ABRI and Golkar look after each other

ABRI and Golkar look after each other

By Tedy Novan
and Gin Kurniawan

YOGYAKARTA (JP): The proprietary of the Armed Forces' (ABRI)
support for the dominant Golkar is often questioned, but Army
Chief of Staff Hartono recently said the Armed Forces would stick
behind Golkar.

Below is an excerpt of The Jakarta Post's interview with
military observer Yahya Muhaimin, who is also the dean of Gadjah
Mada University's School of Social and Political Sciences.

Question: What do you think about the Armed Forces-Golkar
relationship?

Answer: The Armed Forces and Golkar have a long, historic
relationship. Golkar was formally established in October 1964,
but ABRI had had lengthy relations with its embryos. They were a
civilian-military working group and military-farmers and
military-workers forums.

They were professional groups which later became functional
(groups) and eventually became Golongan Karya (Functional Group,
known by the Golkar acronym). Golkar was set up to compete
against the (now) banned Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

The long history of (Golkar) was focussed on creating a
balance of power against the PKI. At a grassroots level, other
political parties also struggled against the PKI, but
ineffectively. ABRI then used the functional group (Golkar -- to
contend the PKI).

In 1971, under then minister of home affairs Amir Machmud, the
functional group was formalized. Within Golkar, the functional
organizations were separated from any of their affiliated
parties' ideologies. ABRI aimed to have a free hand in pushing
for political and economic reform in Indonesia, because political
parties were considered ineffective and sluggish.

The 1971 elections were marked with intervention, and it was
less than ideal.

What do you mean, not ideal?

There were too many infringements which made the election
undemocratic.

Do you mean that ABRI forced its own will then?

Yes, because Golkar and ABRI jointly made the election a means
to bring the country back from political and economic chaos to a
state where there was national stability. I can understand if
this transitional period drags.

Now, after several elections, I see some progress, but its
still too slow. The election process is occasionally less than
transparent.

Do you think that ABRI and Golkar are still dependent on one
another?

The historical partnership of ABRI and Golkar shows that they
protect each others interests. There are mutual interests:
Thousands of ABRI personnel work for Golkar, from its top to
bottom levels.

When they become independent from each other, this situation
will change. How will they become mutually independent? Politics
is a matter of interests. Now, how do they manage their mutual
interests? Their mutual independence will last long. This is not
a simple matter, it relates to culture; Indonesia is a society
based on familiarity.

Golkar and ABRI must not cheat each another, they must be
honest with one another. This is achievable so long as Golkar
retains its single majority (dominant political position).

Structurally, many Golkar members come from the big Armed
Forces' family. How can they be independent from one another?
When the Armed Forces treats political parties equally, it's not
the Armed Forces' policy. It's more like an initiative by one or
more groups inside the Armed Forces.

What are the benefits and costs of this situation?

Essentially, (Golkar's and ABRI's interdependence is) to
sustain development. In Japan, conflicts between groups can be
accommodated by a system without any upheavals. I think the Armed
Forces believes that (Indonesia) cannot do that. For example, the
riot in Tasikmalaya, West Java (showed), how pluralistic our
society is.

Japan, a homogeneous country that maintained its single
majority for tens of years, eventually changed. Why? Because the
social pluralism could be controlled by one system, not by
military apparatus. Many observers view that ABRI does not have
confidence in such a system.

Do you think the Armed Forces cannot be neutral?

It's not a simple matter of ABRI just being independent. I
think that Japan's single majority is structurally similar to our
situation. However, Japanese military is not involved in
politics. We have the ABRI factor here. So, questions of equal
opportunity, checks and balances on power cannot be answered
optimally. How can we have optimal control here.

Do you think the Armed Forces' function is to control, not to
be active in politics?

Yes. In Japan, besides running a system, there is cultural
control. They have a culture in which people feel ashamed to be
corrupt. We do not have such a culture here.

The single majority party in Japan is dynamic and pluralistic.
Politicians, bureaucrats and conglomerates play one another, but
not destroy each other. Their system runs well. The infringement,
say the (corruption) of money, is a factor that can be
controlled.

What about here? Messy, right? Fortunately, we have ABRI which
stabilizes the situation... a role that must be used optimally so
that the single majority party (Golkar) becomes dynamic.

A study by the National Institute of Sciences suggests that
the Armed Forces' sociopolitical function be reduced.

ABRI has a concept of tut wuri handayani (guiding from
behind). The study covered only one side of this concept. The
concept needs further clarification, because it is still open to
interpretation.

ABRI will be truly politically neutral on matters unrelated to
defense and security affairs. ABRI will prioritize civilians...
and quality, rather than quantity, in its sociopolitical affairs.

We have a different sociocultural condition to Japan. We can
not use American system, because culturally we are very
different. ABRI and Golkar have become real partners.

How can all parties have equal opportunities? We must have
effective mutual control. Like in Japan, they are more
paternalistic than we are, but Japan's culture is an effective
control.