A stable Indonesia vital for Southeast Asian security

A stable Indonesia vital for Southeast Asian security

By Paul Dibb

The following article is based on a paper presented at an
international conference recently held in Bogor, co-hosted by the
Jakarta-based Research Institute for Peace and Democracy. This is
the first of two articles.

BOGOR: Despite the dramatic events in Indonesia, Southeast
Asia is not an area of high priority for the major powers.

Developments in Northeast Asia, and particularly the tensions
between China and the United States over Taiwan, as well as the
risk of war between India and Pakistan in South Asia, will
preoccupy the major powers.

This is not to argue that Southeast Asia is strategically
unimportant. The ten ASEAN countries have a combined population
of over 500 million people and they stand astride very important
straits that account for about 40 percent of the world's maritime
trade. The region is flanked by the crucial strategic landmasses
of Northeast Asia and South Asia.

To a growing extent, the interests of the great powers are
likely to overlap in Southeast Asia. But it is important to
understand that, unlike Northeast Asia and South Asia, major
power war is most unlikely to occur in Southeast Asia.

This gives the region an essentially peaceful outlook. Within
Southeast Asia, it seems highly improbable that one regional
country will attack another, despite tensions and disagreements
between some members of ASEAN.

What is of much greater security concern is political and
social stability within the ASEAN countries themselves and the
risk that serious upheaval or fragmentation, especially in
Indonesia, will infect other parts of Southeast Asia.

Indonesia's stability is central to the national security of
its neighbors: Singapore and Malaysia to the north, the
Philippines and Papua New Guinea to the east, and Australia to
the south.

With this analysis in mind, we now examine the outlook for
regional security. This will include the role of the major
external powers.

Overall, it is my view that we are unlikely to see a major
disruption to Southeast Asia's security, leading to serious armed
conflict.

This is an important judgment. It depends crucially upon an
optimistic view of the outlook for stability in Indonesia.

We live in a period, the post-Cold War era, of great strategic
change and unpredictability. Who would have foreseen the demise
of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, let alone the Asian
economic crisis and the overthrow of the Soeharto regime in
Indonesia?

It is easy, therefore, for former defense planners -- such as
myself -- to be cautious about the future. At the very least, we
should be wary of predicting a fail-safe and optimistic outlook
for Southeast Asia.

Responsible security analysts should ask themselves what might
go wrong. This is not to indulge in "worst-case" scenarios.
Rather it is to examine a range of credible alternative outcomes
for regional security, so that our political leaders are not
caught by surprise when something goes badly wrong.

What are some of these alternative futures then? They range
from conflict between Thailand and Myanmar and Cambodia and
Thailand over border disagreements, through to a repeat of the
military clashes that occurred in the late 1970s between Vietnam
and Cambodia or China being tempted again to "teach Vietnam a
lesson". Most of these scenarios are unlikely, except for the
growing problems between Myanmar and Thailand.

Further to the south, there are periodic tensions between
Malaysia and Singapore over territorial and ethnic matters but
these two countries seem to have learnt how to manage a difficult
relationship.

The Philippines still faces serious problems of insurrection
in its southern province of Mindanao and it is very concerned
about China's claims to Philippines' territory in the South China
Sea.

To the east of Indonesia, Papua New Guinea is a weak state
facing potential economic collapse and strong secessionist
movements.

From Australia's perspective, it now confronts an arc of
instability to its near north stretching from Indonesia through
to Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, where there is an
active insurrection.

New Zealand's defense policy, which is to structure its armed
forces primarily for peacekeeping, means that that country is
becoming more of a strategic liability than a defense asset for
Australia.

In contemplating the strategic future, there is a growing
consensus that Southeast Asia will be the focus of what is called
"the new strategic agenda".

In other words, the region will increasingly experience the
effects of illegal migration, drug trafficking, piracy, and
transnational environmental damage.

Whilst these non-traditional security concerns are unlikely to
lead to armed conflict between nations, they do add to regional
instability and tensions, especially between neighboring
countries.

In theory, these problems should lend themselves more readily
to cooperation among countries of the region than the more
demanding issues of military cooperation and transparency.

