Aceh: Remedial or restored-independence secession?

Kusnanto Anggoro, Senior Researcher, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta

The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) is committed to achieving independence by political means, through diplomacy and international law. Since the early 1990s, the separatists submitted reports to the UN, calling for the submission of resolutions on Aceh's self-determination. Violent means, however, appear to be at the forefront of their struggle for an ultimate independence.

That is understandable, given their limited resources and opportunities. Die-hard ideologists seeking independence, however, were not initially a dominant force within GAM. Their success in raising a sense of nationalism among Acehnese has been helped by the continuing injustice and other authoritarian measures of Jakarta, plus the reckless brutality of the security apparatus. So has political sympathy from abroad.

Such a situation will likely remain the same for quite some time. Indeed, the way the government handles the problem of Aceh will determine how the international community reacts. No doubt, most criticism has been addressed to the government, simply because the government is the stronger party. The need for a political solution to the issue has become the chorus of the international community.

Territorial integrity remains a sacrosanct principle; this may have even been reemphasized after the end of the Cold War. State practice since 1945 shows clearly the extreme reluctance of states to recognize or accept unilateral secession outside the colonial context. Most successful cases are more the exception than the rule, at least from the standpoint of international law.

Separatism may result in independent states; or it may settle for internal self-government within an extensively decentralized system. Yet, during the last 50 years, no unilateral secession has appeared successful: Senegal (1960), Singapore (1965), Bangladesh (1971) and Eritrea (1993) being cases in point.

The key feature was that the concerned parties expressly agreed to separation. Besides, except Bangladesh, the other three were also remnants of a colonial legacy.

The experience of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the Balkans could be too specific and perhaps beyond imagination. Still, all of the 22 new independent states emerging from the ruins of the Soviet Union did not emerge from unilateral secession.

In Czechoslovakia (1993), the separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia was a straightforwardly consensual process at the level of the governments and parliaments concerned. They became separate states after an agreement between them to dissolve the Czechoslovak Federation.

In the case of the Soviet Union, the former imperial entity, the Russian Federation, accepted the emergence to independence of the other republics. A more tragic experience is the successor states of the former Yugoslavia (1991-1992), which came into existence through a complex and violent process.

This is the only case since 1971 in which new states have emerged in a noncolonial context against the continued opposition of a government claiming to represent the predecessor state.

Still, neither in the former Soviet Union nor in Yugoslavia have more constituent states emerged and gained international recognition. Chechnya unilaterally seceded from the Russian Federation in November 1991; and yet it is still struggling more than a decade later. Nagorny-Karabakh failed to secure independence from Azerbaijan, despite massive support from Armenia.

This suggests that the most likely option for Aceh's separatists would be less than full-fledged independence. Even when they opt for political means, including those based on a majority vote of the population of a substate territory, international law has traditionally treated it very reluctantly. Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights justifies separatist claims only for cultural identity and internal self-government, still on the basis of respect for territorial integrity.

Surely, developments in respect of the idea of internal self- determination and self-government still occur. They are accompanied by an extension of minority rights, including the rights of national minorities, and an increased recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples.

Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether these developments will affect the established rules and practices with respect to self-determination and the territorial integrity of states.

In most cases, where the government of the state in question has maintained its opposition to the secession, such attempts have gained virtually no international support or recognition.

Indeed, although the international community has criticized the conduct of Russian forces in Chechnya regarding the use of disproportionate force and alleged violations of international humanitarian law, it has also accepted that the conflict with Chechnya is an internal armed conflict, and that the principle of territorial integrity applies.

There should be several caveats. Recognition of the independence of the Baltic States may not be based primarily on the dissolution of the Soviet Union but the suppression of independence. Meanwhile, the articulated basis for the European and international response to the outbreak of violence and armed conflict in Yugoslavia appeared to be inevitable dissolution of Yugoslavia as a matter of fact.

It remains to be seen whether the people of Aceh will be successful in gaining the right to self-determination. Aceh separatism could be a case of "restoring independent secession", as the Baltic states were.

Three hundred years after the Dutch occupied Java, Aceh was still an internationally-recognized independent state with diplomatic relations with much of the world, including Britain and the United States.

Alternatively, Aceh may be a case of "remedial secession". It has been part of Indonesia since 1945. The emergence of armed rebellion has been caused by escalating violation of democratic principles since the 1950s, but most particularly during the repressive years of the New Order regime.

The international support for Bangladesh in the 1970s was in part due to the violence and repression engaged in by the Pakistan military regime, which made reunification unthinkable.

So far the government has been able to secure international support for its territorial integrity. Nonetheless, while the international community is hungry for the "responsibility to protect", particular concern should be very much aimed at avoiding excessive human casualties and protecting human rights.

During the first month of military rule, the international public may be satisfied with the internal disciplinary measures of the armed forces, such as investigation of soldiers allegedly involved in atrocities against civilians and/or withdrawal of the battalion to which the soldier belongs.

In the coming weeks, however, this should be complemented by efforts to open more access to independent monitors. There is now stronger pressure for the government to be more responsive to developments on the ground.

The government is required to make public its longer term planning, especially that relating to synchronizing military operations with other components of the "integrated operation" -- humanitarian assistance, law enforcement and the empowerment of local government.

The writer also lectures in Strategic and Security Studies at the postgraduate studies program, Department of International Relations, University of Indonesia and convenes Propatria, Indonesia's Working Group for Security Sector Reform.