A third option for East Timor

By Widjoseno Sastroamidjojo

JAKARTA (JP): The announcement made earlier by Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, particularly concerning the possibility of releasing East Timor from Indonesia as a second option should the offer of greater autonomy be rejected has taken the world greatly by surprise.

Moreover, such a radical alternative has left the so-called East Timorese independence leaders at the crossroads. This could be seen clearly from their ambiguous political stance on the future of East Timor. For instance, pro-independence advocate Jose Ramos-Horta who had been desperately seeking ways and struggling for the sake of East Timor's independence for many years surprisingly still preferred a referendum instead of welcoming the second option offered by Indonesia. The same goes for the Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Bishop Belo, who also opted for greater autonomy for the province.

Apart from the comprehensive solution offered by Indonesia, the second political option unfortunately has become the object of criticism not only from a segment of the international community, but also from certain sectors in this country. People tend to jump to a conclusion much too quickly and think that the Indonesian government will enforce the second alternative unilaterally.

Actually they forget that the second option is merely conditional, and that it would only be implemented as a last resort should the alternative of meaningful autonomy end in a deadlock. Moreover, many people are still questioning the feasibility of the second alternative, arguing that a unilateral decision by Indonesia would not be democratic unless the East Timorese people are given a chance to determine their own political future.

These worries are understandable because the second option itself tends to reflect the sense of arrogance some East Timorese find unacceptable and which may eventually be detrimental to Indonesia's conduct of diplomacy in the near future.

As an alternative to a referendum, the disengagement of the 27th province from Indonesia as stated by the government should be the ultimate solution. However, the verdict itself should not be determined solely by the next MPR General Session (SU-MPR).

It would be better if a third alternative is also taken into account by giving the East Timorese (pro and contra integration) a last chance to determine their choices or preferences through the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) as the duly constituted representation of the East Timorese people within the Indonesian system.

Therefore, the final decision on the fate of East Timor would not be determined by the MPR, but only approved by it (preferably after the June 1999 general election, in order to achieve a more credible result). The third alternative is a relatively neutral solution to the East Timor problem that can accommodate the persisting differences between sides and parties. It is believed that this option will be more beneficial to the East Timorese as well as Indonesia in the future knowing that it was the East Timorese themselves who asked to be integrated with Indonesia.

Compared to the referendum as requested by foreign countries, the third alternative could also serve as "a face-saving formula" for the government and particularly the Armed Forces which had from the very beginning the biggest role as well as interest in the process of integrating East Timor into Indonesia. More importantly, the net result of this solution will clearly reflect the true aspirations of the entire East Timorese nation without having to go through a divisive referendum.

In other words, the end result will be more acceptable to all concerned parties (national and international) without going through a referendum which is considered unconstitutional by the government. In the long run, the implementation of this alternative would help Indonesia avoid making the past mistake of the Portuguese in abandoning the territory indefinitely in 1975. Such an option will spare Indonesia the accusation of being irresponsible and immoral.

However if the second option is inevitable and knowing that there is a growing fear of insecurity in the territory, then Falintil (Forcas Armadas de Lebertacao Nacional de Timor Leste) should guarantee the safety of the former pro-integrationists.

Furthermore, in order to restore peace, order and security in East Timor the United Nations must immediately organize a general election to elect a trusted leader who represents all the interests of the East Timor people in their entirety.

The writer, a political science graduate of the Nasional University, Jakarta, works at the Foreign Ministry. He has written this article in a private capacity.

Window: As an alternative to a referendum, the disengagement of the 27th province from Indonesia as stated by the government should be the ultimate solution. However, the verdict itself should not be determined solely by the next MPR General Session (SU-MPR).