Accountability as reform agenda

Accountability as reform agenda

Menggapai Kedaulatan untuk Rakyat (Attaining Sovereignty for the
People); By Prof. Miriam Budiardjo; Mizan, Bandung, November 1998;
xvi and 246 pages.

YOGYAKARTA (JP): Professor Miriam Budiardjo assumes most of
the problems we are now facing could have been avoided if the
supervision and control over existing governmental institutions
had functioned properly. If the People's Consultative Assembly
(MPR) and the House of Representatives (DPR), in accordance with
their duties, had more effectively asked for the government's
accountability, the monetary crisis and the crisis of confidence
we are now facing need not have taken place. Based on this
belief, she focuses her analysis on the need for the government
to be held accountable.

Accountability is the grounds upon which a mandatory governs
those who have issued the mandate. In the theory of traditional
politics, the people authorize some person or persons to govern
them, while the government is accountable to the people. This is
called people's sovereignty. Accountability can be interpreted as
political justification with sanctions. In the parliamentary
system, the sanctions are direct because they can lead to the
dismissal of the executive at any time if the mandatory fails to
implement those policies which have been agreed upon.

The matter of accountability was clearly formulated in the
1945 Constitution and it was once implemented in our political
life. This accountability worked for three reasons: the president
was accountable to the MPR; the president had to heed the voice
of the DPR; and the DPR had the authority to call a special
session of the MPR to demand the president's accountability.

At some point in the Old Order regime, the MPR was used to
consolidate the ideology of manipol usdek (manifesto of political
reorganization) and proclaim Sukarno president for life. The DPR
was divested of various rights and authority. At the beginning of
the New Order regime, DPR Pancasila (November 1966 to August
1970) managed to alter the political situation to such an extent
that it was able to summon president Sukarno to give his
accountability in front of the MPR, resulting in Sukarno's
dismissal.

According to Miriam, during the New Order era the MPR could
not effectively demand the accountability of the president
because this accountability was only given every five years, when
newly elected MPR members were installed. The president's
accountability speech at these times gave the impression of being
a mere formality. Accountability was also not effective because
the DPR was under the "influence" of the executive. This
situation was the result of conditions which were not politically
rational.

First, the MPR only assembled once every five years. This was
in accordance with the Constitution, which states that the MPR
and the DPR must meet at least once every five years. The DPR
held sessions throughout the year.

Miriam suggests the MPR convene once a year or once every two
years. An ideal situation would be for the MPR to meet in August
following the annual state address.

The second condition was the imbalance between elected and
appointed assembly members. In the 1997 elections, 66.6 percent
of the MPR's 1,000 total members were appointed. This situation
clearly benefited the executive, who appointed the members.

The author suggest reducing the number of MPR members in order
to make the assembly more efficient in analyzing material and to
improve its accountability. This would also make the DPR better
able to supervise the president, while the president would be
able to continuously hear the voice of the DPR as the people.

Third, the DPR did not employ its full range of powers and
rights, including its right of initiative (to draft a bill). As a
result, during the New Order regime the DPR's right of initiative
became virtually useless.

The use of the right of budget was also sterile during the New
Order because the DPR's authority vanished under the executive's
influence, even though the DPR theoretically has more power than
the executive. Also, the DPR's rights of interpellation and
inquiry were not used to their maximum. The use of these rights
would have made the DPR more credible and legitimate in conveying
the people's aspirations.

We agree that above all, there is the need for transparency in
the government's accountability to the people because
accountability can control the implementation of power and
prevent power from being abused. And it is through transparent
accountability that the people know if the mandate entrusted to
the government has been implemented or not.

This book, with its recommendations for improvements in the
political condition and effectiveness of state institutions
during the drastically altered political conditions of the post-
New Order era, should become a reference for more democratic and
rational future political development in line with the people's
sovereignty.

-- Munawar AM