A study in history: Diplomacy of crisis in RI

A study in history: Diplomacy of crisis in RI

Siswo Pramono, School of Social Science, The Australian
National University, Canberra

Diplomacy of crisis, in a wider sense, is the whole process of
foreign policy making and its implementation in a bid to survive
during a crisis. Indonesia should learn from this "crisis
diplomacy" during the 1945 to 1950 period, a time of marathon
negotiations (i.e. Linggarjati, Renville and the Round Table
conferences) and Dutch military aggression, in attempts to find a
better way to manage the current multi-dimensional crisis.

Despite stark differences, the decolonization crisis and the
current 1997 to 2002 crisis share some common characteristics.

Both crises involved wars or military action just short of
war. In 1947 and 1948, Indonesia had to fight the Dutch military
aggression; in 1999, during the secession of East Timor,
Indonesia managed to avoid direct war with Australia, but it has
been fighting lingering guerrilla wars in Aceh and Irian Jaya, as
well as conducting peacekeeping operations in Maluku, East Nusa
Tenggara, Central Sulawesi and West Kalimantan. These two periods
have in common, a high probability of state collapse.

Both crises also highlighted what Foreign Minister Hasan
Wirayuda called intermestik factors (the intermingling of
international and domestic factors). In 1945-1950, the poor
Indonesia had to suffer even further from the global economic
recession as the consequence of World War II. Domestic politics
were greatly affected by the antagonistic relations between the
U.S. and the Soviet Union, which then led the world into the Cold
War.

The current crisis, too, is the consequence of such
intermingling factors. Indonesia's weak economic fundamentals, as
the product of a corrupt system, were brought to collapse by the
Asian economic meltdown. It is also an irony that the growth of
Indonesia's baby democracy is sometimes impeded by the
increasingly authoritarian post-Cold War, if not post-Sept. 11,
global political realities.

In both crises, the government faced and is facing a finite
period of time to respond to the worsening instability. And, on
many occasions, the government has lost control over events. As
such, important lessons can be drawn by comparing the
decolonization crisis and the current crisis.

First, president Sukarno, who was bestowed, by the
Constitution, with an almost unlimited authority, relied on the
recommendations of his aides Sutan Sjahrir (a diplomat of true
intellectual depth), Mohammad Hatta (a realist and practical
administrator) and Amir Sjarifudin (a military expert). The point
is, a good decision-making process needs multiple advocacy. The
President must not rely on the recommendation of one official or
one department only. The implications on the current crisis is
that an all-inclusive (or total) diplomacy is needed to address,
for instance, such a complex issue as the fate of Indonesian
illegal workers in Malaysia.

Second, Sukarno, while leaving the details of diplomatic
practices to the experts (e.g. Ahmad Soebardjo, Agus Salim, and
A.A. Maramis), encouraged a public discourse on foreign policy.
In the current case, Indonesia must promote such a public
discourse, for instance, of whether or not the government should
rely on the IMF as a solution to the economic crisis, as part of
crisis diplomacy.

Third, Sukarno asserted close political control in the
implementation of foreign policy. In the current crisis, East
Timor was a bitter lesson. Apart from the 5 May, 1999 tripartite
Indonesia-Portugal-UN agreement, Indonesia rarely, if at all,
held senior official meetings with the East Timorese independence
leaders.

Consequently, the government lost control over the realpolitik
of East Timor and instead held an illusion that Indonesia would
win the Aug. 30, 1999 vote despite decades of human rights abuse
in the territory. To avoid the same mistake, the diplomacy for
Aceh now involves direct senior official meetings between
Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).

Fourth, during the decolonization crisis, the government was
prepared to accommodate options ranging from united states within
Indonesia to a unitary state of Indonesia, while the latter
remained the prime objective of the "crisis diplomacy". In the
current crisis, too, the government must be able to maintain
flexible options of crisis management.

Fifth, in the 1945 to 1950 time, Indonesia refrained from
setting a definite time in negotiations with the Dutch. The
current government can adopt the same strategy by reducing the
time pressure in dealing with such delicate issues as Aceh and
Irian Jaya. Prolonged negotiations with the resistance groups and
other societal representatives of the two regions will likely
produce more sustainable results than continuing small-scale
wars. Sukarno's later policy of trying to deal with secessionist
movements by heavily relying on the military option, and then
failing to uphold promises must not be repeated.

Sixth, in 1945 to 1950, lengthy negotiations provided the
opportunity for the Indonesian leaders to improve their knowledge
about the adversary's strengths and weaknesses. Later, this
knowledge helped Indonesia win the diplomatic battle with the
Dutch over Irian Jaya. Megawati Soekarnoputri's government should
consider the same strategy of maintaining communication with,
improving the knowledge of, and hence addressing the grievances
that the secessionists in Irian Jaya and Aceh in an effort to
preserve national integrity.

Seventh, the key to the successful crisis diplomacy between
1945 and 1950, according to Charles Wolf, Jr., the then American
Vice Consul in Jakarta, was capable leadership. On Aug. 17, 1950
the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, as originally
proclaimed, was restored. And now, Indonesia needs similarly
capable crisis diplomacy leaders in a bid to preserve the unitary
state.

Indonesia's crisis diplomacy in the last five years represents
the hard work of those involved in diplomacy. Indonesia failed
to anticipate the Asian economic meltdown but somehow has been
able to endure, with unbearable pain, its worst impacts.
Indonesia failed to secure the territory after the result of the
East Timor referendum, but managed to avoid a devastating war
with Australia (and its ANZUS allies).

Indonesia also managed to settle the dispute of illegal
migrants with Australia (i.e the Tampa case and others) but now
is facing an even bigger problem with Malaysia. Indonesia is
committed to combat terrorism, but any unilateral action of the
world's superpower in its "war on terror" will affect Indonesia's
domestic politics. Indonesia is on the brink of national
disintegration but able to attain international support for
national integrity. The current crisis is not over yet, but the
Indonesian people are determined to pass the test.

The writer is also an official at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.