Aceh : A tragedy of strategic proportions JP/7/BRUNO1

Part 2 of 2

Aceh: A Tragedy of Strategic Proportions

Bruno Dercon Jakarta

Part 1 of this article explained that any call for sparing Aceh's on-land natural resources from plunder seems not unreasonable for a people traumatized by the sea and desperate for new sources of income. Therefore, it may be wise for the national and provincial governments to draw up a recovery plan which exhibits prevention and preparedness, not only against the next tsunami, but also against future and more predictable natural and human-caused disasters. The following policy issues and initiatives should be considered:

* A worst-case scenario for Aceh is that it pays for short- term recovery with the proceeds of a declining gas industry and of a depleting forest stock. By the time roads and bridges are rebuilt, there won't be an economy left.

* The redevelopment of Aceh's west coast needs a long-term viability appraisal. There is no doubt that fishing will be taken up again over time, but the question is to which extent new infrastructure including the Ladia Galaska road network serves genuine local recovery interests.

* The east coast of Aceh can be designated as a special development zone with investment and tax incentives for industrial investments. Such a zone would have greater natural protection against disasters; has already have an industrial infrastructure and experienced labor; can more easily develop economic linkages with Thailand and Malaysia; and can more readily absorb refugees from Banda Aceh and the west coast. ASEAN sympathy must be translated into an ASEAN strategy of more intensive cross-boundary trade and investment.

* The decline of gas exploration and of its downstream industries should now be readdressed in terms of an active strategy of conversion and redevelopment of assets. Alaissez- faire attitude is unacceptable, both from the government and from multinationals. A cooperation framework between multinationals operating in different sectors in Aceh can contribute to the improvement of labor mobility in general and to outplacement and re-training in particular.

* There is a real urgency now for national forest policy makers to depart from the past mega-concession approach to forestry and to implement in Aceh the contemporary approaches of community foresting. It is vital that economic recovery will not won't be carried forward by providing benefits to large companies only. It is equally vital that a new wave of poverty-driven environmental destruction is prevented early on.

* Fast urban recovery depends on stimulating micro-sized and medium-sized enterprises of all forms and colors in order to get them off the ground again. But recovery also requires that the claims and the memories are disconnected, when appropriate, from the micro locations of the tragedy and readdressed in other ways. This will require an unusual quality of local leadership, especially in Banda Aceh. Stimulating entrepreneurship would still require land redistribution, literally from the dead to the living, and should avoid claims lingering for years in the administrative and legal system. Economic recovery can then be further aided through fast infrastructure redevelopment.

Moreover, recovery should also imply working at the built environment and its cultural and social dimensions. Think of the bold compensation scheme devised by the American government after The Sept. 11 terrorist attack, which was compassionate but fast and abundantly provided consolation and overcoming (trauma support, sustained counseling, public remembering, public discussion about rebuilding). The key issue is that recovery is not allowed to become a festering process of grid lock, both physically in the urban environment and psychologically.

* There is the issue of planning for prevention and preparedness. Most simply and if limited to engineering issues, that starts with working at earthquake safety, as earthquakes happen more often than tsunamis in Aceh. Furthermore, the key to survival is in knowledge, preparation, guaranteed access to emergency information and response capabilities.

It would be great to devise a fail proof built environment in the face of any disaster, but it is pretty much a waste of time to contemplate such schemes if there is no underlying reliability in terms of economic and social welfare.

* Part of the preparedness capabilities is the capacity for coordinated disaster response. It has become clear that Sumatra needs a regional disaster response system. Today, the response structure depends on the ministries. Yet a Vice-Presidential Office can never be sufficiently prepared for local disaster response and neither are increasingly hollowed-out national ministries.

In the U.S., the Federal Government is instrumental in mobilizing support yet the FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Authority) works through 10 response regions, each one covering several states and each one working together with others to respond to exceptional disasters.

More importantly, its regional offices routinely work on training, simulation and prevention. Sumatra should set up coordinated disaster response and preparedness systems and other large Indonesian islands should do the same.

Next time, a large-scale response can perhaps still be organized from Jakarta, but sustained recovery and prevention cannot. Having Pan-Sumatra administrative capabilities would then be an asset.

* Finally, there is little hope for local economic recovery if the civil war is taken up again in force. A large dose of national leadership will be needed to negotiate a peace settlement with GAM. National leadership and more pervasive international cooperation will also be essential in order to keep mafia and piracy practices from resurging.

The International Maritime Bureau reported a total halt of attacks on vessels in the past two weeks and sees it as proof that Aceh's coastal waters must have been hosting most of the criminal gangs (Financial Times, Jan. 6).

Today, international cooperation does make a difference on the ground in Aceh. It will be required again for overcoming regional issues of crime and the illegal export of natural resources and thus for guaranteeing adequate conditions for local investment and social recovery.

The writer (brdercon@yahoo.com) is an urban and regional planner and was Team Leader for the Riau Master Plan 2020. The experience derived from formulating a strategic long-term change plan for Riau Province were instrumental for these articles.