Aceh does not deserve another war

Aceh does not deserve another war

By Barbara Leigh

SYDNEY (JP): The white sands of Aceh's beaches are fresh in my
memory. What is the future for its people? Will there be a
referendum there? Do people want independence, autonomy, or just
the chance to participate in the wealth of their own province?

At the moment there would seem to be three major groups in
Aceh whose views will play a significant role in deciding the
direction in which Aceh will move in the future.

The first is what I would call the technocratic elite. This
group consists of the top bureaucrats, the professionals
(including the various sectors of the armed forces where the
leaders are integrated into this elite, although they are usually
of a different ethnic origin) and the successful business
leaders. There is a great deal of overlapping in that any one
person may have a number of occupational positions.

These people live in the towns, particularly in the capital,
Banda Aceh, and enjoy a lifestyle that is similar to upper/
upper-middle class lifestyles in other parts of Indonesia. They
frequently travel outside Aceh -- either overseas or to other
parts of Indonesia for professional, social or business reasons,
and their children are often sent for education to universities
outside Aceh.

The second is the Islamic religious leadership -- the
influential Islamic leaders and teachers within Aceh. This is
also an elite group. It is generally in the modernist tradition
of Islam. The boundaries between the technocratic elite and the
religious elite are in many cases hazy, as there is intermarriage
between the children of these two groups and the business
interests of this group are also strong. These people also live
in the towns and also have strong links with religious groups
both in other parts of Indonesia and also in Malaysia and Brunei.

These two groups have a long history in Aceh. The titles of
the traditional leaders are the Teukus and the Teungkus, or the
generic names are the Uleebalang and the Ulama. Stuart Schlegel
wrote of the more modern division between the technocrats and the
religious leaders when he was there in the early 1970s
(Technocrats in a Muslim Society: Symbolic Community in Aceh,
Ohio University, 1979). It's a division that is still pertinent
but has become more blurred over the life of the New Order.

The third group is the people of the villages throughout Aceh.
Many of the young people now have secondary and, in an increasing
number of cases, tertiary education.

The movement for a referendum comes primarily from within this
third group. It consists of a significant number of villagers in
the areas with which we are familiar -- Pidie, North Aceh and
East Aceh -- with a small but growing number coming from South
and West Aceh. In talking with villagers, what they most want is
job opportunities, opportunities to receive credit for increasing
small business enterprises and a sense that they are not falling
behind other parts of Indonesia. They want to be proud to be
Acehnese, and not to feel that their land and its resources is
being sucked dry by the central powers -- which they equate with
Java.

During the 1980s and 1990s, talk of the Soeharto family's
business interests was common in tones that were derogatory. The
villagers are concerned about their own living conditions. In
many cases these villagers have never visited Java, and have no
understanding whatsoever of the extent of poverty that exists in
many pockets of Java.

They are not aware of the strangulation of business
enterprises and the forced movement of people from their land
that has caused such suffering in Java. Wealth and poverty are
relative concepts, and it is the visual confrontation of
differences that enables people to locate themselves. Many
villagers in Aceh feel poor. Indeed many are very poor -- in
relation to their neighbors.

Villagers who travel to the capital to visit relatives see the
lifestyle of the towns. They watch TV and see what they do not
have. Often families have sold land to pay for their children's
tertiary education, and now there is no return on that
expenditure. The frustration level is high. The "Free Aceh"
movement that has waxed and waned over decades is now in
resurgence.

Enter the military. Not in small numbers, but as an
overwhelming force. The sheer brutality, extent of violence and
number of civilian fatalities attributable to the military has
seen extraordinary peaks at various times throughout the 1990s.

This has been exacerbated by provacateurs, who, as military
personnel, are infiltrating Free Aceh demonstrations and carrying
out their own agendas. These provocateurs are paid, lawless
thugs. Just as Soeharto and his family's name became increasingly
dirty, the perception of the Indonesian armed forces (ABRI, now
TNI) is now so filthy as to be beyond cleansing.

Given the interests of these three groups, what is the likely
outcome? The first two groups on the whole are not pushing for an
independent Aceh. They want more autonomy, but that has been
forthcoming to some extent already, and given the current
political climate is likely to come on a greater scale after
there is some certainty as to the political form and color of the
new government. These groups have not been vocal, but any
analysis of Aceh's future must include their silent strength (and
silent support of a military presence).

What will the villagers throughout Aceh do? Will there be a
groundswell of public opinion for a referendum that gains
momentum, primarily fueled by the sheer horror of the military
atrocities committed against fellow Acehnese? Therein lies the
unpredictable factor. And therein lies the challenge to the
leaders of Aceh.

The Acehnese leadership (including both the technocrats and
the religious leaders) faces a number of challenges, in which
strong choices need to be made. The Acehnese villagers are
entitled to a safe and secure living environment. The Indonesian
Army is not able to provide that at this point in time. Other
peacekeeping choices have to be made that do not include the
military in any of its forms.

The decision-making process needs to be initiated, so that the
necessary people in Jakarta are appraised and brought into the
decision-making and implementation process. Once the villages are
secure, then the legitimate concerns of the villagers need to be
addressed -- not in Banda Aceh, but in the villages where the
leaders sit down with their own people and really understand the
problems confronting people in their daily lives.

One hundred years ago the Dutch-Aceh war was in its final
throes. This beautiful province does not deserve another war to
usher in the next century.

The writer is a lecturer at the University of Technology in
Sydney, Australia. She lived and worked in Aceh in the late
1970s. Since then she has returned on a number of occasions. Her
latest visit was in April 1999.