ABRI's dual function: Interference or assistance?

ABRI's dual function: Interference or assistance?

By J. Soedjati Djiwandono

This is the second of three articles in a series on the dual-
function concept of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI).

JAKARTA (JP): It is conventional thinking in Indonesia that
the country achieved independence through a revolution. But the
truth is that it was a combination of diplomacy and armed
struggle that ultimately won Indonesia' s independence.

In his memoirs, the late Gen. T.B. Simatupang distinguished
between the "first line" (diplomacy) and "second line" (armed
struggle) of Indonesia's struggle for independence.

The choice of that twin strategy, however, was more or less
spontaneous, and there was a good deal of overlapping regarding
the actors, for the choice of actors in either line was not based
on professional qualifications, as is the case in peace time.

At that time, Col. Simatupang took part in both. In that
sense, the doctrine of dwifungsi (dual function) is no more than
a formulation, an affirmation and an institutionalization of the
role of ABRI that it has played since the birth of the republic.
The break from this role was a period of parliamentary democracy
in the 1950s. Thus, the primary basis for its claim of dual
function is historical.

Such an historical claim, however, has created a problem
largely overlooked in the debate on ABRI's dwifungsi. It may very
well be justifiable as far as the genuine and original
independence fighters were concerned.

They were the core of Indonesia's Armed Forces, established
basically out of formerly independent and voluntarily self-
proclaimed groups of fighters as a spontaneous response to the
proclamation of independence. For the 1945 generation of
Indonesian soldiers, the dual function relates to their personal
experiences.

At best, however, as one writer has put it, it may be
"dubious" to regard the former Indonesian troops of the Royal
Dutch East Indies army (KNIL) that were integrated with the
Indonesian Armed Forces as part of the deal with the Netherlands
at the Round Table Conference in the Hague prior to the transfer
of sovereignty at the end of 1949. These were truly
"professional", not to say "mercenary" soldiers serving the Dutch
colonial regime.

A similar argument may be made with regard to the post-1945
generations of ABRI members, for whom dwifungsi has no relation
with personal experiences. To them, the personal and historical
value of dwifungsi cannot possibly be applied.

One might well argue, nevertheless, that if ABRI had ever been
interested in establishing a military rule, the opportunity had
certainly presented itself in the power vacuum immediately after
the failed coup attempt in 1965, as well as on other previous
occasions.

The first was provided by the abortive communist rebellion in
1948, when the struggle against the Dutch was still going on. The
second presented itself when the core civilian leadership of
Indonesia during the national revolution for independence,
president Sukarno, vice president Mohammad Hatta and others,
decided to stay in the capital of the republic of that time,
Yogyakarta, after the Dutch troops succeeded in entering and
occupying the republican capital, so that they were taken
prisoner by the Dutch on Dec. 19, 1948.

By contrast, Gen. Sudirman fled into the countryside to lead a
guerrilla warfare. He did not agree with the civilian leadership
and refused to stay in town.

In fact, on returning to Yogyakarta after the Indonesian
leaders had been released pending the transfer of sovereignty
from the Dutch to the Federal Republic of Indonesia, Gen.
Sudirman was reluctant to see president Sukarno, until he was
persuaded to do so by Col. T.B. Simatupang, then his deputy chief
of staff.

In any event, despite his disagreement with the civilian
leadership, never at any time during that period did Gen.
Sudirman attempt to take over the reign of government, thereby
possibly establishing a military regime, even if the opportunity
was there.

But then, of course, such an act would have been
counterproductive. It would probably have prevented the
independence of Indonesia being recognized by the international
community.

The republic would probably never have survived, at least as
proclaimed on Aug. 17, 1945. This was the consideration of the
decision for president Sukarno and other Indonesian leaders to
stay in Yogyakarta, knowing full well that they would be captured
by the Dutch.

Moreover, on various occasions, ABRI has saved the nation from
disintegration in the face of other rebellions; by fanatical
Moslems in the early 1950s and by regional commanders in the late
1950s.

Thus, without ABRI, Indonesia could very well have become
either a communist or an Islamic theocratic state, or simply
disintegrated. The nation-state as proclaimed on Aug. 17, 1945,
would have ceased to exist. That seems to be a sufficient basis
for legitimacy -- at least for the time being.

The writer is a political observer residing in Jakarta. The
article is a summary from a chapter he wrote in a newly published
book Civil-military relations: Building Democracy and Regional
Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe. The
book was published by Westview Press and edited by David R.
Mares.