But in several regional countries drug trafficking, economic
activities that lead to severe environmental damage, illegal
migration, and even piracy involve vested interests, including
the military. It will, therefore, be difficult to eradicate these
serious problems.

The Asian economic crisis of 1997 and 1998 demonstrated just
how closely economics and security are intertwined. The speed and
depth of the crisis was unprecedented in modern Asian economic
history.

It fundamentally shook the confidence of the region. It also
undermined the idea that Asian countries had found a foolproof
combination of political authoritarianism and state capitalism
that would ensure economic growth for all time.

But the crisis also demonstrated that democracy was alive and
well in South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines where
democratic elections led to a smooth handover of power.

The story was different in Indonesia, which was much more
profoundly affected by the crisis than any other country. But
even there the collapse of Soeharto's military regime was
relatively peaceful.

Even so, the economic crisis has set back Indonesia's
prosperity by at least ten years. Unemployment remains extremely
high and democracy is fragile. The economic crisis has had
serious security implications for Indonesia.

It has also made the rest of the region much less confident
and more introspective. This means that most countries in the
region have less time to give to broader regional security
cooperation.

What is the likelihood of another economic crisis?

While most countries in the region are making a remarkable
economic recovery, they have done little to address the
fundamental structural problems that made them so vulnerable to
the crisis of 1997.

The key issues of banking reform, financial accountability,
currency volatility, as well as corruption, have hardly been
touched in many instances. This means that the region is
vulnerable to another crisis.

The fear must be that few if any, countries in Asia have
learned much from the crisis of 1997 and 1998. There is an
imperfect understanding of the nexus between economics and
security in the region.

But the balance of power and the role of the external powers
should also be of serious concern to Southeast Asian security
planners.

The most obvious issue of contention is China's claim to all
the islands and reefs in the South China Sea and their
surrounding waters. The Chinese authorities continue to issue
maps which show that China effectively claims the whole of the
South China Sea and there is evidence that the People's
Liberation Army continues to militarize China's claims.

Recently there have been clashes between some ASEAN countries
and China over their South China Sea claims. China has used
military force on more than one occasion in the South China Sea.
The solution to this serious territorial issue is clearly
negotiation and compromise.

But China is a rising power that sees itself as the natural
leading power in Asia. It is acquiring, with assistance from
Russia, modern military equipment that will enable it to prevail
militarily in the South China Sea against any regional power, if
it so wishes. Were China to succeed in asserting sovereignty over
the South China Sea it would be able to penetrate deeply into
Southeast Asia and threaten freedom of navigation.

There are serious questions surrounding the rise of China to
power. Will China be a responsible and cooperative member of the
international community, abiding by its rules of non-aggression
and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries?

Or will China become an expansionist power, as have other
rising powers in the past?

World history has been marked by the rise of ambitious new
powers seeking to displace weaker powers. But China is many
decades away from being a peer competitor with the dominant world
power, the United States.

The main danger to Southeast Asia in the short term is not
Chinese military aggression. It is the risk that the next theater
of Cold War confrontation will be between the United States and
China. There is a growing sentiment in America that sees China as
a strategic competitor, if not the next "evil empire".

While there is an important convergence of interests with
respect to North Korea and the spread of nuclear weapons, China
and the U.S. increasingly diverge on a long list of key strategic
issues. These include Taiwan; Japan's regional security role;
Iran and Iraq; the expansion of North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO); the strengthening of other U.S. alliances;
missile exports; theater and national missile defenses; and the
U.S. security role in the Asia-Pacific.

David Shambaugh claims that growing "strategic competition" is
likely to characterize Sino-American relations for most of the
coming decade, irrespective of the new American administration
that comes to office in 2001. I would assert that the risk is
higher than this: for those of us who live in the Asia-Pacific
region it is that there will be a struggle for power between the
United States and China, leading to military confrontation.

The greatest risk is over Taiwan. War between the United
States and China in the Taiwan Straits would risk drawing in
America's allies, including Australia.

Washington would expect its other allies, particularly Japan
and South Korea, to support it. Such expectations could seriously
damage America's alliances in the region.

