Aceh: Facing the reality of New Order regime's legacy
Aceh: Facing the reality of New Order regime's legacy
Max Lane, Visiting Fellow, Centre for Asia Pacific
Social Transformation Studies (CAPSTRANS), University of Wollongong,
New South Wales, Australia
When Hasan Tiro proclaimed the Independent State of Aceh and
launched the Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF), also
known as the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), he attracted little
support. Contrary to the myth making of the current leadership of
GAM, and some academic commentators, political and social
discontent in Aceh had previously not taken a separatist form.
Previous armed rebellions in Aceh had been part of an archipelago
wide struggle for an Islamic Indonesia, not an independent Aceh.
What was a small and basically isolated group in 1976 can now
mobilize, according to almost all parties, 5,000 guerrillas.
Guerrilla war is a specific form of armed struggle and cannot
grow unless there is some significant popular support.
Certainly guerrilla struggle inevitably collapses in the
absence of civilian support. How is it that a tiny group
declaring an independent state with no public support and calling
for the return to a feudal era sultanate could grow so much that
the current Indonesian government thinks that it now requires at
least 50,000 combat troops and a state of military emergency to
subdue it?
The situation reflects a new fact about Aceh: There are now at
least two fundamentally opposed visions of the future of Aceh
among the Acehnese population. One vision sees an independent
Aceh, of one kind or another.
The other sees Aceh remaining within Indonesia. This is now a
simple fact of the internal political life of Aceh. Aceh has not
been invaded by GAM from outside nor is GAM the extension of some
external political or military power.
It exists because some significant number of Acehnese want
Aceh to be independent. This vision does not automatically
translate into support for the political ideology or leadership
of GAM but it is the reason for the growth in GAM's political
influence.
Why has the vision for an independent Aceh developed?
Widespread sentiment in the direction of independence did not
develop until after 1998. This was manifested in the huge
demonstration demanding a referendum on independence that took
place in November, 1999.
Prior to this most anti-government sentiment shared a similar
character to that which existed throughout Indonesia: there was a
rejection of the Soeharto-Golkar New Order dictatorship and of
dwifungsi, i.e. a political role for the army.
There was also discontent with the widening gap between rich
and poor, corruption and resentment at the fact that little
benefit flowed to the people in Aceh from the exploitation of oil
and gas in the region by American and Japanese business. But
resentment at militarization was probably the biggest issue.
Aceh had been an area of intense military operations (DOM),
and had been the sight of many human rights abuses. This was
acknowledged by the government of then president B.J. Habibie and
by the military, when both president Habibie and Gen. Wiranto
went to Aceh to apologize to the people of Aceh.
As the Soeharto regime weakened under the impact of popular
protest throughout the country during late 1997 and early 1998, a
reformasi movement also developed in Aceh. Many new political and
NGO organizations developed. These included student, human
rights, women's farmer and other groups. During 1997 and 1998
there was little talk within this movement of demanding
independence.
Of course, GAM continued to proclaim Aceh as an independent
state and called for that to be recognized by Jakarta and by
other states. GAM had also grown during the 1980s attracting
support as a response to the militarization and human rights
abuses of DOM. But even in 1998, the growth of GAM had not
transformed into broad pro-independence sentiment.
The massive 1999 pro-referendum demonstration, the
consolidation of GAM's position and the spread of pro-
independence sentiment occurred as a direct manifestation of
disappointment with the character and policies of governments
that followed after Soeharto.
Most significantly, despite promises, no significant
prosecutions for human rights abuses took place. Even more
significantly, a high level of militarization continued as
national governments continued to implement a military response
to GAM.
The essence of this military response, as it is in all
guerrilla war situations, is to forcibly separate the guerrillas
from any civilian support base. This inevitable brings
militarization and human rights abuses to the civilian
population.
In other words, the rise of Acehnese nationalism is a direct
response to militarization and New Order style economic failure
and corruption. It has not arisen because of any systematic
suppression of Acehnese language, religion, or culture (except
insofar as the Soeharto regime neglected education and culture
nationally).
In any case, the reality that everybody faces today is that
the New Order dictatorship set in motion a process which has
created two visions of the future for Aceh.
This now is just a fact, a reality. The current military
operations may or may not succeed in pressing GAM back into the
hills and reducing the number of GAM guerrillas.
But it will not and cannot eliminate the existence of the two
visions. Perhaps, it may even strengthen the existence of the
pro-independence vision, which has always grown in response to
increased militarization.
National political groups and other institutions which support
the idea of a unitary Indonesia including Aceh need to recognize
that such unity will only be achieved if it is voluntarily
supported by all involved.
Winning voluntary support from Sabang to Merauke to establish
the republic was a great achievement of the young activists of
the Indonesian nationalist movement.
There is little doubt that unity across the archipelago,
established upon the will of the people, provides the optimal
basis for the development of the economy, society and culture of
the peoples of the archipelago
This was a democratic and political achievement that GAM
unjustly denigrates. However, the anti-democratic policies of the
New Order violated that voluntary character of unity and, in
conjunction with DOM, provoked the spread of wider pro-
independence sentiment.
Organizations and individuals who were a part of or who
supported the New Order must take responsibility for the
situation that has now developed in Aceh. A return to seeking a
democratic and political resolution to the troubles in Aceh is
necessary.
The conflict in Aceh cannot be handled without an
acknowledgement of the fact of the existence of these two
competing visions as a direct product of the New Order's
repressive policies. This fact must be recognized by both sides.
GAM insists that Aceh is already an independent state. The
current government in Jakarta refuses to contemplate any
consideration of independence.
A recognition of the existence of two competing visions
necessitates the preparedness to allow a genuine debate and
campaign to proceed in peaceful circumstances whereby the people
of Aceh can decide which vision will best further their
interests.