Aceh: An extremely fragile peace agreement
Aceh: An extremely fragile peace agreement
International Crisis Group, Brussel/Jakarta
On Dec. 9, 2002, an agreement on cessation of hostilities in
Aceh was concluded in Geneva, bringing hope that an end to the
26-year-old conflict between Indonesian government forces and
guerrillas of the proindependence Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was in
sight. Since then there have been many positive developments,
most strikingly, a dramatic drop in the level of violence.
The agreement, however, is not a peace settlement. It is
rather a framework for negotiating a resolution of the conflict,
and it remains extremely fragile. The first two months were
supposed to be the confidence-building phase of the accord, but
far from generating confidence, they may have actually reinforced
each side's wariness of the other's long-term intentions.
On Feb. 9, 2003, the two sides moved into a five-month
implementation phase with major differences unresolved. These
include how the Indonesian military will relocate as GAM places
an increasing percentage of its weapons in designated locations.
The leadership of GAM may have accepted the concept of autonomy
as a starting point for discussions but not as a political end,
and there remains little incentive for the guerrilla group to
reinvent itself as a political party working within the
Indonesian electoral system.
The Indonesian Army is not likely to sit quietly indefinitely
if the reduction of violence leads, as appears to be the case, to
more organizing in support of independence, whether or not that
organizing constitutes a formal violation of the agreement. The
provincial government of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) also
constitutes an obstacle to lasting peace because it has such low
credibility and is so widely seen as corrupt. As long as it is
seen to embody "autonomy", as granted to Aceh under an August
2001 law, many Acehnese will continue to see independence as a
desirable alternative.
The Dec. 9 agreement, brokered by the Geneva-based non-
governmental organization, the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC), was the
outcome of three years of tortuous negotiations and interim
efforts to end the violence that worked briefly and then
collapsed.
This agreement is different from all those that preceded it.
It has international monitors in place. Its structure for
investigation and reporting of violations is already far more
transparent than those in the previous accords. It is backed at
the highest levels of the Indonesian government and by a broad
range of international donors.
It is the best -- and maybe the last -- chance that the 4.4
million people of Aceh have for a negotiated peace. It may also
be their best chance to get international backing for local
government reform and substantial post-conflict reconstruction
aid.
The consequences of failure would be grim, and intensified
military operations would be all but inevitable. The outpouring
of enthusiasm that the agreement has generated across Aceh should
be reason enough to for all parties involved to do their utmost
to ensure its success.
Recommendations
The most important recommendation to both sides is to see the
current five-month implementation phase of the agreement through
to completion while refraining from actions that violate the
letter or spirit of the agreement.
There are more recommendations below to the government than to
GAM. This should not be read as an indication that the government
has greater responsibility but rather as an indication of how
important the issue of local governance has become. In many areas
of Aceh, the populace has simply lost all faith in government.
That faith will not be restored by an autonomy law, and an
increase in funds going into provincial and district budgets does
not necessarily translate into an improved standard of living for
ordinary Acehnese.
To the government of Indonesia
* Offer GAM more realistic incentives to take part in the
political process, including by supporting the necessary legal
changes that would allow for local political parties in Aceh.
* Support fully the process outlined in the Dec. 9, 2002
agreement for investigating reported violations.
* Improve local governance by:
(a)supporting efforts to strengthen the fiscal transparency of
the NAD government;
(b)having an independent board review the allocation of
contracts for publicly-financed projects in Aceh as well as the
relationship between expenditure authorized and quality of work;
(c)ensuring that allegations of corruption by provincial and
district officials are promptly investigated, and where
appropriate, prosecuted, by individuals who themselves have no
political or economic ties to those being investigated; and
(d)supporting the assessment by a credible international
accounting firm of accounting practices by provincial and
district governments and how these could be improved.
* Support a carefully designed public opinion survey in sample
villages across Aceh of how Acehnese believe their lives could be
improved and what their priorities are for themselves and their
children, and use the results to design public policies that
respond to local aspirations.
* Develop a plan to restore credibility in the justice system
in Aceh, including:
(a) ensuring that the establishment of new religious courts
does not further weaken the legal system by creating confusion
about overlapping jurisdictions;
(b) giving high priority to the administration of justice
within the peace zones; and
(c) understanding why local or traditional methods of justice
are seen as more effective than anything on offer from the state.
* End illegal levies along roads by:
(a) having the national army and police headquarters in
Jakarta make this a priority, with spot inspections using the
kind of commercial vehicles that are normally the target of
demands for money; and
(b) enforce strict discipline from headquarters on police and
soldiers who extort money.
* Encourage the local parliament in Aceh to give high priority
to the draft regulation, qanun, on direct election of local
officials, including regents and mayors.
* Channel all central government aid and humanitarian
assistance through a special body committed to complete
transparency and public accountability.
* Have a senior government official from Jakarta chair a
discussion among law faculty, nongovernmental organizations, the
local press, military and police on freedom of expression and
assembly, so that mutually acceptable definitions are worked out
for how those freedoms can be exercised in Aceh.
To GAM:
* Refrain from proindependence rallies and other activities
that suggest to the government that GAM is using the cessation of
hostilities to consolidate political and military support.
* Give serious attention to how the January 2001 discussions,
at the time of the "Provisional Understanding" on the democratic
process, could be translated into a concrete program for
transforming GAM into a political party in a way that would not
involve a referendum but also would not indelibly alter GAM's
identity.
* End extortion of the local populace by GAM members.
* Support fully the process outlined in the Dec. 9, 2002
agreement for investigating reported violations.
To International Donors:
* Fund immediate reinforcement of the HDC media and public
relations unit to enable a much more direct, widespread, and
unbiased dissemination of the contents of the agreement, in the
Acehnese language and in a manner likely to draw a wide audience.
* Produce immediate peace dividends in communities affected by
conflict through high-visibility projects that help shore up the
agreement.
* Support local efforts to promote fiscal transparency by:
(a) helping journalists find information on the Rp 700 billion
(approximately US$79 million) allocated for education by the
provincial government; and
(b) reinforcing pressure on Jakarta and the local government
to ensure independent and credible auditing of the latter's
expenditures.
* Look for ways to absorb GAM fighters into the labour force
without creating wage distortions.
* Prepare plans to help with the direct elections of local
officials, if and when the provincial regulation on direct
elections is adopted.
* Avoid, as almost all donors already are, channeling
assistance through the provincial government.
* Monitor project implementation by creating a small multi-
donor office in Aceh that can also easily provide information on
donor assistance to Acehnese organizations.
* Consider reviewing project implementation on a regular
basis, to see how well the donor effort is strengthening the
peace, and make adjustments accordingly.
The above article is an excerpt of the executive summary of
The International Crisis Group (ICG) report on Aceh, issued on
Feb. 27. Full text is available at www.crisisweb.org