ABRI 'Dwifungsi' rooted in civilian and military antagonism

ABRI 'Dwifungsi' rooted in civilian and military antagonism

BANDUNG (JP): The Dwifungsi doctrine of the Indonesian Armed
Forces (ABRI) is often regarded as a dichotomy of civilian and
military authorities, a power struggle between civilian and
military leaders.

Although the military has consistently denied the suggestion,
Dwifungsi was an answer to what they saw as incompetence on the
part of the civilian leadership that first appeared in 1948, when
the Sukarno government surrendered to the Dutch, leaving the
defense of the country's newfound independence entirely in the
hands of the military.

The root of civilian and military antagonism can be traced
back to the beginning of the republic, when Sukarno seemed
hesitant in forming a national army. When it was finally formed
under the name Badan Keamanan Rakyat (People's Security Force),
most of its members were former PETA officers who were deeply
influenced by the values of the Japanese military. PETA is the
acronym for Pembela Tanah Air, the Defenders of the Motherland.

Ulf Sundhaussen, in his book Road to power: Indonesian
military politics 1945-1967, argues that from the beginning,
these PETA officers did not welcome civilian interference in
their affairs and considered the military to be an autonomous
institution. This attitude prevailed and was partly responsible
for the way ABRI positioned itself under Sukarno.

The military's distaste of the civilian leadership became
apparent on Dec. 19, 1948, when the Dutch launched a military
offensive to seize Yogyakarta, then the seat of the republican
government. President Sukarno and vice president/prime minister
Mohammad Hatta decided to remain in the city and were arrested by
the Dutch, despite an earlier agreement with the military
leadership that in the event of an attack, Sukarno and his
cabinet would retreat to the hinterland and join the army to
fight a guerrilla war.

Sukarno's decision clearly upset the military, especially
those officers who had been informed of Sukarno's earlier promise
to join the guerrilla movement. Hatta's order for the military to
continue the armed struggle failed to restore the military's
respect for their civilian leaders.

On Dec. 22, 1948, Col. A.H. Nasution, the military commander
in Java, declared the establishment of a military government in
Java on the grounds that the government no longer existed since
two of its top leaders, Sukarno and Hatta, had been arrested by
the Dutch. Meanwhile, the provisional government in Sumatra under
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara could not be located.

Nasution announced the appointment of divisional commanders in
West, Central and East Java, namely Col. Abimanyu, Col. Gatot
Subroto and Col. Sungkono, who also served as military governors
in their respective areas. Civilian governors were restricted to
an advisory role in the emergency government put in place during
the guerrilla war.

The military administration continued right down to district
level, and only at the village level was the bureaucracy still
headed by civilians. To support the new structure, Nasution
placed a number of active military officers in civilian posts and
instructed them to launch a guerrilla war that became known as
the "total people's defense" doctrine.

The establishment of the military administration justified
ABRI's view that Indonesia's independence relied largely on the
armed struggle rather then on diplomacy. This was the beginning
of the dichotomy of a civilian (political) and military role for
the Armed Forces, and confirmed its status as part of the state
apparatus, and not a tool of the government of the day.

Instability

The struggle for complete independence faced another challenge
when the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia agreed to
establish the Republik Indonesia Serikat (United Republic of
Indonesia, or RIS) in 1949. ABRI strongly opposed the Dutch-
sponsored federal government and through its political efforts,
succeeded in retrieving Indonesian unity and the enactment of the
1950 Provisional Constitution.

Political developments in the 1950s further strengthened ABRI
as a socio-political force. Based on the 1950 Provisional
Constitution, Indonesia's political system developed along the
lines of a European-style parliamentary democracy. This system
left President Sukarno and the military without any real power,
much to their discontent, given the significant roles they played
in the struggle for independence.

The system was also marked by instability due to sharp
friction between the numerous political parties that stemmed from
ideological differences and fierce competition for strategic
positions in the cabinet. This kind of rivalry nearly caused the
nation to disintegrate, prompting ABRI to involve itself in
political affairs and to play a part in the running of the state.

In 1952, ABRI became a functional group in the legislative
body and it was through its involvement in politics that it
helped to bring about an equilibrium in the political discourse
of the time.

ABRI's success in dealing with a series of separatist
uprisings, from the Darul Islam rebellion that started in West
Java to the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia
(Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, or PRRI) and the
All-Out Struggle (Perjuangan Semesta, or Permesta), provided
further proof of the military's commitment to defending national
unity and integrity. The rebellions were seen to be a result of
the failure of political parties to solve their problems.

At the same time, the majority of military officers remained
honest, committed to developing the nation, and determined to
disseminate the revolutionary spirit among a people divided by
conflicting politicians whose only concern was their material
well-being. Against this background, ABRI emerged as a solid and
prominent political power.

Sundhaussen, a prominent expert on the Indonesian military,
pointed out that ABRI's involvement in politics was as much a
result of the failure of civilians to offer a strong political
leadership based on national unity and integrity.

In July 1959, Nasution, by then Army Chief of Staff, succeeded
in persuading Sukarno to announce Indonesia's return to the 1945
Constitution. Nasution argued that Indonesia needed stability and
unity, and said the only way to achieve this was to return to the
1945 Constitution. The decree effecting this was announced on
July 5, 1959.

