Aceh 2004: Zero prospects for peace

Aguswandi, Researcher, Tapol, London

The new year has arrived but Aceh is as gloomy as ever. There is no sign of any significant change to the situation in "Mecca's veranda" in the forthcoming year. It is very obvious that all the unpleasantness (violence and suffering) will continue as before. The Acehnese started 2004 with news of 11 deaths from a New Year's Eve bomb blast. This followed closely the killing of one of Indonesia's best journalists, Ersa Siregar.

All of this can be traced back to the time last year when President Megawati Soekarnoputri decided to impose martial law on Aceh, on May 19, 2003. Suddenly the Acehnese woke up to find themselves in the middle of Indonesia's largest war since the time of Soeharto's New Order. The situation is now similar to that five years ago when Aceh was a military operations area, known as DOM. Many Acehnese who fled Aceh say the current situation is even worse than when DOM was in force.

The decision to begin the new military operation was not unpredictable. What many cannot understand is the readiness of the supposed civilian government to hand a blank cheque to the military in Aceh. Megawati is not Soeharto, yet she is the only civilian president in the post-Soeharto era to have handed Aceh back to the Indonesian Military (TNI). She is the most militaristic president since Soeharto in terms of her policy toward Aceh. This is in contrast to Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid, who was prepared to search for political solutions. His decision to open dialog with the Acehnese and GAM transformed the conflict from a militaristic one to a political one.

Gus Dur's approach enabled many to talk about the root causes of the conflict. It also reduced the amount of violence. The main discourse of the conflict then focused on injustice, impunity and militarism in Indonesia, and the centralizing tendency of the national government. It recognized the need for a constructive dialog to tackle the underlying cause of the conflict. Under Gus Dur, the Indonesian people and the Acehnese at least had space to discuss the roots of the problem.

And then Megawati arrived. Through the imposition of martial law in Aceh, she is becoming the person most responsible for transforming the Aceh conflict into one that is militaristic in character. This militarization has led to a shift in the main discourse on the Aceh conflict. Whereas the conflict was basically political, it has now become military, in which GAM and the TNI are becoming the main actors.

As a result, current news stories about Aceh simply describe the death toll, the killing of GAM members, the loyalty parades, the fantastic "achievements" of the military operation, the heroism of soldiers. And the war is becoming, or has become, self-perpetuating, with the participants fighting because they have to fight. Jakarta's soldiers have to fight because their generals have sent them to Aceh, and GAM has to fight because it sees no other option.

Militarism cannot solve the Aceh problem: It cannot and will not. Indonesian militarism in Aceh has been the main reason for the collapse of Indonesian nationalism in the province and has provoked a rise in Acehnese nationalism. It is one of the main reasons for the rise of separatist sentiment among the Acehnese. It is the reason why many young Acehnese choose to fight and join GAM. The specter of separatism was only a specter; it became real only after Aceh was handed over to the military.

Unfortunately, Jakarta is turning a blind eye to this. Militarism has been the departure point for Megawati's policy toward Aceh. Megawati is now forgetting the tears she wept during the previous general election when she promised to stop the bloodshed in Aceh.

In this militarized culture, the story being told is always a fantastic one. The generals promised a quick victory. They said it would take only a few months to deal with the small number of armed separatists. But now, more than seven months have passed and in military terms the operation is going nowhere. No top GAM commanders have been captured and there is no sign that the operation will end soon. But the generals still insist that the operation is very successful.

Even if all the present members of GAM were killed and the military were to establish control, the problems in Aceh would not end. The underlying problem is not about a few thousand locals using guns and weapons, and who have persistently demanded independence for Aceh. It is much more than that, because it is the problem of Indonesia itself. The problem lies in the fact that Indonesia cannot offer hope to the Acehnese. The present military operation has even further destroyed the hope that some in Aceh may still have had. The conflict in Aceh is basically the problem of politics in Indonesia -- an inability of Indonesia to transform itself into a more democratic, less militaristic state.

It is unlikely that such a political transformation will occur in Indonesia soon -- not even in 2004. Although this is a general election year, Indonesian politics are still very messy. Consequently, the Aceh problem is unlikely to be resolved easily. Besides, Aceh is too far away for many in Jakarta to really care about it. For Jakarta it is no big deal, and there is no hope that Aceh will become one in 2004.

Currently, Aceh is a place where the death of 10 to 15 people is seen as normal and acceptable. At least 1,000 people have been killed in Aceh since martial law began. Jakarta is too busy to account for these deaths; it is too busy preparing for the election. And since many of those who have died, and will die, are people not regarded as potentially the important voters in the general election, they are even less relevant to many in Jakarta. And, I guess, no more tears will be shed for Aceh by politicians in this year's general election campaign.

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