A re-run of the approach to war?

Isabel Hilton Guardian News Service London

If Tony Blair's conversation with Ariel Sharon is a reliable guide, he appears to be shifting his position on Iran from one of constructive engagement to one of more overt concern about Iran's nuclear program. Are we seeing a re-run of the long approach to war, or just an increase in already established diplomatic pressure?

The problem with crying wolf, of course, is that when the hot breath is really on your neck, skepticism results. In fact, there are many reasons why governments are concerned about Iran: There are serious and longstanding suspicions about Iran's nuclear program, though nobody has yet tried to argue that Tehran is close to developing weapons. Iran has offered only limited cooperation with inspections and has not yet signed the protocol that would allow a more rigorous inspection regime. In this argument, it is intent that counts.

Iran also continues to support groups such as Hamas that Sharon would like to see disappear from the map before he signs any Middle East peace agreement and, the U.S. alleges, it still harbors al-Qaeda suspects. And, as the home of the Shia revolution, Iran carries weight among the world's millions of Shia -- notably, of course, in Iraq. If the occupying power in Iraq was ever to permit elections, it would have to accept the risk of an Islamic government more friendly to Tehran than to Washington and, in the short term, it has to deal with sections of Iraqi influence that are guarding the Iranian interest in the politics of Iraq.

All or any of the above might trigger a rise in the rhetorical temperature. But as with Iraq, the fundamental question is whether the U.S. is already set on military action.

There is no doubt that the U.S. is determined to prevent Iran acquiring a nuclear capability, but in view of current difficulties in Iraq even the hardliners stop short of advocating a full-scale war. Instead, the hawks in the administration have argued for preemptive strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities at Bushehr, Natanz and Arak. Until now, the British approach has been to try to use international regulation and inspection rather than military threat.

So far, Blair's position is still consistent with a multilateral raising of the diplomatic temperature to bring pressure to bear on the regime, rather than a signal that Iran is an imminent military target. It is an approach that has the support of Russia and the EU -- no doubt in the hope that the U.S. might be persuaded there is more to gain by a multilateral approach than by a B52.

Washington may not have undergone the full road-to-Damascus moment on a multilateralist approach, but the U.S. has declined Iran's offer of bilateral talks and -- for now -- is leaving it to the International Atomic Energy Agency, despite the Bush administration's long record of undermining the IAEA's work.

But inside the administration there are signs of division that go beyond military action: It publicly encourages dissent in Iran -- including those who have been demonstrating in support of the progressive President Khatami against the mullahs. But hardliners within the administration want to adopt the People's Mujahidin, the extremist opposition group supported by Saddam Hussein, for use against Tehran.

The group is on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations, but it has recently been credited as the source of intelligence on Iran's clandestine nuclear program. Supporting the People's Mujahidin would alienate EU member states that have so far been willing to cooperate in applying multilateral pressure and strengthen the contention of Iran's hardliners that there is nothing to be gained by cooperation with the U.S.

It was a destabilizing choice for many of them, as it proved for Blair. If doing Washington's bidding yielded any influence at all, he should use it now -- for his own sake -- to keep the pressure on Iran diplomatic.