Short of such cataclysmic events, the main danger for
Southeast Asia is that it will be under increasing pressure to
side with either China or the United States in their struggle for
power and influence. This could divide the region. There are
already signs that Malaysia and Thailand incline towards China.
Vietnam, the Philippines and Singapore favor the U.S.. Indonesia
has traditionally been hostile to China. But President
Abdurrahman Wahid has talked recently about a triangular
relationship with China and India that would offset Indonesia's
traditional closer relationship with the United States.

The future course of Indonesia's relations with China will be
followed with the utmost scrutiny, not least by the United States
and Australia. The purchase by Indonesia of arms from China, for
instance, would raise alarm.

There is the further issue that China does not accept the
rationale for the U.S. forward military presence in Asia. It
explicitly calls for the abrogation of all alliances, claiming
that they are not conducive to maintaining peace and security in
the post-Cold War world.

Before his visit to Australia last year, President Jiang Zemin
proclaimed that alliances were "obsolete". (What in fact is
obsolete is Communism}.

Chinese officials have openly called for the removal of U.S.
forces from the region. China must accept that the U.S. is not
going to withdraw from Asia and America's alliances are not going
to disappear.

China needs to understand that Asia without the United States
would be a dangerous place. It would leave the region open to
Chinese hegemony and to the potential for conflict between China
and Japan. None of this would be conducive to peace and stability
in the region.

As China's influence in Southeast Asia grows, India -- which
is also a major power -- will seek to compete with China. Until
recently, India's poor economic performance, its alliance with
the former Soviet Union, and its military preoccupation with
Pakistan have served to limit its interests in Southeast Asia.

But India now seems set on a path of economic reform and its
economy is growing strongly. The military balance on the
subcontinent now firmly favors India and with each year that
passes India's superior economic performance will improve its
military advantage.

India, therefore, will be able to lift its strategic horizons
away from its obsession with Pakistan. Southeast Asia is a
natural area for India's future focus.

India has long-established historical ties to the region
(including with Indonesia) and its territory, including the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands, are in close proximity to Southeast
Asia.

Already, India is seeking to strengthen its old relationship
with Vietnam, as well as with Japan. This competition between
India and China will benefit the region because it will ensure
that neither power predominates.

Japan should have strong strategic interests in Southeast Asia
because more than half of its imports, including most of its oil,
passes through the straits of the region.

If a potentially hostile power were to gain control over the
maritime approaches to Southeast Asia, Japan's economic health
would be fundamentally threatened. As long as the United States
remains the dominant world power, and has a strong alliance with
Japan, this will not occur.

Of greater concern is Japan's inability to provide leadership
in Asia commensurate with its economic power. Partly, this is to
do with lingering memories of Japan's aggression in the World War
II. But it also stems from Japan's preoccupation with its
domestic economic problems, which have seen its economy virtually
stagnant for the last decade.

Moreover, as we saw in the Asian economic crisis three years
ago, the United States is not willing to allow Japan to take on
the role of financial leader in Southeast Asia.

It is important that Japan has more of a leadership role in
the region both to offset the growth in China's influence and
because its economy accounts for 60 percent of Asia's Gross
National Product. But China -- whose economy is less than a fifth
the size of that of Japan -- has a much higher political profile
in the region.

Russia, which is the other major power, is unlikely to be a
significant influence in Southeast Asia for the foreseeable
future. It will remain preoccupied with its internal political
and economic affairs and the situation along its borders,
especially the territories of the former Soviet Union.

Russia's ability to supply advanced conventional weapons to
China and India is, however, a matter of concern. Arms exports
are one of the few competitive products produced by the ailing
Russian economy. Russia has the capacity to upset the regional
military balance and it is already doing this through its arms
supplies to China.

Overall, it is unlikely that any one major power will become
the hegemony in Asia. Instead, what we are likely to see is a
competitive struggle for influence between the United States,
China, Japan and India.

The key relationship here is the one between the United States
and China, which must not be allowed to deteriorate into military
confrontation and war.

Prof. Paul Dibb is head of the Strategic and Defense Studies
Center in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at the
Australian National University. He was formerly Deputy Secretary
and Director of the Joint Intelligence Organization in the
Australian Department of Defense.