A sound assessment

Though so far no official response has been given to the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) annual assessment of human rights conditions in this country, it can be safely surmised that the document is not exactly being greeted as a welcome New Year's present by the Indonesian government. Indeed, if anything, the commission's verdict as released on Wednesday delivers yet another blow to the already tattered image of the country's security apparatus, the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) in particular.

While acknowledging that a number of positive steps have in the past year been taken to promote human rights in Indonesia, the commission notes that, overall, the conditions currently prevailing in Indonesia are not conducive to the genuine protection of human rights due to the fact that a series of serious violations remain unresolved and, in the public's perception, are destined to do so.

Noting that the protection of human rights is primarily the duty of the government, the document says it is impossible to avoid the impression that many cases of violence have involved elements of the Armed Forces, besides those involving members of the community engaged in brawls. "The elementary question that arises is: Why have the security and law enforcement authorities in the past year not been capable of resolving serious human rights violations?" the document asks.

The basic answer, according to the statement, is that the Armed Forces as an institution appears to be handicapped by "internal constraints" created by a process of politicization that has weakened its integrity and enfeebled its ability to act as an effective force. Moreover, with the military's prestige currently at its lowest point, the spread of violence is difficult to prevent since the security apparatus lacks the authority that is needed to firmly establish public adherence to prevailing norms. Unless the existing cases of human rights abuses are swiftly resolved through open and fair court proceedings, frustration will grow among the public, triggering more violence that will develop into a source of instability.

From opening observation to final recommendation, the logic and good sense of the documented assessment is difficult to refute. The document once again proves the commission's integrity and relative independence despite the fact that it was established under Soeharto by means of a presidential decree. For the security authorities, and the Armed Forces in particular, the pill may be difficult to swallow. ABRI and the government, however, are well advised to accept the assessment with magnanimity if they are to win back the trust of the people. The widespread public skepticism about the ongoing trial of the 11 Army Special Forces (Kopassus) soldiers accused of the kidnapping of political activists, for example, shows that the commission is not alone in its view that the trial makes a mockery of justice and had better be aborted.

For the military in particular, winning back the public's trust and respect is especially important given its ambition of maintaining a role, albeit perhaps in a new form, in social and political affairs. The only way open for it to achieve this, though, would be by demonstrating to the public that it is sincere in its promise to "reposition" itself. Keeping cases of serious human rights violations buried or suspended certainly will not help to achieve that purpose. It is a difficult decision to make under the circumstances and one that is not without its risks. Nevertheless, it is a step that must somehow be undertaken. At stake is the future of the people, the country and the nation.