A study in history: Diplomacy of crisis in RI

Siswo Pramono, School of Social Science, The Australian National University, Canberra

Diplomacy of crisis, in a wider sense, is the whole process of foreign policy making and its implementation in a bid to survive during a crisis. Indonesia should learn from this "crisis diplomacy" during the 1945 to 1950 period, a time of marathon negotiations (i.e. Linggarjati, Renville and the Round Table conferences) and Dutch military aggression, in attempts to find a better way to manage the current multi-dimensional crisis.

Despite stark differences, the decolonization crisis and the current 1997 to 2002 crisis share some common characteristics.

Both crises involved wars or military action just short of war. In 1947 and 1948, Indonesia had to fight the Dutch military aggression; in 1999, during the secession of East Timor, Indonesia managed to avoid direct war with Australia, but it has been fighting lingering guerrilla wars in Aceh and Irian Jaya, as well as conducting peacekeeping operations in Maluku, East Nusa Tenggara, Central Sulawesi and West Kalimantan. These two periods have in common, a high probability of state collapse.

Both crises also highlighted what Foreign Minister Hasan Wirayuda called intermestik factors (the intermingling of international and domestic factors). In 1945-1950, the poor Indonesia had to suffer even further from the global economic recession as the consequence of World War II. Domestic politics were greatly affected by the antagonistic relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, which then led the world into the Cold War.

The current crisis, too, is the consequence of such intermingling factors. Indonesia's weak economic fundamentals, as the product of a corrupt system, were brought to collapse by the Asian economic meltdown. It is also an irony that the growth of Indonesia's baby democracy is sometimes impeded by the increasingly authoritarian post-Cold War, if not post-Sept. 11, global political realities.

In both crises, the government faced and is facing a finite period of time to respond to the worsening instability. And, on many occasions, the government has lost control over events. As such, important lessons can be drawn by comparing the decolonization crisis and the current crisis.

First, president Sukarno, who was bestowed, by the Constitution, with an almost unlimited authority, relied on the recommendations of his aides Sutan Sjahrir (a diplomat of true intellectual depth), Mohammad Hatta (a realist and practical administrator) and Amir Sjarifudin (a military expert). The point is, a good decision-making process needs multiple advocacy. The President must not rely on the recommendation of one official or one department only. The implications on the current crisis is that an all-inclusive (or total) diplomacy is needed to address, for instance, such a complex issue as the fate of Indonesian illegal workers in Malaysia.

Second, Sukarno, while leaving the details of diplomatic practices to the experts (e.g. Ahmad Soebardjo, Agus Salim, and A.A. Maramis), encouraged a public discourse on foreign policy. In the current case, Indonesia must promote such a public discourse, for instance, of whether or not the government should rely on the IMF as a solution to the economic crisis, as part of crisis diplomacy.

Third, Sukarno asserted close political control in the implementation of foreign policy. In the current crisis, East Timor was a bitter lesson. Apart from the 5 May, 1999 tripartite Indonesia-Portugal-UN agreement, Indonesia rarely, if at all, held senior official meetings with the East Timorese independence leaders.

Consequently, the government lost control over the realpolitik of East Timor and instead held an illusion that Indonesia would win the Aug. 30, 1999 vote despite decades of human rights abuse in the territory. To avoid the same mistake, the diplomacy for Aceh now involves direct senior official meetings between Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).

Fourth, during the decolonization crisis, the government was prepared to accommodate options ranging from united states within Indonesia to a unitary state of Indonesia, while the latter remained the prime objective of the "crisis diplomacy". In the current crisis, too, the government must be able to maintain flexible options of crisis management.

Fifth, in the 1945 to 1950 time, Indonesia refrained from setting a definite time in negotiations with the Dutch. The current government can adopt the same strategy by reducing the time pressure in dealing with such delicate issues as Aceh and Irian Jaya. Prolonged negotiations with the resistance groups and other societal representatives of the two regions will likely produce more sustainable results than continuing small-scale wars. Sukarno's later policy of trying to deal with secessionist movements by heavily relying on the military option, and then failing to uphold promises must not be repeated.

Sixth, in 1945 to 1950, lengthy negotiations provided the opportunity for the Indonesian leaders to improve their knowledge about the adversary's strengths and weaknesses. Later, this knowledge helped Indonesia win the diplomatic battle with the Dutch over Irian Jaya. Megawati Soekarnoputri's government should consider the same strategy of maintaining communication with, improving the knowledge of, and hence addressing the grievances that the secessionists in Irian Jaya and Aceh in an effort to preserve national integrity.

Seventh, the key to the successful crisis diplomacy between 1945 and 1950, according to Charles Wolf, Jr., the then American Vice Consul in Jakarta, was capable leadership. On Aug. 17, 1950 the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, as originally proclaimed, was restored. And now, Indonesia needs similarly capable crisis diplomacy leaders in a bid to preserve the unitary state.

Indonesia's crisis diplomacy in the last five years represents the hard work of those involved in diplomacy. Indonesia failed to anticipate the Asian economic meltdown but somehow has been able to endure, with unbearable pain, its worst impacts. Indonesia failed to secure the territory after the result of the East Timor referendum, but managed to avoid a devastating war with Australia (and its ANZUS allies).

Indonesia also managed to settle the dispute of illegal migrants with Australia (i.e the Tampa case and others) but now is facing an even bigger problem with Malaysia. Indonesia is committed to combat terrorism, but any unilateral action of the world's superpower in its "war on terror" will affect Indonesia's domestic politics. Indonesia is on the brink of national disintegration but able to attain international support for national integrity. The current crisis is not over yet, but the Indonesian people are determined to pass the test.

The writer is also an official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.