Aceh does not deserve another war

By Barbara Leigh

SYDNEY (JP): The white sands of Aceh's beaches are fresh in my memory. What is the future for its people? Will there be a referendum there? Do people want independence, autonomy, or just the chance to participate in the wealth of their own province?

At the moment there would seem to be three major groups in Aceh whose views will play a significant role in deciding the direction in which Aceh will move in the future.

The first is what I would call the technocratic elite. This group consists of the top bureaucrats, the professionals (including the various sectors of the armed forces where the leaders are integrated into this elite, although they are usually of a different ethnic origin) and the successful business leaders. There is a great deal of overlapping in that any one person may have a number of occupational positions.

These people live in the towns, particularly in the capital, Banda Aceh, and enjoy a lifestyle that is similar to upper/ upper-middle class lifestyles in other parts of Indonesia. They frequently travel outside Aceh -- either overseas or to other parts of Indonesia for professional, social or business reasons, and their children are often sent for education to universities outside Aceh.

The second is the Islamic religious leadership -- the influential Islamic leaders and teachers within Aceh. This is also an elite group. It is generally in the modernist tradition of Islam. The boundaries between the technocratic elite and the religious elite are in many cases hazy, as there is intermarriage between the children of these two groups and the business interests of this group are also strong. These people also live in the towns and also have strong links with religious groups both in other parts of Indonesia and also in Malaysia and Brunei.

These two groups have a long history in Aceh. The titles of the traditional leaders are the Teukus and the Teungkus, or the generic names are the Uleebalang and the Ulama. Stuart Schlegel wrote of the more modern division between the technocrats and the religious leaders when he was there in the early 1970s (Technocrats in a Muslim Society: Symbolic Community in Aceh, Ohio University, 1979). It's a division that is still pertinent but has become more blurred over the life of the New Order.

The third group is the people of the villages throughout Aceh. Many of the young people now have secondary and, in an increasing number of cases, tertiary education.

The movement for a referendum comes primarily from within this third group. It consists of a significant number of villagers in the areas with which we are familiar -- Pidie, North Aceh and East Aceh -- with a small but growing number coming from South and West Aceh. In talking with villagers, what they most want is job opportunities, opportunities to receive credit for increasing small business enterprises and a sense that they are not falling behind other parts of Indonesia. They want to be proud to be Acehnese, and not to feel that their land and its resources is being sucked dry by the central powers -- which they equate with Java.

During the 1980s and 1990s, talk of the Soeharto family's business interests was common in tones that were derogatory. The villagers are concerned about their own living conditions. In many cases these villagers have never visited Java, and have no understanding whatsoever of the extent of poverty that exists in many pockets of Java.

They are not aware of the strangulation of business enterprises and the forced movement of people from their land that has caused such suffering in Java. Wealth and poverty are relative concepts, and it is the visual confrontation of differences that enables people to locate themselves. Many villagers in Aceh feel poor. Indeed many are very poor -- in relation to their neighbors.

Villagers who travel to the capital to visit relatives see the lifestyle of the towns. They watch TV and see what they do not have. Often families have sold land to pay for their children's tertiary education, and now there is no return on that expenditure. The frustration level is high. The "Free Aceh" movement that has waxed and waned over decades is now in resurgence.

Enter the military. Not in small numbers, but as an overwhelming force. The sheer brutality, extent of violence and number of civilian fatalities attributable to the military has seen extraordinary peaks at various times throughout the 1990s.

This has been exacerbated by provacateurs, who, as military personnel, are infiltrating Free Aceh demonstrations and carrying out their own agendas. These provocateurs are paid, lawless thugs. Just as Soeharto and his family's name became increasingly dirty, the perception of the Indonesian armed forces (ABRI, now TNI) is now so filthy as to be beyond cleansing.

Given the interests of these three groups, what is the likely outcome? The first two groups on the whole are not pushing for an independent Aceh. They want more autonomy, but that has been forthcoming to some extent already, and given the current political climate is likely to come on a greater scale after there is some certainty as to the political form and color of the new government. These groups have not been vocal, but any analysis of Aceh's future must include their silent strength (and silent support of a military presence).

What will the villagers throughout Aceh do? Will there be a groundswell of public opinion for a referendum that gains momentum, primarily fueled by the sheer horror of the military atrocities committed against fellow Acehnese? Therein lies the unpredictable factor. And therein lies the challenge to the leaders of Aceh.

The Acehnese leadership (including both the technocrats and the religious leaders) faces a number of challenges, in which strong choices need to be made. The Acehnese villagers are entitled to a safe and secure living environment. The Indonesian Army is not able to provide that at this point in time. Other peacekeeping choices have to be made that do not include the military in any of its forms.

The decision-making process needs to be initiated, so that the necessary people in Jakarta are appraised and brought into the decision-making and implementation process. Once the villages are secure, then the legitimate concerns of the villagers need to be addressed -- not in Banda Aceh, but in the villages where the leaders sit down with their own people and really understand the problems confronting people in their daily lives.

One hundred years ago the Dutch-Aceh war was in its final throes. This beautiful province does not deserve another war to usher in the next century.

The writer is a lecturer at the University of Technology in Sydney, Australia. She lived and worked in Aceh in the late 1970s. Since then she has returned on a number of occasions. Her latest visit was in April 1999.