Aceh: Remedial or restored-independence secession?

Aceh: Remedial or restored-independence secession?

Kusnanto Anggoro, Senior Researcher, Centre for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta

The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) is committed to achieving
independence by political means, through diplomacy and
international law. Since the early 1990s, the separatists
submitted reports to the UN, calling for the submission of
resolutions on Aceh's self-determination. Violent means, however,
appear to be at the forefront of their struggle for an ultimate
independence.

That is understandable, given their limited resources and
opportunities. Die-hard ideologists seeking independence,
however, were not initially a dominant force within GAM. Their
success in raising a sense of nationalism among Acehnese has been
helped by the continuing injustice and other authoritarian
measures of Jakarta, plus the reckless brutality of the security
apparatus. So has political sympathy from abroad.

Such a situation will likely remain the same for quite some
time. Indeed, the way the government handles the problem of Aceh
will determine how the international community reacts. No doubt,
most criticism has been addressed to the government, simply
because the government is the stronger party. The need for a
political solution to the issue has become the chorus of the
international community.

Territorial integrity remains a sacrosanct principle; this may
have even been reemphasized after the end of the Cold War. State
practice since 1945 shows clearly the extreme reluctance of
states to recognize or accept unilateral secession outside the
colonial context. Most successful cases are more the exception
than the rule, at least from the standpoint of international
law.

Separatism may result in independent states; or it may settle
for internal self-government within an extensively decentralized
system. Yet, during the last 50 years, no unilateral secession
has appeared successful: Senegal (1960), Singapore (1965),
Bangladesh (1971) and Eritrea (1993) being cases in point.

The key feature was that the concerned parties expressly
agreed to separation. Besides, except Bangladesh, the other three
were also remnants of a colonial legacy.

The experience of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the
Balkans could be too specific and perhaps beyond imagination.
Still, all of the 22 new independent states emerging from the
ruins of the Soviet Union did not emerge from unilateral
secession.

In Czechoslovakia (1993), the separation of the Czech Republic
and Slovakia was a straightforwardly consensual process at the
level of the governments and parliaments concerned. They became
separate states after an agreement between them to dissolve the
Czechoslovak Federation.

In the case of the Soviet Union, the former imperial entity,
the Russian Federation, accepted the emergence to independence of
the other republics. A more tragic experience is the successor
states of the former Yugoslavia (1991-1992), which came into
existence through a complex and violent process.

This is the only case since 1971 in which new states have
emerged in a noncolonial context against the continued opposition
of a government claiming to represent the predecessor
state.

Still, neither in the former Soviet Union nor in Yugoslavia
have more constituent states emerged and gained international
recognition. Chechnya unilaterally seceded from the Russian
Federation in November 1991; and yet it is still struggling more
than a decade later. Nagorny-Karabakh failed to secure
independence from Azerbaijan, despite massive support from
Armenia.

This suggests that the most likely option for Aceh's
separatists would be less than full-fledged independence. Even
when they opt for political means, including those based on a
majority vote of the population of a substate territory,
international law has traditionally treated it very reluctantly.
Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights justifies separatist claims only for cultural identity and
internal self-government, still on the basis of respect for
territorial integrity.

Surely, developments in respect of the idea of internal self-
determination and self-government still occur. They are
accompanied by an extension of minority rights, including the
rights of national minorities, and an increased recognition of
the rights of indigenous peoples.

Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether these developments
will affect the established rules and practices with respect to
self-determination and the territorial integrity of states.

In most cases, where the government of the state in question
has maintained its opposition to the secession, such attempts
have gained virtually no international support or
recognition.

Indeed, although the international community has criticized
the conduct of Russian forces in Chechnya regarding the use of
disproportionate force and alleged violations of international
humanitarian law, it has also accepted that the conflict with
Chechnya is an internal armed conflict, and that the principle of
territorial integrity applies.

There should be several caveats. Recognition of the
independence of the Baltic States may not be based primarily on
the dissolution of the Soviet Union but the suppression of
independence. Meanwhile, the articulated basis for the European
and international response to the outbreak of violence and armed
conflict in Yugoslavia appeared to be inevitable dissolution of
Yugoslavia as a matter of fact.

It remains to be seen whether the people of Aceh will be
successful in gaining the right to self-determination. Aceh
separatism could be a case of "restoring independent secession",
as the Baltic states were.

Three hundred years after the Dutch occupied Java, Aceh was
still an internationally-recognized independent state with
diplomatic relations with much of the world, including Britain
and the United States.

Alternatively, Aceh may be a case of "remedial secession". It
has been part of Indonesia since 1945. The emergence of armed
rebellion has been caused by escalating violation of democratic
principles since the 1950s, but most particularly during the
repressive years of the New Order regime.

The international support for Bangladesh in the 1970s was in
part due to the violence and repression engaged in by the
Pakistan military regime, which made reunification unthinkable.

So far the government has been able to secure international
support for its territorial integrity. Nonetheless, while the
international community is hungry for the "responsibility to
protect", particular concern should be very much aimed at
avoiding excessive human casualties and protecting human
rights.

During the first month of military rule, the international
public may be satisfied with the internal disciplinary measures
of the armed forces, such as investigation of soldiers allegedly
involved in atrocities against civilians and/or withdrawal of the
battalion to which the soldier belongs.

In the coming weeks, however, this should be complemented by
efforts to open more access to independent monitors. There is now
stronger pressure for the government to be more responsive to
developments on the ground.

The government is required to make public its longer term
planning, especially that relating to synchronizing military
operations with other components of the "integrated operation" --
humanitarian assistance, law enforcement and the empowerment of
local government.

The writer also lectures in Strategic and Security Studies at the
postgraduate studies program, Department of International
Relations, University of Indonesia and convenes Propatria,
Indonesia's Working Group for Security Sector Reform.