Abu Bakar Ba'asyir trial a political showcase

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir trial a political showcase

Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, Jakarta

Once again, 66-year-old cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir went before the
court on Thursday to face charges in connection with terrorist
activities.

At the courthouse, Ba'asyir told reporters that "Bush and his
slave Howard" were behind the trials, referring to the U.S.
president and the Australian prime minister. His remarks have a
degree of truth, given their insistence that the Indonesian
judiciary try Ba'asyir, and are as true as the intelligence
reports that link him with various convicted terrorists and the
network of Islamic boarding schools that educated them.

While the current charges on possession of explosives
implicate him in the August 2003 JW Marriott Hotel bombing, the
fundamental question as to whether -- in the bigger picture --
his conviction can be recorded as a victory in the war on terror
remains a contentious point of debate.

Clearly, the Megawati administration -- including then-
security chief and current President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono --
did a poor job in shaping public opinion through depicting
Ba'asyir as a terrorist leader. Against the maniacal profiles of
bombers Amrozi and Imam Samudra etched in the public psyche, the
government failed to nurture public perception that this elderly
man with a seemingly soft demeanor could be a calculating killer.

The case itself seems irrelevant in Indonesia's great battle
against terrorism. After being held in custody for over two
years, nothing more in terms of strategic information can be
coaxed from Ba'asyir that has not already been extracted by
police and security officials.

The general consensus thus far has been that Ba'asyir may have
been the ideological and spiritual leader of the terrorist
network, but was not the architect of the wave of terrorist
attacks that has plagued the country since 2000. His
incarceration would probably do little to stem further terrorist
activity, since he never commanded the foot soldiers and officers
in the terrorist army. In fact, a conviction would make a martyr
of him among right-wing radicals.

Even if Ba'asyir was acquitted, conventional wisdom suggests
that he would be a marked man, with his every move watched
closely.

It has been widely documented that Ba'asyir, along with
Abdullah Sungkar, founded the Pondok Ngruki Islamic boarding
school in Central Java. The two founders eventually sought refuge
in Malaysia in 1985 and did not return until Soeharto's downfall
in 1998.

Having established strong regional links, Ba'asyir then helped
found Robitatul Mujahidin in 1999, and later the Indonesian
Mujahidin Council (MMI). He allegedly inherited the Jamaah
Islamiyah (JI) leadership after Sungkar's death in 1999.

Attempts to convict him of suspected links to JI's terrorist
activity failed, and Ba'asyir was eventually sentenced in 2003
for a plot to overthrow the government. However, even this
conviction was later overturned by a higher court.

For Susilo's nascent administration, the case could be a win-
win situation in that he takes the credit but not the blame.

Susilo need not fear the possible "Islamic backlash" that
haunted Megawati's administration. If Ba'asyir is convicted,
Susilo can probably still count on the support of his two
conservative Islamic parties -- the Prosperous Justice Party and
the Crescent Star Party -- to stem the localized, rowdy reaction.

Furthermore, he can declare honestly to right-wing
constituents that the verdict was purely a judicial process.
Ba'asyir's case was even initiated by the previous
administration, and he has no jurisdiction intervening in a case
already at the court's behest.

At the same time, Susilo can also take credit for the
conviction before the West, which has placed Ba'asyir high on the
list of primary objectives in the war against terror.

The most important aspect of this case is not terrorism,
security or Ba'asyir, but the litmus test it is on Indonesia's
ability to respect the rule of law, setting political interests
and supremacy of law in the courtroom to fight it out in public.

It is, in other words, an indicator as to whether this newly
democratic nation has the conviction to play by the rules it set
for itself -- even though they may impede the overwhelming
political desire to incarcerate Ba'asyir.

For the West, Ba'asyir's conviction is a cause celebre. It has
also become an unfair measure against which to judge Jakarta's
commitment to the war on terror. After a successive series of
terrorist attacks, there should be no doubt as to the country's
commitment to stopping terrorism.

On the contrary, railroading Ba'asyir's legal process
politically would indicate a despotic tendency in the Susilo
administration. Indonesia should be proud that despite foreign
criticism on Ba'asyir, the country has not willfully disregarded
due process and has not resorted to mocking international
standards like the Geneva Convention in the name of national
interest.

The Constitutional Court has already ruled that Law No.
16/2003 on the retroactive application of Antiterrorism Law No.
15/2003 was unconstitutional, and the government should also be
commended for respecting that decision.

Whatever the price, the end must not justify the means. If
Ba'asyir is found guilty, he should be punished with severity,
including the death penalty if necessary. If acquitted, however,
then it will either be because of ineptitude on the part of
prosecutors and police in building a strong case against the
cleric, or perhaps because Ba'asyir may truly be innocent of the
charges leveled against him.