Aceh's 'peace' thrives on 'sustainable violence'

Aceh's 'peace' thrives on 'sustainable violence'

Aboeprijadi Santoso, Radio Netherlands, Amsterdam

A year after the Presidential Order No. 4/2001, which
commenced a military crackdown, the control of the Free Aceh
Movement (GAM) seems to have declined, but it is a long, long way
before Jakarta could regain the trust of the Acehnese. Meanwhile
violence continues unabated.

A humanitarian worker who regularly visited villages in Tiro,
Pidie, has described the situation as "calm but unpredictable."
She knew only too well how vulnerable the area had been in the
recent past. Tiro lies near the Halimun Mountain where the GAM
leader Hasan di Tiro proclaimed independence in 1976.

Villagers do not feel safe despite the growing control of the
police and the military. Instead, locals were suspicious as
Jakarta's soldiers patrolled in civilian cloths. In places like
Tiro, it was visible that market and houses were burnt down by
acts of revenge.

"The night belongs to those with guns," a resident said,
referring to Army units and the police mobile brigade. Elsewhere
GAM rebels controlled some areas.

Only the world football matches have made peace possible as
members of security apparatuses and GAM supporters often sat
together before the big screen in Banda Aceh.

Yet Aceh has changed much since a few months. In interviews
with Radio Netherlands, the regional commander Maj. Gen. Djali
Yusuf and GAM negotiator Sofyan Ibrahim Tiba recognized the
significance of the changes -- albeit in different terms.

"Most public institutions have functioned normally. So we're
sure, we have won the hearts and mind of the people," the general
boasted.

Equally optimistic, Sofyan believed that GAM's popular support
remains strong despite increasing violence on its part. "They
will be able to distinguish between GAM's strategic commitment to
independence and excesses (of violence)," he claimed.

Interestingly, both sides are eagerly preparing for "all
inclusive dialog" of all components of society, which should lead
to the general elections in May 2004. While Jakarta insists that
the special autonomy law for the provincial State of Aceh
Darussalam should be the framework of the dialog, GAM sees it at
best only as "a supplementary topic".

Whether the law will be revised, "the main topic should be the
three main causes of the conflict," said Sofyan, who is also a
top advisor of the Sweden-based GAM leaders.

The three main causes of the conflict, said Sofyan, also a
former lecturer of constitutional law at a Muhammadiyah
educational institute, are the issue of Aceh's historic
sovereignty, social-economic injustice and the crimes against
humanity committed by the Army.

Only by addressing these issues, he added, would it be
meaningful to hold general elections to choose what the Geneva
agreement called "a democratic Aceh government."

"Since GAM is a government, it will not take part in the
elections, but there will be one or several pro-independent
political parties that will contest the existing Indonesian
parties," Sofyan said revealing his plan.

If the pro-independent parties win, the dialog could proceed
toward a peaceful transfer of sovereignty like when Singapore
seceded from the Union of Malaya in 1965.

But Sofyan said he prefers the "Quebec model" referring to the
French-oriented province that after two plebiscites opted to
remain part of Canada.

"This middle way," he stressed, "would accommodate Jakarta's
desire to maintain the integration of Indonesia." Therefore, the
directly elected Aceh government should be a transitional one
until a referendum decides on the status of Aceh.

Clearly, the chance of such proposals is zero as long as
Jakarta rejects any referendum and refuses a role for a third
party other than a mere facilitator.

Yet, curiously, both sides are preparing elaborate processes
toward electing a new government, whilst the May 9 Geneva
agreement did not define the nature of the would-be elected Aceh
government (remaining within the republic, a transitional or an
independent one); nor, more importantly, did it indicate the
security arrangement for the dialog and the vote processes (with
or without a third party and who will be responsible for the
security).

Note that even with a third authoritative party, as in East
Timor with the role of the United Nations in 1999, the Indonesian
security force could disrupt the aftermath of the vote processes.

Whatever the scenario, these suggest that Aceh's "all
inclusive dialog", its structure and substance, will be crucial
in determining the nature of the vote processes -- and the
success or failure of the peace process.

However, with the military gaining ground in the field and
Jakarta diplomats acquiring a greater leverage at the negotiating
table, doubts rise as to what Geneva could deliver or even
whether the talk with GAM will continue.

After all, the warring parties have gained most from this "no-
war-no-peace" condition. Extortion has become almost routine at
various levels of the administration and local elite throughout
the province, extracting over time a huge amount of capital for
some armed groups.

At this level, the phrase "10 percent" -- for each group i.e.
Army or Brimob units and GAM -- has been often mentioned as the
value being demanded, usually with threat, from bureaucrats and
contractors who managed development projects, and from any rich
people.

Worse, illegal levies were claimed daily from public
transport, involving, like in Matangkuli, Pidie, more than 30
Army checkpoints. As the Army intensified its campaign, GAM units
abducted, sometimes even killed civilians, who were accused of
being informants.

Human rights violations are directly linked to illegal cash
flows. As more funds were needed for logistics in difficult
times, armed groups of whatever units resorted to extortions.
Wealthy traders flee to Medan and Jakarta, leaving the capital of
Banda Aceh as Aceh's only economic enclave with a vibrant
business.

The peace process thus serves various interests -- except
peace. The Geneva agreement creates the illusion that the two
sides, Jakarta and GAM, are willing to achieve peace in the
spirit of justice and democracy. But it allows the existing
conditions to prevail as long as both sides maintain their vested
interests.

This pattern has in fact evolved for years and became
widespread recently since neither side has achieved victory and a
final settlement has not been reached.

Maintaining a conflict situation became important to keep cash
flowing. With the extortion, levies and (threats of) violence
going on, the process has helped perpetuate, not sustainable
development, but, as one analyst aptly dubbed it, "sustainable
violence".

It marks a new cycle for the GAM and the security apparatuses
in war-torn Aceh. GAM's heydays of 1997 to 2000 have gone since
the Army hit back throughout 2001 with a record of civilian
victims reaching, according to human rights watchers here, some
1,700 civilian deaths -- although Gen. Djali Yusuf -- incredibly
-- claimed "only 59 civilians deaths."

With the civil movement in Aceh growing weaker, repression has
left the field for the two main protagonists, the Army and GAM,
with the first may be about to crush the latter.

Whatever the prospect of GAM and the war, human rights
activist Abdul Rahman Yacob has argued, GAM has popularized the
idea of independence. So, once the gene is out there, the people
will most likely keep it alive.

Jakarta politicians and generals will accordingly be seen as
too obsessed with the unitary state to have little empathy on the
human costs of the war, and to consider its own future; and, as
with the East Timor issue in the past, Jakarta diplomats will
have to cover what the Army did in the field.

The conclusion can only be one: Without seriously enforcing
peace and justice, the military campaign can only stimulate the
very idea they are fighting against.

The above report followed the writer's visit to Banda Aceh and
Pidie regency.