Abdurrahman Wahid implements half-hearted autonomy

Abdurrahman Wahid implements half-hearted autonomy

Question: What challenges are facing the plan to implement
regional autonomy?

Answer: Great challenges, obviously, despite the fact that the
autonomy concept was already contained in the 1945 Law No. 1.

Imagine, thinking and wishing for something for 50 years and
only seeing it turning into reality, God willing, next year.

For 14 years after 1949, we tried to uphold democracy in
Indonesia. In many ways we were successful. But after 1959, when
(founding president) Sukarno issued his decree reinstating the
1945 Constitution, we found ourselves drifting even further away
from (our goal of) democracy.

All that time we were given promises that were never kept.
That's why the outer regions then lost their patience, and
expressed this in the form of establishing their own regional
administrations.

Look at the string of rebellions that have taken place since
independence, the DI/TII (Islamic state), the regional
differences which peaked with the Permesta/PRRI rebellion.

All those were demands for autonomy. And what did they get?
Not autonomy, but more centralized power. Under Sukarno and
Soeharto, any hopes for autonomy faded away, despite it being
always touted in their promises. Soeharto issued a law on
regional administration in 1979, but it was only during (the
administration of) B.J. Habibie that the idea received greater
attention.

Now, the administration of Gus Dur is implementing the law
halfheartedly.

Q: What do you mean halfheartedly?

A: What has his administration done to facilitate the
implementation of the rulings that he himself introduced?

The two laws concerned need a number of implementing
regulations. The government once promised to put it into effect
in March 2000, but postponed it to April, then to September. How
many new rulings has he produced? Only a few, while actually one
law needs dozens of directives.

And now, in a recent meeting with local legislators, Gus Dur
said "regional autonomy has been too hastily arranged." This
shows how unprepared he is. So what we have now is a government
that is ill-prepared to implement the laws, and regional
administrations who are also far from ready.

All this time the government sapped dry all of the regional
resources and only returned (a small portion) back to the
regions. This way, the regions became very much dependent on the
central government. Law No. 25 was introduced to correct this --
some authority will be returned to the regions so they will be
able tend to their own financial affairs. The regional
administrations will then be able to collect their own taxes and
levies without going through the central government as they have
always done.

But I wonder if the replacement of finance ministers has
dissipated the country's resolve (to implement the autonomy
policy). This should not have happened. The ministers should be
able to come and go, but policies should remain the same.

We have only one month left, (it will not be) possible to
produce the regulations necessary for the implementation of the
autonomy policy in such a short time.

Q: How ready is Indonesian society for autonomy?

A: The regions are basically divided into two: those rich in
natural resources, and the poor regions. The rich regions, such
as Aceh, Riau, East Kalimantan and West Papua or Irian Jaya are
those that made the early demands for autonomy because they have
been the largest contributors to our GNP.

They believed that reducing the flow of income to the central
government would automatically increase the flow to their own
treasuries, thus enabling them to run development programs as
they see fit. The other regions are, on the other hand, heavily
dependent on the central government. They are not ready for
autonomy.

Another problem relates to human resources. It is obvious that
urban centers have better prepared human resources. The larger
the cities, the better prepared they are. Look at Jakarta,
Makassar or Medan. The farther away from the urban centers, the
more ill-prepared the regions are. We would have a Java - outer
regions dichotomy because the regions that are relatively ready
are those in Java.

Another factor to be looked at is cultural resources -- which
show that no region in Indonesia is ready for autonomy. We are so
used to centralization, to paternalism, authoritarianism, that we
are no longer able to see alternatives to those patterns.

The (long-standing) culture of power has destroyed the ability
to be independent. We are so used to being controlled as regards
even the smallest minutiae -- pencils, paper and typewriters were
sent to the outer regions from Jakarta for the sake of uniformity
and centralization.

Let us take an example of a school in the hinterland of
Kalimantan, where its desks, tables and chairs are imported from
Jakarta despite the fact that the island is rich with timber
while Java no longer has forests. What happens is that people cut
the Kalimantan trees, ship the timber to be processed in Java
before shipping back the goods to Kalimantan.

So the least ready factor here is our own culture. We have
failed to cultivate a culture that would support democratization
and autonomy.

How regions will fare in the autonomy drive will depend on
combinations of factors. There are certainly regions with certain
factors that should enable them to progress and prosper under the
autonomy policy. As human resource is the most dominant factor,
then urban centers will show a better response to the autonomy
policy.

Much will depend on the wisdom of the regional leaders. If the
rich regions are led by skilled persons, those who place a
premium on the interests of their people rather than on their own
interests, then they will progress rapidly. Problems will abound
in the regions which are rich in natural resources, but have poor
human resources and cultural resources. This is where the worries
about the possible emergence of local strongmen are justified.

So the three factors need to be looked at simultaneously. Rich
regions can either progress rapidly or not progress at all
depending upon the wisdom, or lack of it, of their leaders.

Let's look at Malaysia, whose history since 1959 shows a
marked contradiction to ours. In the period of 1945-1959,
Indonesia had good leadership, one that was very democratic and
put such importance on the people's interests that the leaders
were willing to live simply. That was our golden age, despite the
simplicity of life.

Now Malaysia is enjoying such a period -- even if they were
hit by the same crisis that hit us, they rebounded sooner and are
now on their way back.

Q: A sociological theory says that, in the past, a region's
prosperity hinged on its geographical location, on whether it was
a coastal area or a hinterland. Does this theory have any
relevance given your assessment of the three factors above?

A: Yes, although we also need to discuss several new dimensions
to the theory. The first dimension is (the presence of) the
conspiracy of centers of power. We need to differentiate between
economic powers and political powers, which existed mostly in the
hinterland as most of the centers of (traditional) kingdoms were
in such regions.

The centers of economic activity were found mostly along the
coastal areas, because the agricultural system that we have
developed is traditional in nature and even now is very much at
subsistence level. Therefore, only a limited amount of
agricultural products are traded. But with the growth of import-
export and other economic activities, the coastal areas would
certainly developed further, and have done so in the past.

The dichotomy of inland-coastal areas, however, gave rise to
various problems including cultural friction. People said that
culturally, the coastal regions were more egalitarian and
moderate, while the inland areas tended to be more feudal and the
powerholders tended to be more repressive.

Q: Because the autonomy policy will be based on Level II regions
(the regencies), may we conclude that coastal regencies will
progress more rapidly than inland regencies?

A: That is possible. But there will be variations because not all
coastal regions are already developed. Maybe they are in Java,
but not so in the outer islands. In South Sulawesi, for instance,
it is the inland regions that are relatively more developed. That
is because of the backwardness of the means of production in the
coastal regions, while inland regencies have greater expanses of
agricultural production.

In fact, we can say that the poorest and the most downtrodden
people in Indonesia are fishermen; their income is the lowest of
all. In coastal areas, too, we see differences between coastal
cities and coastal villages. The fishermen live in coastal
villages, which are much poorer than inland villages. (Ali Said
Damanik)