Aceh deserves respect
As time passes it is getting more and more difficult to comprehend the futile attempts of the government, as represented by Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, to settle the problems of restive Aceh province.
Unfolding events and conflicting statements during the last two months clearly show the lack of a sound strategy and a sense of direction toward finding a workable solution to the multidimensional problems of that troubled province.
After the latest recurrence of intensified violence in the area, Minister Susilo branded the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) early last month as terrorists, the first time the separatists had been so labeled. This was followed by the statement "enough is enough" and a suggestion regarding the imposition of a civil or military state of emergency in the province. He claimed the Acehnese people supported the new security approach.
His visit to Aceh, from July 9 through July 13, however, proved otherwise: The local Acehnese rejected the government's plan to impose a state of emergency. Returning to Jakarta, Susilo said that the rejection, as voiced by Acehnese councillors and Governor Abdullah Puteh, did not reflect the wishes of the Acehnese people as a whole. His statement was immediately followed by a demand from the local military commander to increase the number of troops deployed to Aceh.
One month later, Susilo embarked on a second visit to the province, explaining that the government wished to seek input from the regions not covered during his earlier visit. This time his statement concerned a totally different subject: a proposal to form a new province for three regions in central, southwest, and west Aceh, separate from the rest of the current province where most of the violence has been taking place. It is difficult to avoid comparisons with the old colonial approach: divide et impera (divide and rule).
Just a week before that visit, Anthony Zinni, a retired U.S. general and mediator from Swiss-based Henry Dunant Center, arrived in Aceh to help revive the stalled peace talks brokered by the Center since 2000. Zinni suggested that the government pursue a dialog with GAM.
Early this week the government announced what Susilo called a revised policy for Aceh. The government decided to step up its military pressure on the Aceh rebels, giving them until December to accept the special autonomy offer, a prerequisite for future dialog, or face the brunt of Indonesia's military's might. In fact he said the military would do "whatever it takes to ensure the unity of the state."
It is not surprising that the revised policy has drawn sharp criticism from numerous figures, both in Aceh and in Jakarta. For starters, military pressure will not work, not only because nobody believes it will apart from the military, but because our own history has taught us so. A military approach proved to be a complete failure in the former province of East Timor. Elsewhere, the military option has not brought any long-lasting solution to satisfy the aspirations of the people of Papua. The military option has not worked in Maluku or Central Sulawesi either.
In fact, the military approach, labeled Daerah Operasi Militer or DOM (Military Operation Area), failed for ten years (from 1988 to 1998) in Aceh province to bring peace and security to the area. What most people cannot forget, moreover, is the fact that during that period thousands of people were killed, mostly innocent civilians, and thousands more are still missing and must be presumed dead.
Second, in this reform era -- which we believe to be transitional until a more democratic Indonesia can emerge -- finding a solution concerning the sovereignty of the nation and sovereignty of the people, should not be left to the deliberations of the military establishment alone. It is really sad to see that in handling the Aceh problem President Megawati prefers to listen to retired general Susilo and active generals such as Military (TNI) Commander Gen. Endriartono Sutarto and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu instead of the governor and councillors of Aceh province and respectable public figures such as former minister Ali Alatas, Muslim scholar Nurcholish Madjid, Muhammadiyah Chairman Syafii Ma'arif, Muslim cleric Alie Yafie, and Ismail Hassan Metareum. Given that the TNI has become part of the problem in Aceh, there is all the more reason for the government to listen to other parties.
Third, the Aceh problem is not synonymous with GAM. That organization was not a factor in Aceh until a few years ago, and only later it was blown out of all proportion, partly due to exaggeration by the military. In fact, lately, the GAM factor has become an annoyance to the Acehnese people to the point that its appeal not to fly the Indonesian flag on Independence Day was not heeded in most parts of the province.
The restiveness of the province originates from a time long before the existence of GAM. Since the early 1950s there has been a common feeling of betrayal at the hands of the Republic of Indonesia after all that the people of Aceh, from the very beginning, contributed to the nation's independence. It is worth noting that Aceh and Yogyakarta were the only sultanates of many in the Dutch East Indies that willingly and voluntarily surrendered their sovereignty to the Indonesian Republic. It was in recognition of this that both provinces were given "special area" status.
Five consecutive presidents of the Republic, from Sukarno, Soeharto, BJ Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid to Megawati Soekarnoputri, made many promises to the people of Aceh. None were honored. Instead, the central government has systematically siphoned off much of the province's resources.
The proud people of Aceh deserve much better than a military approach. Their dignity deserves to be shown the respect that has long been overdue. The central government should start with rebuilding the trust that has been frittered away over the last 50 years.