Fri, 27 May 2005

Aceh's forgotten victims

Brad Adams, New York

On Dec. 25, 2004, eighteen people were reported killed in Aceh during clashes between the Indonesian military and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). This brought the official number of fatalities since martial law and full scale military operations were declared in the province in May 2003 to 2,300.

In that same period, between 125,000-150,000 had become internally displaced persons (IDPs), living in deplorable conditions beyond the reach of international aid workers, as access to Aceh for international humanitarian and human rights workers had been forbidden by government authorities, who wanted to prosecute their war in the dark.

Twenty-four hours later the eighteen killings, the huge number of "conflict IDPs," and the conflict itself had been almost completely forgotten. It is time to wake up to the full reality of Aceh.

The Dec. 26 earthquake and tsunami and the massive human loss and physical devastation it has wrought on Aceh has rightly been at the forefront of Indonesian and, indeed, world concern. Over 127,000 people were killed in the space of minutes, with another 37,000 still missing, presumed dead. Over 500,000 people were displaced by the disaster, many of whom continue to rely on help from outside the province (and the country) for basic necessities.

Subsequent earthquakes and aftershocks, including the March 28 quake on Nias island which killed at least 905 people and displaced almost 107,000 people, continue to affect and traumatize the people of Aceh and North Sumatra. It will take years for Aceh to recover from the physical, emotional, and human toll of the earthquake and tsunami.

However, while international sympathy and attention have focused sharply on aid and reconstruction for tsunami and earthquake victims, collective amnesia and indifference characterize the reaction to civilian suffering from the three- decades-old conflict that continues to devastate much of Aceh. While the government and GAM are scheduled to have their fourth round of peace talks in Helsinki in late May, in Aceh the killings continue.

Since the tsunami struck at least 260 more people have been killed in ongoing fighting between Indonesian security forces and GAM. This is hardly reported or commented on. Human Rights Watch and others have extensively documented the abuses perpetrated in the conflict for many years, including extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary arrests, extortion, and forced displacement.

Both the Indonesian military and GAM have targeted civilians, who have always borne the brunt of the violence. The end last week of the civilian state of emergency is welcome, but only if it leads to improved behavior by the Indonesian military. Otherwise, it will be seen by Acehnese as just another cosmetic gesture that fails to deal with the main problem: The brutal behavior of Indonesian soldiers and their lack of accountability for abuses.

While the Indonesian government has been congratulated for allowing largely unfettered access to tsunami hit areas of Aceh, since it resumed military operations in May 2003 access to conflict areas for humanitarian workers, journalists, and human rights monitors has been almost completely cut off. The large majority of the province remains closed to humanitarian workers and human rights monitoring.

And it is in these parts of the province that the conflict continues, largely hidden from view, and without scrutiny. The handful of foreign journalists who ventured into Aceh's hinterland in January and February to cover conflict related stories were met with resistance, obstruction, and, in some cases, detention and interrogation from Indonesian security forces.

Prior to the tsunami, conflict IDPs had taken up residence in government camps, mosques, and spontaneous shelters inside Aceh and North Sumatra. During this period the international aid community, including the UN, had been persistently trying to gain access to the province to provide the same kind of assistance it is now offering to tsunami victims. The Indonesian government refused.

Now largely forgotten, these IDPs remain in urgent need of assistance and support. Yet they are off the radar and agenda of the Indonesian government and the thousands of humanitarian workers in Aceh now delivering assistance to tsunami survivors.

The tsunami has presented the international community with an unprecedented opportunity to make a real difference for all of Aceh. It is almost entirely foreign money that will reconstruct and rehabilitate Aceh. Donors should condition assistance on full access to the whole province and the ability to assist conflict IDPs -- who are longer suffering and no less deserving of assistance.

It is critical that donors fully understand that the Indonesian military is a party to a vicious war in Aceh. While the military performed commendably in the weeks after the tsunami, providing urgently needed logistical support to the aid effort at the same time its soldiers had to deal with the loss of many of their colleagues from the tsunami, its brutal human rights record -- and the lack of serious reform by the government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono -- means that most Acehnese do not see it as a neutral or benevolent institution.

Indonesian aid workers are also concerned that the military will try to use its financial and political influence to control reconstruction contracts in the province. The military has already inserted itself into several areas of the relief effort in Aceh, responsible in some areas for the distribution of government aid and engaged in management of some of the spontaneous IDP camps, set up by an estimated 400,000 IDPs throughout Aceh. In some towns they are the main coordinating body for both international and domestic aid.

The military should no longer play a major role in post- tsunami reconstruction. The aid community, with a long record of successfully dealing with tragedies around the world, can now meet virtually all logistical needs. Given the well-documented record of massive corruption in the Indonesian military, donors should insist that there be no further military participation in the reconstruction of Aceh -- including through military-linked businesses or the provision of security services.

They should set up a process to pro-actively vet companies for military ties before assigning contracts. If the international community now acquiesces to the efforts by the Indonesian military to control aid and restrict access again in Aceh, it will set back efforts to strengthen the capacity of civilian institutions in Aceh, both government and civil society.

UN and World Bank aid officials readily acknowledge that real development in Aceh cannot take place in the middle of war. But so long as war rages, the Indonesian government and donors need to demonstrate the political will necessary to meet the humanitarian needs of all Acehnese. Without this the coast may start to recover, but much of the rest of Aceh will remain in crisis, forgotten, and ravaged by war.

The writer is Asia director for the New York-based Human Rights Watch.