Aceh 2004: Zero prospects for peace

Aceh 2004: Zero prospects for peace

Aguswandi, Researcher, Tapol, London

The new year has arrived but Aceh is as gloomy as ever. There
is no sign of any significant change to the situation in "Mecca's
veranda" in the forthcoming year. It is very obvious that all
the unpleasantness (violence and suffering) will continue as
before. The Acehnese started 2004 with news of 11 deaths from a
New Year's Eve bomb blast. This followed closely the killing of
one of Indonesia's best journalists, Ersa Siregar.

All of this can be traced back to the time last year when
President Megawati Soekarnoputri decided to impose martial law on
Aceh, on May 19, 2003. Suddenly the Acehnese woke up to find
themselves in the middle of Indonesia's largest war since the
time of Soeharto's New Order. The situation is now similar to
that five years ago when Aceh was a military operations area,
known as DOM. Many Acehnese who fled Aceh say the current
situation is even worse than when DOM was in force.

The decision to begin the new military operation was not
unpredictable. What many cannot understand is the readiness of
the supposed civilian government to hand a blank cheque to the
military in Aceh. Megawati is not Soeharto, yet she is the only
civilian president in the post-Soeharto era to have handed Aceh
back to the Indonesian Military (TNI). She is the most
militaristic president since Soeharto in terms of her policy
toward Aceh. This is in contrast to Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid,
who was prepared to search for political solutions. His decision
to open dialog with the Acehnese and GAM transformed the conflict
from a militaristic one to a political one.

Gus Dur's approach enabled many to talk about the root causes
of the conflict. It also reduced the amount of violence. The main
discourse of the conflict then focused on injustice, impunity and
militarism in Indonesia, and the centralizing tendency of the
national government. It recognized the need for a constructive
dialog to tackle the underlying cause of the conflict. Under Gus
Dur, the Indonesian people and the Acehnese at least had space to
discuss the roots of the problem.

And then Megawati arrived. Through the imposition of martial
law in Aceh, she is becoming the person most responsible for
transforming the Aceh conflict into one that is militaristic in
character. This militarization has led to a shift in the main
discourse on the Aceh conflict. Whereas the conflict was
basically political, it has now become military, in which GAM and
the TNI are becoming the main actors.

As a result, current news stories about Aceh simply describe
the death toll, the killing of GAM members, the loyalty parades,
the fantastic "achievements" of the military operation, the
heroism of soldiers. And the war is becoming, or has become,
self-perpetuating, with the participants fighting because they
have to fight. Jakarta's soldiers have to fight because their
generals have sent them to Aceh, and GAM has to fight because it
sees no other option.

Militarism cannot solve the Aceh problem: It cannot and will
not. Indonesian militarism in Aceh has been the main reason for
the collapse of Indonesian nationalism in the province and has
provoked a rise in Acehnese nationalism. It is one of the main
reasons for the rise of separatist sentiment among the Acehnese.
It is the reason why many young Acehnese choose to fight and join
GAM. The specter of separatism was only a specter; it became real
only after Aceh was handed over to the military.

Unfortunately, Jakarta is turning a blind eye to this.
Militarism has been the departure point for Megawati's policy
toward Aceh. Megawati is now forgetting the tears she wept during
the previous general election when she promised to stop the
bloodshed in Aceh.

In this militarized culture, the story being told is always a
fantastic one. The generals promised a quick victory. They said
it would take only a few months to deal with the small number of
armed separatists. But now, more than seven months have passed
and in military terms the operation is going nowhere. No top GAM
commanders have been captured and there is no sign that the
operation will end soon. But the generals still insist that the
operation is very successful.

Even if all the present members of GAM were killed and the
military were to establish control, the problems in Aceh would
not end. The underlying problem is not about a few thousand
locals using guns and weapons, and who have persistently demanded
independence for Aceh. It is much more than that, because it is
the problem of Indonesia itself. The problem lies in the fact
that Indonesia cannot offer hope to the Acehnese. The present
military operation has even further destroyed the hope that some
in Aceh may still have had. The conflict in Aceh is basically the
problem of politics in Indonesia -- an inability of Indonesia to
transform itself into a more democratic, less militaristic state.

It is unlikely that such a political transformation will occur
in Indonesia soon -- not even in 2004. Although this is a
general election year, Indonesian politics are still very messy.
Consequently, the Aceh problem is unlikely to be resolved easily.
Besides, Aceh is too far away for many in Jakarta to really care
about it. For Jakarta it is no big deal, and there is no hope
that Aceh will become one in 2004.

Currently, Aceh is a place where the death of 10 to 15 people
is seen as normal and acceptable. At least 1,000 people have been
killed in Aceh since martial law began. Jakarta is too busy to
account for these deaths; it is too busy preparing for the
election. And since many of those who have died, and will die,
are people not regarded as potentially the important voters in
the general election, they are even less relevant to many in
Jakarta. And, I guess, no more tears will be shed for Aceh by
politicians in this year's general election campaign.

The writer is a . For further information on Tapol
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