Sun, 13 Jun 1999

Accountability as reform agenda

Menggapai Kedaulatan untuk Rakyat (Attaining Sovereignty for the People); By Prof. Miriam Budiardjo; Mizan, Bandung, November 1998; xvi and 246 pages.

YOGYAKARTA (JP): Professor Miriam Budiardjo assumes most of the problems we are now facing could have been avoided if the supervision and control over existing governmental institutions had functioned properly. If the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) and the House of Representatives (DPR), in accordance with their duties, had more effectively asked for the government's accountability, the monetary crisis and the crisis of confidence we are now facing need not have taken place. Based on this belief, she focuses her analysis on the need for the government to be held accountable.

Accountability is the grounds upon which a mandatory governs those who have issued the mandate. In the theory of traditional politics, the people authorize some person or persons to govern them, while the government is accountable to the people. This is called people's sovereignty. Accountability can be interpreted as political justification with sanctions. In the parliamentary system, the sanctions are direct because they can lead to the dismissal of the executive at any time if the mandatory fails to implement those policies which have been agreed upon.

The matter of accountability was clearly formulated in the 1945 Constitution and it was once implemented in our political life. This accountability worked for three reasons: the president was accountable to the MPR; the president had to heed the voice of the DPR; and the DPR had the authority to call a special session of the MPR to demand the president's accountability.

At some point in the Old Order regime, the MPR was used to consolidate the ideology of manipol usdek (manifesto of political reorganization) and proclaim Sukarno president for life. The DPR was divested of various rights and authority. At the beginning of the New Order regime, DPR Pancasila (November 1966 to August 1970) managed to alter the political situation to such an extent that it was able to summon president Sukarno to give his accountability in front of the MPR, resulting in Sukarno's dismissal.

According to Miriam, during the New Order era the MPR could not effectively demand the accountability of the president because this accountability was only given every five years, when newly elected MPR members were installed. The president's accountability speech at these times gave the impression of being a mere formality. Accountability was also not effective because the DPR was under the "influence" of the executive. This situation was the result of conditions which were not politically rational.

First, the MPR only assembled once every five years. This was in accordance with the Constitution, which states that the MPR and the DPR must meet at least once every five years. The DPR held sessions throughout the year.

Miriam suggests the MPR convene once a year or once every two years. An ideal situation would be for the MPR to meet in August following the annual state address.

The second condition was the imbalance between elected and appointed assembly members. In the 1997 elections, 66.6 percent of the MPR's 1,000 total members were appointed. This situation clearly benefited the executive, who appointed the members.

The author suggest reducing the number of MPR members in order to make the assembly more efficient in analyzing material and to improve its accountability. This would also make the DPR better able to supervise the president, while the president would be able to continuously hear the voice of the DPR as the people.

Third, the DPR did not employ its full range of powers and rights, including its right of initiative (to draft a bill). As a result, during the New Order regime the DPR's right of initiative became virtually useless.

The use of the right of budget was also sterile during the New Order because the DPR's authority vanished under the executive's influence, even though the DPR theoretically has more power than the executive. Also, the DPR's rights of interpellation and inquiry were not used to their maximum. The use of these rights would have made the DPR more credible and legitimate in conveying the people's aspirations.

We agree that above all, there is the need for transparency in the government's accountability to the people because accountability can control the implementation of power and prevent power from being abused. And it is through transparent accountability that the people know if the mandate entrusted to the government has been implemented or not.

This book, with its recommendations for improvements in the political condition and effectiveness of state institutions during the drastically altered political conditions of the post- New Order era, should become a reference for more democratic and rational future political development in line with the people's sovereignty.

-- Munawar AM