Aceh deserves respect
Aceh deserves respect
As time passes it is getting more and more difficult to
comprehend the futile attempts of the government, as represented
by Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, to settle the problems of restive Aceh
province.
Unfolding events and conflicting statements during the last
two months clearly show the lack of a sound strategy and a sense
of direction toward finding a workable solution to the
multidimensional problems of that troubled province.
After the latest recurrence of intensified violence in the
area, Minister Susilo branded the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) early
last month as terrorists, the first time the separatists had been
so labeled. This was followed by the statement "enough is enough"
and a suggestion regarding the imposition of a civil or military
state of emergency in the province. He claimed the Acehnese
people supported the new security approach.
His visit to Aceh, from July 9 through July 13, however,
proved otherwise: The local Acehnese rejected the government's
plan to impose a state of emergency. Returning to Jakarta, Susilo
said that the rejection, as voiced by Acehnese councillors and
Governor Abdullah Puteh, did not reflect the wishes of the
Acehnese people as a whole. His statement was immediately
followed by a demand from the local military commander to
increase the number of troops deployed to Aceh.
One month later, Susilo embarked on a second visit to the
province, explaining that the government wished to seek input
from the regions not covered during his earlier visit. This time
his statement concerned a totally different subject: a proposal
to form a new province for three regions in central, southwest,
and west Aceh, separate from the rest of the current province
where most of the violence has been taking place. It is difficult
to avoid comparisons with the old colonial approach: divide et
impera (divide and rule).
Just a week before that visit, Anthony Zinni, a retired U.S.
general and mediator from Swiss-based Henry Dunant Center,
arrived in Aceh to help revive the stalled peace talks brokered
by the Center since 2000. Zinni suggested that the government
pursue a dialog with GAM.
Early this week the government announced what Susilo called a
revised policy for Aceh. The government decided to step up its
military pressure on the Aceh rebels, giving them until December
to accept the special autonomy offer, a prerequisite for future
dialog, or face the brunt of Indonesia's military's might. In
fact he said the military would do "whatever it takes to ensure
the unity of the state."
It is not surprising that the revised policy has drawn sharp
criticism from numerous figures, both in Aceh and in Jakarta.
For starters, military pressure will not work, not only because
nobody believes it will apart from the military, but because our
own history has taught us so. A military approach proved to be a
complete failure in the former province of East Timor. Elsewhere,
the military option has not brought any long-lasting solution to
satisfy the aspirations of the people of Papua. The military
option has not worked in Maluku or Central Sulawesi either.
In fact, the military approach, labeled Daerah Operasi Militer
or DOM (Military Operation Area), failed for ten years (from 1988
to 1998) in Aceh province to bring peace and security to the
area. What most people cannot forget, moreover, is the fact that
during that period thousands of people were killed, mostly
innocent civilians, and thousands more are still missing and must
be presumed dead.
Second, in this reform era -- which we believe to be
transitional until a more democratic Indonesia can emerge --
finding a solution concerning the sovereignty of the nation and
sovereignty of the people, should not be left to the
deliberations of the military establishment alone. It is really
sad to see that in handling the Aceh problem President Megawati
prefers to listen to retired general Susilo and active generals
such as Military (TNI) Commander Gen. Endriartono Sutarto and
Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu instead of the
governor and councillors of Aceh province and respectable public
figures such as former minister Ali Alatas, Muslim scholar
Nurcholish Madjid, Muhammadiyah Chairman Syafii Ma'arif, Muslim
cleric Alie Yafie, and Ismail Hassan Metareum. Given that the TNI
has become part of the problem in Aceh, there is all the more
reason for the government to listen to other parties.
Third, the Aceh problem is not synonymous with GAM. That
organization was not a factor in Aceh until a few years ago, and
only later it was blown out of all proportion, partly due to
exaggeration by the military. In fact, lately, the GAM factor has
become an annoyance to the Acehnese people to the point that its
appeal not to fly the Indonesian flag on Independence Day was not
heeded in most parts of the province.
The restiveness of the province originates from a time long
before the existence of GAM. Since the early 1950s there has been
a common feeling of betrayal at the hands of the Republic of
Indonesia after all that the people of Aceh, from the very
beginning, contributed to the nation's independence. It is worth
noting that Aceh and Yogyakarta were the only sultanates of many
in the Dutch East Indies that willingly and voluntarily
surrendered their sovereignty to the Indonesian Republic. It was
in recognition of this that both provinces were given "special
area" status.
Five consecutive presidents of the Republic, from Sukarno,
Soeharto, BJ Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid to Megawati
Soekarnoputri, made many promises to the people of Aceh. None
were honored. Instead, the central government has systematically
siphoned off much of the province's resources.
The proud people of Aceh deserve much better than a military
approach. Their dignity deserves to be shown the respect that has
long been overdue. The central government should start with
rebuilding the trust that has been frittered away over the last
50 years.