ABRI's dual function: Interference or assistance?

By J. Soedjati Djiwandono

This is the second of three articles in a series on the dual- function concept of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI).

JAKARTA (JP): It is conventional thinking in Indonesia that the country achieved independence through a revolution. But the truth is that it was a combination of diplomacy and armed struggle that ultimately won Indonesia' s independence.

In his memoirs, the late Gen. T.B. Simatupang distinguished between the "first line" (diplomacy) and "second line" (armed struggle) of Indonesia's struggle for independence.

The choice of that twin strategy, however, was more or less spontaneous, and there was a good deal of overlapping regarding the actors, for the choice of actors in either line was not based on professional qualifications, as is the case in peace time.

At that time, Col. Simatupang took part in both. In that sense, the doctrine of dwifungsi (dual function) is no more than a formulation, an affirmation and an institutionalization of the role of ABRI that it has played since the birth of the republic. The break from this role was a period of parliamentary democracy in the 1950s. Thus, the primary basis for its claim of dual function is historical.

Such an historical claim, however, has created a problem largely overlooked in the debate on ABRI's dwifungsi. It may very well be justifiable as far as the genuine and original independence fighters were concerned.

They were the core of Indonesia's Armed Forces, established basically out of formerly independent and voluntarily self- proclaimed groups of fighters as a spontaneous response to the proclamation of independence. For the 1945 generation of Indonesian soldiers, the dual function relates to their personal experiences.

At best, however, as one writer has put it, it may be "dubious" to regard the former Indonesian troops of the Royal Dutch East Indies army (KNIL) that were integrated with the Indonesian Armed Forces as part of the deal with the Netherlands at the Round Table Conference in the Hague prior to the transfer of sovereignty at the end of 1949. These were truly "professional", not to say "mercenary" soldiers serving the Dutch colonial regime.

A similar argument may be made with regard to the post-1945 generations of ABRI members, for whom dwifungsi has no relation with personal experiences. To them, the personal and historical value of dwifungsi cannot possibly be applied.

One might well argue, nevertheless, that if ABRI had ever been interested in establishing a military rule, the opportunity had certainly presented itself in the power vacuum immediately after the failed coup attempt in 1965, as well as on other previous occasions.

The first was provided by the abortive communist rebellion in 1948, when the struggle against the Dutch was still going on. The second presented itself when the core civilian leadership of Indonesia during the national revolution for independence, president Sukarno, vice president Mohammad Hatta and others, decided to stay in the capital of the republic of that time, Yogyakarta, after the Dutch troops succeeded in entering and occupying the republican capital, so that they were taken prisoner by the Dutch on Dec. 19, 1948.

By contrast, Gen. Sudirman fled into the countryside to lead a guerrilla warfare. He did not agree with the civilian leadership and refused to stay in town.

In fact, on returning to Yogyakarta after the Indonesian leaders had been released pending the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to the Federal Republic of Indonesia, Gen. Sudirman was reluctant to see president Sukarno, until he was persuaded to do so by Col. T.B. Simatupang, then his deputy chief of staff.

In any event, despite his disagreement with the civilian leadership, never at any time during that period did Gen. Sudirman attempt to take over the reign of government, thereby possibly establishing a military regime, even if the opportunity was there.

But then, of course, such an act would have been counterproductive. It would probably have prevented the independence of Indonesia being recognized by the international community.

The republic would probably never have survived, at least as proclaimed on Aug. 17, 1945. This was the consideration of the decision for president Sukarno and other Indonesian leaders to stay in Yogyakarta, knowing full well that they would be captured by the Dutch.

Moreover, on various occasions, ABRI has saved the nation from disintegration in the face of other rebellions; by fanatical Moslems in the early 1950s and by regional commanders in the late 1950s.

Thus, without ABRI, Indonesia could very well have become either a communist or an Islamic theocratic state, or simply disintegrated. The nation-state as proclaimed on Aug. 17, 1945, would have ceased to exist. That seems to be a sufficient basis for legitimacy -- at least for the time being.

The writer is a political observer residing in Jakarta. The article is a summary from a chapter he wrote in a newly published book Civil-military relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe. The book was published by Westview Press and edited by David R. Mares.