A pointless decision

The government's decision, as announced by Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono this week, to extend martial law in the special territory of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam is a perfect study in contradiction. Given the performance thus far by both the military (TNI) and the local administration in Aceh, the decision to extend martial law in the province, possibly until after the general elections in April next year, makes little -- if any -- sense at all.

Consider, for example, Susilo's own admission: "In terms of personnel and weaponry, GAM (the separatist Free Aceh Movement) rebels remain strong and they have modified their tactics to full guerrilla warfare." And this, despite the fact that the TNI has about 400,000 troops deployed in the province to fight some 5,000 GAM rebels, who have for years been fighting for the independence of their territory from Indonesia.

More than half of GAM's total strength of some 5,000 men (and women) have reportedly either been killed or captured, but only 459 weapons have so far been confiscated from the rebels' arsenal, estimated to contain 2,000 arms of various types and makes. While their ranks have been reduced, GAM guerrillas have spread themselves across a wider area and slipped through military cordons into rougher and more remote areas in a change of guerrilla tactics.

Not much has been heard, meanwhile, of the Rp 1.3 trillion (the equivalent of about US$153 million), which the government allocated for what it has termed "integrated operations," to include, besides military operations, the dispensing of humanitarian assistance to the population and restoration of the functioning of local administrations to the lowest levels within the restive province.

What all this amounts to is, in short, that the government and military have failed to deliver on their promise to eliminate GAM "down to its roots" and restore peace and order in the province within the six months it was given.

That, certainly, is cause enough for concern, but it is only one aspect of a larger set of problems that have plagued the special province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and befouled its relationship with its mother country, the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, almost since the start of Indonesia's independence.

In these past six months of integrated operations in Aceh, the policy has not resolved the question of eliminating the climate of continual discord that exists between Jakarta and Banda Aceh, the capital of the troubled province, due to perceived injustices, exploitation and repression carried out by successive Indonesian administrations.

What the integrated operations have, in general terms, failed to achieve is to alleviate the suffering of the Acehnese population, even in areas that have been freed of GAM, which, in any case, is believed in its heyday to have controlled only a handful of Aceh districts and subdistricts. Indeed, in many areas, the hardship that the population has to bear is reported to have increased. What it has achieved is to lessen accountability on those who hold power.

Given the complex situation that exists in the province, it is appropriate to suggest that first of all the government evaluate -- carefully and thoroughly, and by involving experts outside the government if necessary -- whether or not the integrated operations in Aceh have been successful. If the answer is in the affirmative, obviously there is no need for an extension. On the other hand, if the answer is negative, the TNI does not deserve to be granted the option of an extension to its operations.

This brings us to the task of finding alternative ways to solve the decades-old problem. One alternative would be to replace the present martial law administration with a new one, either civilian or military, or a mixture of both. The efficacy and acceptability of such an administration, however, would very much depend on the character and qualifications of those chosen to govern. Such a changing of the guard would not be acceptable, as it would be unlikely to ease the burden and suffering of the Acehnese people.

Another, more acceptable, alternative would be to install a new administration -- neither military nor the one currently in power -- but a transitional administration, whose main job would be to create an atmosphere conducive to the establishment of a democratic civil society in Aceh, based on an improved law on regional autonomy and provided with clear targets for the betterment of life for the Acehnese. Only by doing this can the nation hope to settle Aceh's long-standing problems once and for all.