A third option for East Timor

A third option for East Timor

By Widjoseno Sastroamidjojo

JAKARTA (JP): The announcement made earlier by Indonesian
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, particularly concerning the
possibility of releasing East Timor from Indonesia as a second
option should the offer of greater autonomy be rejected has taken
the world greatly by surprise.

Moreover, such a radical alternative has left the so-called
East Timorese independence leaders at the crossroads. This could
be seen clearly from their ambiguous political stance on the
future of East Timor. For instance, pro-independence advocate
Jose Ramos-Horta who had been desperately seeking ways and
struggling for the sake of East Timor's independence for many
years surprisingly still preferred a referendum instead of
welcoming the second option offered by Indonesia. The same goes
for the Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Bishop Belo, who also opted
for greater autonomy for the province.

Apart from the comprehensive solution offered by Indonesia,
the second political option unfortunately has become the object
of criticism not only from a segment of the international
community, but also from certain sectors in this country. People
tend to jump to a conclusion much too quickly and think that the
Indonesian government will enforce the second alternative
unilaterally.

Actually they forget that the second option is merely
conditional, and that it would only be implemented as a last
resort should the alternative of meaningful autonomy end in a
deadlock. Moreover, many people are still questioning the
feasibility of the second alternative, arguing that a unilateral
decision by Indonesia would not be democratic unless the East
Timorese people are given a chance to determine their own
political future.

These worries are understandable because the second option
itself tends to reflect the sense of arrogance some East Timorese
find unacceptable and which may eventually be detrimental to
Indonesia's conduct of diplomacy in the near future.

As an alternative to a referendum, the disengagement of the
27th province from Indonesia as stated by the government should
be the ultimate solution. However, the verdict itself should not
be determined solely by the next MPR General Session (SU-MPR).

It would be better if a third alternative is also taken into
account by giving the East Timorese (pro and contra integration)
a last chance to determine their choices or preferences through
the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) as the duly
constituted representation of the East Timorese people within the
Indonesian system.

Therefore, the final decision on the fate of East Timor would
not be determined by the MPR, but only approved by it (preferably
after the June 1999 general election, in order to achieve a more
credible result). The third alternative is a relatively neutral
solution to the East Timor problem that can accommodate the
persisting differences between sides and parties. It is believed
that this option will be more beneficial to the East Timorese as
well as Indonesia in the future knowing that it was the East
Timorese themselves who asked to be integrated with Indonesia.

Compared to the referendum as requested by foreign countries,
the third alternative could also serve as "a face-saving formula"
for the government and particularly the Armed Forces which had
from the very beginning the biggest role as well as interest in
the process of integrating East Timor into Indonesia. More
importantly, the net result of this solution will clearly reflect
the true aspirations of the entire East Timorese nation without
having to go through a divisive referendum.

In other words, the end result will be more acceptable to all
concerned parties (national and international) without going
through a referendum which is considered unconstitutional by the
government. In the long run, the implementation of this
alternative would help Indonesia avoid making the past mistake of
the Portuguese in abandoning the territory indefinitely in 1975.
Such an option will spare Indonesia the accusation of being
irresponsible and immoral.

However if the second option is inevitable and knowing that
there is a growing fear of insecurity in the territory, then
Falintil (Forcas Armadas de Lebertacao Nacional de Timor Leste)
should guarantee the safety of the former pro-integrationists.

Furthermore, in order to restore peace, order and security in
East Timor the United Nations must immediately organize a general
election to elect a trusted leader who represents all the
interests of the East Timor people in their entirety.

The writer, a political science graduate of the Nasional
University, Jakarta, works at the Foreign Ministry. He has
written this article in a private capacity.

Window: As an alternative to a referendum, the disengagement of
the 27th province from Indonesia as stated by the government
should be the ultimate solution. However, the verdict itself
should not be determined solely by the next MPR General Session
(SU-MPR).