ABRI 'Dwifungsi' rooted in civilian and military antagonism
BANDUNG (JP): The Dwifungsi doctrine of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) is often regarded as a dichotomy of civilian and military authorities, a power struggle between civilian and military leaders.
Although the military has consistently denied the suggestion, Dwifungsi was an answer to what they saw as incompetence on the part of the civilian leadership that first appeared in 1948, when the Sukarno government surrendered to the Dutch, leaving the defense of the country's newfound independence entirely in the hands of the military.
The root of civilian and military antagonism can be traced back to the beginning of the republic, when Sukarno seemed hesitant in forming a national army. When it was finally formed under the name Badan Keamanan Rakyat (People's Security Force), most of its members were former PETA officers who were deeply influenced by the values of the Japanese military. PETA is the acronym for Pembela Tanah Air, the Defenders of the Motherland.
Ulf Sundhaussen, in his book Road to power: Indonesian military politics 1945-1967, argues that from the beginning, these PETA officers did not welcome civilian interference in their affairs and considered the military to be an autonomous institution. This attitude prevailed and was partly responsible for the way ABRI positioned itself under Sukarno.
The military's distaste of the civilian leadership became apparent on Dec. 19, 1948, when the Dutch launched a military offensive to seize Yogyakarta, then the seat of the republican government. President Sukarno and vice president/prime minister Mohammad Hatta decided to remain in the city and were arrested by the Dutch, despite an earlier agreement with the military leadership that in the event of an attack, Sukarno and his cabinet would retreat to the hinterland and join the army to fight a guerrilla war.
Sukarno's decision clearly upset the military, especially those officers who had been informed of Sukarno's earlier promise to join the guerrilla movement. Hatta's order for the military to continue the armed struggle failed to restore the military's respect for their civilian leaders.
On Dec. 22, 1948, Col. A.H. Nasution, the military commander in Java, declared the establishment of a military government in Java on the grounds that the government no longer existed since two of its top leaders, Sukarno and Hatta, had been arrested by the Dutch. Meanwhile, the provisional government in Sumatra under Sjafruddin Prawiranegara could not be located.
Nasution announced the appointment of divisional commanders in West, Central and East Java, namely Col. Abimanyu, Col. Gatot Subroto and Col. Sungkono, who also served as military governors in their respective areas. Civilian governors were restricted to an advisory role in the emergency government put in place during the guerrilla war.
The military administration continued right down to district level, and only at the village level was the bureaucracy still headed by civilians. To support the new structure, Nasution placed a number of active military officers in civilian posts and instructed them to launch a guerrilla war that became known as the "total people's defense" doctrine.
The establishment of the military administration justified ABRI's view that Indonesia's independence relied largely on the armed struggle rather then on diplomacy. This was the beginning of the dichotomy of a civilian (political) and military role for the Armed Forces, and confirmed its status as part of the state apparatus, and not a tool of the government of the day.
Instability
The struggle for complete independence faced another challenge when the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia agreed to establish the Republik Indonesia Serikat (United Republic of Indonesia, or RIS) in 1949. ABRI strongly opposed the Dutch- sponsored federal government and through its political efforts, succeeded in retrieving Indonesian unity and the enactment of the 1950 Provisional Constitution.
Political developments in the 1950s further strengthened ABRI as a socio-political force. Based on the 1950 Provisional Constitution, Indonesia's political system developed along the lines of a European-style parliamentary democracy. This system left President Sukarno and the military without any real power, much to their discontent, given the significant roles they played in the struggle for independence.
The system was also marked by instability due to sharp friction between the numerous political parties that stemmed from ideological differences and fierce competition for strategic positions in the cabinet. This kind of rivalry nearly caused the nation to disintegrate, prompting ABRI to involve itself in political affairs and to play a part in the running of the state.
In 1952, ABRI became a functional group in the legislative body and it was through its involvement in politics that it helped to bring about an equilibrium in the political discourse of the time.
ABRI's success in dealing with a series of separatist uprisings, from the Darul Islam rebellion that started in West Java to the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, or PRRI) and the All-Out Struggle (Perjuangan Semesta, or Permesta), provided further proof of the military's commitment to defending national unity and integrity. The rebellions were seen to be a result of the failure of political parties to solve their problems.
At the same time, the majority of military officers remained honest, committed to developing the nation, and determined to disseminate the revolutionary spirit among a people divided by conflicting politicians whose only concern was their material well-being. Against this background, ABRI emerged as a solid and prominent political power.
Sundhaussen, a prominent expert on the Indonesian military, pointed out that ABRI's involvement in politics was as much a result of the failure of civilians to offer a strong political leadership based on national unity and integrity.
In July 1959, Nasution, by then Army Chief of Staff, succeeded in persuading Sukarno to announce Indonesia's return to the 1945 Constitution. Nasution argued that Indonesia needed stability and unity, and said the only way to achieve this was to return to the 1945 Constitution. The decree effecting this was announced on July 5, 1959.
