Aceh: Facing the reality of New Order regime's legacy

Max Lane, Visiting Fellow, Centre for Asia Pacific Social Transformation Studies (CAPSTRANS), University of Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia

When Hasan Tiro proclaimed the Independent State of Aceh and launched the Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF), also known as the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), he attracted little support. Contrary to the myth making of the current leadership of GAM, and some academic commentators, political and social discontent in Aceh had previously not taken a separatist form. Previous armed rebellions in Aceh had been part of an archipelago wide struggle for an Islamic Indonesia, not an independent Aceh.

What was a small and basically isolated group in 1976 can now mobilize, according to almost all parties, 5,000 guerrillas. Guerrilla war is a specific form of armed struggle and cannot grow unless there is some significant popular support.

Certainly guerrilla struggle inevitably collapses in the absence of civilian support. How is it that a tiny group declaring an independent state with no public support and calling for the return to a feudal era sultanate could grow so much that the current Indonesian government thinks that it now requires at least 50,000 combat troops and a state of military emergency to subdue it?

The situation reflects a new fact about Aceh: There are now at least two fundamentally opposed visions of the future of Aceh among the Acehnese population. One vision sees an independent Aceh, of one kind or another.

The other sees Aceh remaining within Indonesia. This is now a simple fact of the internal political life of Aceh. Aceh has not been invaded by GAM from outside nor is GAM the extension of some external political or military power.

It exists because some significant number of Acehnese want Aceh to be independent. This vision does not automatically translate into support for the political ideology or leadership of GAM but it is the reason for the growth in GAM's political influence.

Why has the vision for an independent Aceh developed?

Widespread sentiment in the direction of independence did not develop until after 1998. This was manifested in the huge demonstration demanding a referendum on independence that took place in November, 1999.

Prior to this most anti-government sentiment shared a similar character to that which existed throughout Indonesia: there was a rejection of the Soeharto-Golkar New Order dictatorship and of dwifungsi, i.e. a political role for the army.

There was also discontent with the widening gap between rich and poor, corruption and resentment at the fact that little benefit flowed to the people in Aceh from the exploitation of oil and gas in the region by American and Japanese business. But resentment at militarization was probably the biggest issue.

Aceh had been an area of intense military operations (DOM), and had been the sight of many human rights abuses. This was acknowledged by the government of then president B.J. Habibie and by the military, when both president Habibie and Gen. Wiranto went to Aceh to apologize to the people of Aceh.

As the Soeharto regime weakened under the impact of popular protest throughout the country during late 1997 and early 1998, a reformasi movement also developed in Aceh. Many new political and NGO organizations developed. These included student, human rights, women's farmer and other groups. During 1997 and 1998 there was little talk within this movement of demanding independence.

Of course, GAM continued to proclaim Aceh as an independent state and called for that to be recognized by Jakarta and by other states. GAM had also grown during the 1980s attracting support as a response to the militarization and human rights abuses of DOM. But even in 1998, the growth of GAM had not transformed into broad pro-independence sentiment.

The massive 1999 pro-referendum demonstration, the consolidation of GAM's position and the spread of pro- independence sentiment occurred as a direct manifestation of disappointment with the character and policies of governments that followed after Soeharto.

Most significantly, despite promises, no significant prosecutions for human rights abuses took place. Even more significantly, a high level of militarization continued as national governments continued to implement a military response to GAM.

The essence of this military response, as it is in all guerrilla war situations, is to forcibly separate the guerrillas from any civilian support base. This inevitable brings militarization and human rights abuses to the civilian population.

In other words, the rise of Acehnese nationalism is a direct response to militarization and New Order style economic failure and corruption. It has not arisen because of any systematic suppression of Acehnese language, religion, or culture (except insofar as the Soeharto regime neglected education and culture nationally).

In any case, the reality that everybody faces today is that the New Order dictatorship set in motion a process which has created two visions of the future for Aceh. This now is just a fact, a reality. The current military operations may or may not succeed in pressing GAM back into the hills and reducing the number of GAM guerrillas.

But it will not and cannot eliminate the existence of the two visions. Perhaps, it may even strengthen the existence of the pro-independence vision, which has always grown in response to increased militarization.

National political groups and other institutions which support the idea of a unitary Indonesia including Aceh need to recognize that such unity will only be achieved if it is voluntarily supported by all involved.

Winning voluntary support from Sabang to Merauke to establish the republic was a great achievement of the young activists of the Indonesian nationalist movement.

There is little doubt that unity across the archipelago, established upon the will of the people, provides the optimal basis for the development of the economy, society and culture of the peoples of the archipelago

This was a democratic and political achievement that GAM unjustly denigrates. However, the anti-democratic policies of the New Order violated that voluntary character of unity and, in conjunction with DOM, provoked the spread of wider pro- independence sentiment.

Organizations and individuals who were a part of or who supported the New Order must take responsibility for the situation that has now developed in Aceh. A return to seeking a democratic and political resolution to the troubles in Aceh is necessary.

The conflict in Aceh cannot be handled without an acknowledgement of the fact of the existence of these two competing visions as a direct product of the New Order's repressive policies. This fact must be recognized by both sides.

GAM insists that Aceh is already an independent state. The current government in Jakarta refuses to contemplate any consideration of independence.

A recognition of the existence of two competing visions necessitates the preparedness to allow a genuine debate and campaign to proceed in peaceful circumstances whereby the people of Aceh can decide which vision will best further their interests.