Aceh's forgotten victims

Aceh's forgotten victims

Brad Adams, New York

On Dec. 25, 2004, eighteen people were reported killed in Aceh
during clashes between the Indonesian military and the Free Aceh
Movement (GAM). This brought the official number of fatalities
since martial law and full scale military operations were
declared in the province in May 2003 to 2,300.

In that same period, between 125,000-150,000 had become
internally displaced persons (IDPs), living in deplorable
conditions beyond the reach of international aid workers, as
access to Aceh for international humanitarian and human rights
workers had been forbidden by government authorities, who wanted
to prosecute their war in the dark.

Twenty-four hours later the eighteen killings, the huge number
of "conflict IDPs," and the conflict itself had been almost
completely forgotten. It is time to wake up to the full reality
of Aceh.

The Dec. 26 earthquake and tsunami and the massive human loss
and physical devastation it has wrought on Aceh has rightly been
at the forefront of Indonesian and, indeed, world concern. Over
127,000 people were killed in the space of minutes, with another
37,000 still missing, presumed dead. Over 500,000 people were
displaced by the disaster, many of whom continue to rely on help
from outside the province (and the country) for basic
necessities.

Subsequent earthquakes and aftershocks, including the March 28
quake on Nias island which killed at least 905 people and
displaced almost 107,000 people, continue to affect and
traumatize the people of Aceh and North Sumatra. It will take
years for Aceh to recover from the physical, emotional, and human
toll of the earthquake and tsunami.

However, while international sympathy and attention have
focused sharply on aid and reconstruction for tsunami and
earthquake victims, collective amnesia and indifference
characterize the reaction to civilian suffering from the three-
decades-old conflict that continues to devastate much of Aceh.
While the government and GAM are scheduled to have their fourth
round of peace talks in Helsinki in late May, in Aceh the
killings continue.

Since the tsunami struck at least 260 more people have been
killed in ongoing fighting between Indonesian security forces and
GAM. This is hardly reported or commented on. Human Rights Watch
and others have extensively documented the abuses perpetrated in
the conflict for many years, including extrajudicial killings,
torture, arbitrary arrests, extortion, and forced displacement.

Both the Indonesian military and GAM have targeted civilians,
who have always borne the brunt of the violence. The end last
week of the civilian state of emergency is welcome, but only if
it leads to improved behavior by the Indonesian military.
Otherwise, it will be seen by Acehnese as just another cosmetic
gesture that fails to deal with the main problem: The brutal
behavior of Indonesian soldiers and their lack of accountability
for abuses.

While the Indonesian government has been congratulated for
allowing largely unfettered access to tsunami hit areas of Aceh,
since it resumed military operations in May 2003 access to
conflict areas for humanitarian workers, journalists, and human
rights monitors has been almost completely cut off. The large
majority of the province remains closed to humanitarian workers
and human rights monitoring.

And it is in these parts of the province that the conflict
continues, largely hidden from view, and without scrutiny. The
handful of foreign journalists who ventured into Aceh's
hinterland in January and February to cover conflict related
stories were met with resistance, obstruction, and, in some
cases, detention and interrogation from Indonesian security
forces.

Prior to the tsunami, conflict IDPs had taken up residence in
government camps, mosques, and spontaneous shelters inside Aceh
and North Sumatra. During this period the international aid
community, including the UN, had been persistently trying to gain
access to the province to provide the same kind of assistance it
is now offering to tsunami victims. The Indonesian government
refused.

Now largely forgotten, these IDPs remain in urgent need of
assistance and support. Yet they are off the radar and agenda of
the Indonesian government and the thousands of humanitarian
workers in Aceh now delivering assistance to tsunami survivors.

The tsunami has presented the international community with an
unprecedented opportunity to make a real difference for all of
Aceh. It is almost entirely foreign money that will reconstruct
and rehabilitate Aceh. Donors should condition assistance on full
access to the whole province and the ability to assist conflict
IDPs -- who are longer suffering and no less deserving of
assistance.

It is critical that donors fully understand that the
Indonesian military is a party to a vicious war in Aceh. While
the military performed commendably in the weeks after the
tsunami, providing urgently needed logistical support to the aid
effort at the same time its soldiers had to deal with the loss of
many of their colleagues from the tsunami, its brutal human
rights record -- and the lack of serious reform by the government
of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono -- means that most Acehnese
do not see it as a neutral or benevolent institution.

Indonesian aid workers are also concerned that the military
will try to use its financial and political influence to control
reconstruction contracts in the province. The military has
already inserted itself into several areas of the relief effort
in Aceh, responsible in some areas for the distribution of
government aid and engaged in management of some of the
spontaneous IDP camps, set up by an estimated 400,000 IDPs
throughout Aceh. In some towns they are the main coordinating
body for both international and domestic aid.

The military should no longer play a major role in post-
tsunami reconstruction. The aid community, with a long record of
successfully dealing with tragedies around the world, can now
meet virtually all logistical needs. Given the well-documented
record of massive corruption in the Indonesian military, donors
should insist that there be no further military participation in
the reconstruction of Aceh -- including through military-linked
businesses or the provision of security services.

They should set up a process to pro-actively vet companies for
military ties before assigning contracts. If the international
community now acquiesces to the efforts by the Indonesian
military to control aid and restrict access again in Aceh, it
will set back efforts to strengthen the capacity of civilian
institutions in Aceh, both government and civil society.

UN and World Bank aid officials readily acknowledge that real
development in Aceh cannot take place in the middle of war. But
so long as war rages, the Indonesian government and donors need
to demonstrate the political will necessary to meet the
humanitarian needs of all Acehnese. Without this the coast may
start to recover, but much of the rest of Aceh will remain in
crisis, forgotten, and ravaged by war.

The writer is Asia director for the New York-based Human
Rights Watch.