The decree was followed by a greater military involvement in politics and an increase in the number of military representatives in political institutions. When Sukarno announced his Working Cabinet on July 10 of that year, one third of the ministers were military officers. When Sukarno formed the Gotong Royong Parliament in 1960, 35 of its 283 members were military officers. Not long after this, Nasution coined the phrase Dwifungsi for the first time. The concept was formally accepted in 1965 after the first Army Seminar in Bandung.
Middle Way
All the same, the military's political role was still considered temporary in nature, resulting as it did from an emergency war situation.
Nasution then moved to seek a "legal and constitutional" justification for ABRI's political role, and on Nov. 11, 1958, put his concept before the National Military Academy in Magelang, Central Java, on its first anniversary.
His view of the ideal form of the function and position of the military within the state became famous as the Middle Way concept (Jalan Tengah Tentara) and marked the beginning of Dwifungsi as it is known today.
The Middle Way concept allowed military officers to play an active role in non-military affairs, right up to the highest levels of government, including state finance and the economy. The idea was to create a strong government under Sukarno as the only way to reduce the influence of disparate politicians and to prevent national disintegration.
Operationally, Nasution's Middle Way was translated into the territorial warfare doctrine that was endorsed by the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly in 1960, and was confirmed during the Army's second seminar at the Army Staff and Command College in Bandung in January 1962.
The territorial warfare doctrine required the total support of the people. This could only be gained through a good relationship between the military and the general public. The military was responsible for the welfare of the people, and those in rural areas in particular. The military was also responsible for the political education of the common people and instilling in them a sense of national identity. In return, the military would bring about political stability and guarantee domestic security and social justice.
As outlined in the doctrine, territorial units began a series of public service activities and programs of cultural and political education. They also tried to establish contact with the civilian administration, religious and cultural organizations, youth groups, retired officers, labor unions and other mass organizations. The Army dispatched doctors, engineers and other skilled personnel to villages in order to win the hearts and mind of the people. Through these programs, the military hoped not only to improve the welfare of the people, but to contain the many armed rebellions and the growing influence of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which by then had become the largest and strongest political party in Indonesia.
New Order
Sukarno, worried and anxious to counter the military's growing political influence, decided to include members of the PKI in the Dwikora Cabinet of 1964. PKI members were also appointed to the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly and the Gotong Royong Parliament.
The Armed Forces, and the Army in particular, saw the PKI's growing strength as a threat to the state on the grounds that the party was the antithesis of the Pancasila doctrine.
Since introducing a new strategy in 1954 in the aftermath of a failed coup in Madiun, East Java, in 1948, the PKI had grown into a large party with a following of 3.5 million youths, women, farmers and laborers. The PKI's growing importance was partly due to the banning of four political parties, including Masjumi and Partai Sosialis Indonesia, for supporting separatist movements. They gained the upper hand when Sukarno called for nationalists, the religious and communists to unite under the banner of Nationalism-Religion-Communism (NASAKOM).
Sukarno's move was interpreted as a sign of his growing dependence on the Communists to contain the military. Sukarno was also responsible for provoking friction within the military in order to weaken its political power. In 1962, Sukarno replaced Nasution as Army Chief of Staff with Ahmad Yani. However Yani, like his predecessor, was staunchly opposed to the PKI and its intention of forming a fifth force of Communist cadres within the Armed Forces.
As part of his efforts to weaken the military, Sukarno revoked the state of emergency, thus effectively curtailing the military's involvement in dealing with the growing communist influence outside Java.
Earlier, the Armed Forces had formed various organizations to contain the PKI's progress. These organizations were later fused into the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian (now called Irian Jaya). As indicated by its name, this front was formed to liberate West Irian from the Dutch and its membership was restricted to functional groups whose members did not belong to any political party.
The functional groups were a brainchild of Sukarno who, like the Army, was disappointed with the performance of the country's political parties between 1953 and 1957, which he thought had put their own interests before national unity.
In 1959, the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian became the National Front. Four years later, on Oct. 20, the National Front proposed the establishment of the Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya (General Secretariat of the Functional Group). or Sekber Golkar in order to prevent the PKI from dominating the National Front.
In 1965, the Army organized a seminar in Bandung from which emerged a new military doctrine called Tri Ubaya Cakti (three ways). The seminar also officially endorsed Dwifungsi, confirming the Armed Forces dual function as a military and socio-political power. In August 1966, the Army held a second seminar in Bandung and concluded that Nasution's Middle Way was no longer sufficient to face the growing threat posed to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution by the PKI. It was argued that the Armed Forces should abandon its strategy of playing the middleman and take a lead role as the guardian of national unity, Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.
The doctrine of Tri Ubaya Cakti once again confirmed the Armed Forces' close links to the people, its involvement in state affairs, its control over the civilian government, and its important role in efforts to modernize the state and the people. However, ABRI also stated that its participation in all aspects of life did not mean that it wanted unlimited power. As freedom fighters and champions of democracy, ABRI said it would only fight for a constitutional government.
Through Sekber Golkar, ABRI strengthened its socio-political grip on the country, and Golkar, which was created to fight the PKI's domination, became a political tool of the Armed Forces and Soeharto's New Order government. (lem)