A partisan president

A partisan president

Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, Journalist, Jakarta

The office of the president, despite the corruption of its
powers during the Sukarno and Soeharto eras, remains very much an
icon of national sovereignty and dignity. With the advent of
direct presidential elections in 2004, it will become the
paramount embodiment of the democratic process.

Critics have argued that the recently passed laws on the
election of the president only augment the role of the big
political parties. They decry the fact that under the present
arrangements individual candidates have no avenue for
representation and all potential nominees have to succumb to the
hegemony of the party system.

Despite the altruistic intentions of this argument, experience
in more advanced democracies has shown us that the solid linkage
between a president and a political party often becomes a
necessity rather than a luxury for the maintenance of an
effective and stable government.

The president should not only serve as a beacon of national
purpose, the chief executive and head of the armed forces, he
should also function as the country's political boss. In other
words the president must become a focus of steady political
leadership in a system where the House of Representatives (DPR)
is susceptible to the sway of centrifugal forces in a political
environment fraught with antagonism.

It is predicted that the post-2004 legislature will remain
divided in patchy political coalitions with no single party
having a majority. If the nationalist-secularist parties (Golkar
and PDI-P), who are expected to at least occupy a combined 40
percent to 50 percent of seats in the House, cannot coalesce to
forge a common political agenda, divisions will only be further
heightened. This fragmentation represents both a threat and an
opportunity for the incumbent president.

The threat results from the likely pressures that could be
brought to bear upon the executive as a result of these divisive
fissures along party lines. The opportunity lies in the prospect
of the president imposing leadership to rally legislators given
the absence of a predominant faction within the House.

In a system where the legislature has de facto equal powers of
persuasion to the executive, it thus becomes necessary for the
president to play politics. Whenever possible, it is important
for the president to marshal his political arsenal to guide the
legislature -- within the bounds of propriety and without
subverting the fundamental principle of checks and balances -- so
as to ensure the effective running of government.

The primary lesson of the Abdurrahman Wahid administration
must be that any president who is personally or politically
incapable of maintaining amicable cooperation with the House is a
liability to the country.

Apart from the executive's prerogative powers and privileges
to make appointments, the president's most effective weapon of
persuasion vis-a-vis the House is his function as a leading
figure, if not the chief, of a political party. As party chief,
the president has a foothold in the affairs of the House. The
president can also take advantage of his party position to bridge
the constitutional ambivalence in the relationship between the
different branches of government.

The president's dabbling in politics is, unfortunately, a
necessary evil. The image of our chief executive plowing the
political field -- stroking unsavory politicians, calling and
handing out favors for the sake of political expedience, and even
endorsing candidates of little worth -- is a reality that must be
faced if the president is seeking to run a government relatively
free of House interdiction. Such practical necessities can only
be effective if the president has established ties with political
parties.

Beyond the general elections, the president -- despite having
been legitimately elected by the plurality -- cannot draw his
power from such woolly sources of influence. Electoral prowess is
only effective immediately before or after the ballot process. In
the intervening years it is the clout of the political parties
that will determine the sway of a legislature. Consequently, the
president's power is rooted in his position as party chief.

It is questionable whether an "independent candidate", as
sought by our critical friends, could govern effectively in such
an environment. It is a situation that cannot be wished away by
utopian dreams. It is the prevailing reality, one that is the
rule, rather than the exception, in similar systems around the
world.

A president must thrive within a complex network of political
constituents. His inherent powers as chief executive can help to
prop up his authority, but this alone may be insufficient in the
political battlefield. The chief executive must have other
sources of persuasion (a dominant political party) in order to
buttress his standing before the legislature or face the prospect
of becoming a lame-duck president.

The writer is managing editor with Jakarta-based consultancy
firm Van Zorge, Heffernan and Associates.