ABRI should revise political role
Aceh's "Skulls Hill" controversy is the latest blow to the Armed Forces' (ABRI) reputation, which has already been battered by numerous incidents, including the shooting of students and the kidnapping of activists. Hermawan Sulistiyo, a political researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, suggests ways on how ABRI could improve its image.
Question: ABRI has been linked to many cases of human rights violations. Are military policies behind these incidents?
Sulistiyo: I'm sure there is no formal policy for such human rights violations. But these acts might result from ABRI's involvement in politics and the existence of informal instructions. Furthermore, some members of ABRI are arrogant, feeling they are a privileged element of society since they are the only people with the right to use firearms.
Former president Soeharto, for example, gave informal instructions for the "mysterious killings" of alleged criminals (in the 1980s). No formal instructions were given for such killings but Soeharto himself finally admitted (in his biography) that he gave the order. The recent kidnappings of political activists and the massacre at Tanjung Priok in North Jakarta (in 1984) and other parts of the country might have also come from similar instructions. However, the existence of such informal instructions (other than those admitted by Soeharto) still need to be proven in court.
Since there have been no public confessions from ABRI leaders concerning these numerous cases, we have yet to find out which of them came from informal orders and from whom they came from: the president, ABRI's commander or from lower-ranking officers.
Q: But how is it that there was no external check on the military from the House of Representatives (DPR), the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) or international institutions before the rise of the reform movement?
S: People were afraid to question or discuss such plots during Soeharto's oppressive government. The fact that Soeharto, as a president, admitted to having ordered the "mysterious killings" of his own people without any legal process clearly shows his arrogance. No foreign humanitarian institutions protested at the time because they had no hard evidence.
Q: Who do you think planned and carried out the violations?
S: Such plots usually come from intelligence units. So, they might have come from the State Intelligence Coordination Board (Bakin), the Armed Forces Intelligence Body (BIA) or intelligence units from the lower ranks.
Q: Do you think ABRI is still respected?
S: Over the entire history of the New Order government, ABRI has never been regarded as disgraced as it is at present. The Indonesian people mostly regard military personnel as criminals or armed hoodlums, but they do not dare express such feelings openly.
If ABRI leaders, including former commander Feisal Tandjung, said that the kidnappings were carried out by members of the Army's Special Force (Kopassus) beyond the top brass' knowledge, would that indicate that ABRI's coordination is very poor?
It does not necessarily mean that, because we have not seen ABRI's officers getting involved in open physical conflicts. They have denied human rights accusations just because they are cowards and want to save themselves. If they were true fighters, they would admit what they have done.
Q: Do you expect ABRI to firmly discipline officers found to be involved in the violations?
S: I'm sure it won't. Not all officers allegedly involved in such violence will be legally processed and officers who are proven guilty will not receive heavy punishment as expected by the people. ABRI's leaders will be afraid that strict disciplinary measures may cause unrest in its ranks, especially because others have also been involved in other violent acts.
However, the people will be easily satisfied if ABRI brings violators to court.
Q: What measures should ABRI take to improve its image?
S: First, ABRI must revise its political role in the management of the country under its dual-function policy. Second, ABRI should realize that it will no longer enjoy unlimited power.
ABRI's reform concept actually includes revisions of its dual- function policy. Such plans are supported by its younger officers, like ABRI's chief for sociopolitical affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
We can also look to ABRI Commander Gen. Wiranto to create a better military. He is actually a reformist. Yet he is also a bit young to be ABRI commander, so he is moving too carefully so as not to make a political mistake. This has led to slow and half- hearted reform. Many other proreform officers have yet to reach top positions that would give them the authority to bring about change. (riz)