The decree was followed by a greater military involvement in
politics and an increase in the number of military
representatives in political institutions. When Sukarno announced
his Working Cabinet on July 10 of that year, one third of the
ministers were military officers. When Sukarno formed the Gotong
Royong Parliament in 1960, 35 of its 283 members were military
officers. Not long after this, Nasution coined the phrase
Dwifungsi for the first time. The concept was formally accepted
in 1965 after the first Army Seminar in Bandung.

Middle Way

All the same, the military's political role was still
considered temporary in nature, resulting as it did from an
emergency war situation.

Nasution then moved to seek a "legal and constitutional"
justification for ABRI's political role, and on Nov. 11, 1958,
put his concept before the National Military Academy in Magelang,
Central Java, on its first anniversary.

His view of the ideal form of the function and position of the
military within the state became famous as the Middle Way concept
(Jalan Tengah Tentara) and marked the beginning of Dwifungsi as
it is known today.

The Middle Way concept allowed military officers to play an
active role in non-military affairs, right up to the highest
levels of government, including state finance and the economy.
The idea was to create a strong government under Sukarno as the
only way to reduce the influence of disparate politicians and to
prevent national disintegration.

Operationally, Nasution's Middle Way was translated into the
territorial warfare doctrine that was endorsed by the Provisional
People's Consultative Assembly in 1960, and was confirmed during
the Army's second seminar at the Army Staff and Command College
in Bandung in January 1962.

The territorial warfare doctrine required the total support of
the people. This could only be gained through a good relationship
between the military and the general public. The military was
responsible for the welfare of the people, and those in rural
areas in particular. The military was also responsible for the
political education of the common people and instilling in them a
sense of national identity. In return, the military would bring
about political stability and guarantee domestic security and
social justice.

As outlined in the doctrine, territorial units began a series
of public service activities and programs of cultural and
political education. They also tried to establish contact with
the civilian administration, religious and cultural
organizations, youth groups, retired officers, labor unions and
other mass organizations. The Army dispatched doctors, engineers
and other skilled personnel to villages in order to win the
hearts and mind of the people. Through these programs, the
military hoped not only to improve the welfare of the people, but
to contain the many armed rebellions and the growing influence of
the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which by then had become
the largest and strongest political party in Indonesia.

New Order

Sukarno, worried and anxious to counter the military's growing
political influence, decided to include members of the PKI in the
Dwikora Cabinet of 1964. PKI members were also appointed to the
Provisional People's Consultative Assembly and the Gotong Royong
Parliament.

The Armed Forces, and the Army in particular, saw the PKI's
growing strength as a threat to the state on the grounds that the
party was the antithesis of the Pancasila doctrine.

Since introducing a new strategy in 1954 in the aftermath of a
failed coup in Madiun, East Java, in 1948, the PKI had grown into
a large party with a following of 3.5 million youths, women,
farmers and laborers. The PKI's growing importance was partly due
to the banning of four political parties, including Masjumi and
Partai Sosialis Indonesia, for supporting separatist movements.
They gained the upper hand when Sukarno called for nationalists,
the religious and communists to unite under the banner of
Nationalism-Religion-Communism (NASAKOM).

Sukarno's move was interpreted as a sign of his growing
dependence on the Communists to contain the military. Sukarno was
also responsible for provoking friction within the military in
order to weaken its political power. In 1962, Sukarno replaced
Nasution as Army Chief of Staff with Ahmad Yani. However Yani,
like his predecessor, was staunchly opposed to the PKI and its
intention of forming a fifth force of Communist cadres within the
Armed Forces.

As part of his efforts to weaken the military, Sukarno revoked
the state of emergency, thus effectively curtailing the
military's involvement in dealing with the growing communist
influence outside Java.

Earlier, the Armed Forces had formed various organizations to
contain the PKI's progress. These organizations were later fused
into the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian (now
called Irian Jaya). As indicated by its name, this front was
formed to liberate West Irian from the Dutch and its membership
was restricted to functional groups whose members did not belong
to any political party.

The functional groups were a brainchild of Sukarno who, like
the Army, was disappointed with the performance of the country's
political parties between 1953 and 1957, which he thought had put
their own interests before national unity.

In 1959, the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian
became the National Front. Four years later, on Oct. 20, the
National Front proposed the establishment of the Sekretariat
Bersama Golongan Karya (General Secretariat of the Functional
Group). or Sekber Golkar in order to prevent the PKI from
dominating the National Front.

In 1965, the Army organized a seminar in Bandung from which
emerged a new military doctrine called Tri Ubaya Cakti (three
ways). The seminar also officially endorsed Dwifungsi, confirming
the Armed Forces dual function as a military and socio-political
power. In August 1966, the Army held a second seminar in Bandung
and concluded that Nasution's Middle Way was no longer sufficient
to face the growing threat posed to Pancasila and the 1945
Constitution by the PKI. It was argued that the Armed Forces
should abandon its strategy of playing the middleman and take a
lead role as the guardian of national unity, Pancasila and the
1945 Constitution.

The doctrine of Tri Ubaya Cakti once again confirmed the Armed
Forces' close links to the people, its involvement in state
affairs, its control over the civilian government, and its
important role in efforts to modernize the state and the people.
However, ABRI also stated that its participation in all aspects
of life did not mean that it wanted unlimited power. As freedom
fighters and champions of democracy, ABRI said it would only
fight for a constitutional government.

Through Sekber Golkar, ABRI strengthened its socio-political
grip on the country, and Golkar, which was created to fight the
PKI's domination, became a political tool of the Armed Forces and
Soeharto's New Order government. (lem)