ABRI and Golkar look after each other

By Tedy Novan and Gin Kurniawan

YOGYAKARTA (JP): The proprietary of the Armed Forces' (ABRI) support for the dominant Golkar is often questioned, but Army Chief of Staff Hartono recently said the Armed Forces would stick behind Golkar.

Below is an excerpt of The Jakarta Post's interview with military observer Yahya Muhaimin, who is also the dean of Gadjah Mada University's School of Social and Political Sciences.

Question: What do you think about the Armed Forces-Golkar relationship?

Answer: The Armed Forces and Golkar have a long, historic relationship. Golkar was formally established in October 1964, but ABRI had had lengthy relations with its embryos. They were a civilian-military working group and military-farmers and military-workers forums.

They were professional groups which later became functional (groups) and eventually became Golongan Karya (Functional Group, known by the Golkar acronym). Golkar was set up to compete against the (now) banned Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

The long history of (Golkar) was focussed on creating a balance of power against the PKI. At a grassroots level, other political parties also struggled against the PKI, but ineffectively. ABRI then used the functional group (Golkar -- to contend the PKI).

In 1971, under then minister of home affairs Amir Machmud, the functional group was formalized. Within Golkar, the functional organizations were separated from any of their affiliated parties' ideologies. ABRI aimed to have a free hand in pushing for political and economic reform in Indonesia, because political parties were considered ineffective and sluggish.

The 1971 elections were marked with intervention, and it was less than ideal.

What do you mean, not ideal?

There were too many infringements which made the election undemocratic.

Do you mean that ABRI forced its own will then?

Yes, because Golkar and ABRI jointly made the election a means to bring the country back from political and economic chaos to a state where there was national stability. I can understand if this transitional period drags.

Now, after several elections, I see some progress, but its still too slow. The election process is occasionally less than transparent.

Do you think that ABRI and Golkar are still dependent on one another?

The historical partnership of ABRI and Golkar shows that they protect each others interests. There are mutual interests: Thousands of ABRI personnel work for Golkar, from its top to bottom levels.

When they become independent from each other, this situation will change. How will they become mutually independent? Politics is a matter of interests. Now, how do they manage their mutual interests? Their mutual independence will last long. This is not a simple matter, it relates to culture; Indonesia is a society based on familiarity.

Golkar and ABRI must not cheat each another, they must be honest with one another. This is achievable so long as Golkar retains its single majority (dominant political position).

Structurally, many Golkar members come from the big Armed Forces' family. How can they be independent from one another? When the Armed Forces treats political parties equally, it's not the Armed Forces' policy. It's more like an initiative by one or more groups inside the Armed Forces.

What are the benefits and costs of this situation?

Essentially, (Golkar's and ABRI's interdependence is) to sustain development. In Japan, conflicts between groups can be accommodated by a system without any upheavals. I think the Armed Forces believes that (Indonesia) cannot do that. For example, the riot in Tasikmalaya, West Java (showed), how pluralistic our society is.

Japan, a homogeneous country that maintained its single majority for tens of years, eventually changed. Why? Because the social pluralism could be controlled by one system, not by military apparatus. Many observers view that ABRI does not have confidence in such a system.

Do you think the Armed Forces cannot be neutral?

It's not a simple matter of ABRI just being independent. I think that Japan's single majority is structurally similar to our situation. However, Japanese military is not involved in politics. We have the ABRI factor here. So, questions of equal opportunity, checks and balances on power cannot be answered optimally. How can we have optimal control here.

Do you think the Armed Forces' function is to control, not to be active in politics?

Yes. In Japan, besides running a system, there is cultural control. They have a culture in which people feel ashamed to be corrupt. We do not have such a culture here.

The single majority party in Japan is dynamic and pluralistic. Politicians, bureaucrats and conglomerates play one another, but not destroy each other. Their system runs well. The infringement, say the (corruption) of money, is a factor that can be controlled.

What about here? Messy, right? Fortunately, we have ABRI which stabilizes the situation... a role that must be used optimally so that the single majority party (Golkar) becomes dynamic.

A study by the National Institute of Sciences suggests that the Armed Forces' sociopolitical function be reduced.

ABRI has a concept of tut wuri handayani (guiding from behind). The study covered only one side of this concept. The concept needs further clarification, because it is still open to interpretation.

ABRI will be truly politically neutral on matters unrelated to defense and security affairs. ABRI will prioritize civilians... and quality, rather than quantity, in its sociopolitical affairs.

We have a different sociocultural condition to Japan. We can not use American system, because culturally we are very different. ABRI and Golkar have become real partners.

How can all parties have equal opportunities? We must have effective mutual control. Like in Japan, they are more paternalistic than we are, but Japan's culture is an effective control.