independent parties win, the dialog could proceed toward a peaceful transfer of sovereignty like when Singapore seceded from the Union of Malaya in 1965.

But Sofyan said he prefers the "Quebec model" referring to the French-oriented province that after two plebiscites opted to remain part of Canada.

"This middle way," he stressed, "would accommodate Jakarta's desire to maintain the integration of Indonesia." Therefore, the directly elected Aceh government should be a transitional one until a referendum decides on the status of Aceh.

Clearly, the chance of such proposals is zero as long as Jakarta rejects any referendum and refuses a role for a third party other than a mere facilitator.

Yet, curiously, both sides are preparing elaborate processes toward electing a new government, whilst the May 9 Geneva agreement did not define the nature of the would-be elected Aceh government (remaining within the republic, a transitional or an independent one); nor, more importantly, did it indicate the security arrangement for the dialog and the vote processes (with or without a third party and who will be responsible for the security).

Note that even with a third authoritative party, as in East Timor with the role of the United Nations in 1999, the Indonesian security force could disrupt the aftermath of the vote processes.

Whatever the scenario, these suggest that Aceh's "all inclusive dialog", its structure and substance, will be crucial in determining the nature of the vote processes -- and the success or failure of the peace process.

However, with the military gaining ground in the field and Jakarta diplomats acquiring a greater leverage at the negotiating table, doubts rise as to what Geneva could deliver or even whether the talk with GAM will continue.

After all, the warring parties have gained most from this "no- war-no-peace" condition. Extortion has become almost routine at various levels of the administration and local elite throughout the province, extracting over time a huge amount of capital for some armed groups.

At this level, the phrase "10 percent" -- for each group i.e. Army or Brimob units and GAM -- has been often mentioned as the value being demanded, usually with threat, from bureaucrats and contractors who managed development projects, and from any rich people.

Worse, illegal levies were claimed daily from public transport, involving, like in Matangkuli, Pidie, more than 30 Army checkpoints. As the Army intensified its campaign, GAM units abducted, sometimes even killed civilians, who were accused of being informants.

Human rights violations are directly linked to illegal cash flows. As more funds were needed for logistics in difficult times, armed groups of whatever units resorted to extortions. Wealthy traders flee to Medan and Jakarta, leaving the capital of Banda Aceh as Aceh's only economic enclave with a vibrant business.

The peace process thus serves various interests -- except peace. The Geneva agreement creates the illusion that the two sides, Jakarta and GAM, are willing to achieve peace in the spirit of justice and democracy. But it allows the existing conditions to prevail as long as both sides maintain their vested interests.

This pattern has in fact evolved for years and became widespread recently since neither side has achieved victory and a final settlement has not been reached.

Maintaining a conflict situation became important to keep cash flowing. With the extortion, levies and (threats of) violence going on, the process has helped perpetuate, not sustainable development, but, as one analyst aptly dubbed it, "sustainable violence".

It marks a new cycle for the GAM and the security apparatuses in war-torn Aceh. GAM's heydays of 1997 to 2000 have gone since the Army hit back throughout 2001 with a record of civilian victims reaching, according to human rights watchers here, some 1,700 civilian deaths -- although Gen. Djali Yusuf -- incredibly -- claimed "only 59 civilians deaths."

With the civil movement in Aceh growing weaker, repression has left the field for the two main protagonists, the Army and GAM, with the first may be about to crush the latter.

Whatever the prospect of GAM and the war, human rights activist Abdul Rahman Yacob has argued, GAM has popularized the idea of independence. So, once the gene is out there, the people will most likely keep it alive.

Jakarta politicians and generals will accordingly be seen as too obsessed with the unitary state to have little empathy on the human costs of the war, and to consider its own future; and, as with the East Timor issue in the past, Jakarta diplomats will have to cover what the Army did in the field.

The conclusion can only be one: Without seriously enforcing peace and justice, the military campaign can only stimulate the very idea they are fighting against.

The above report followed the writer's visit to Banda Aceh and Pidie regency.