A new political constellation?

By F. Aziez

BANDUNG (JP): American political scientist R. William Liddle gives an interesting analysis of the Indonesian party system in the May 20 edition of Republika. In his Party system in Indonesia: Mirror or Bridge?', he bases his analysis on an article written by Bahtiar Effendy which uses Geertz's conception framework of political streams, dividing Indonesian society into groups of santri, or devout Muslims, and priyayi/abangan, those Muslims who hold beliefs in which their faith and rituals are mixed with Hinduism-Buddhism and animism (Geertz seems to disregard other religions in the society).

Liddle sets out his analysis from the actual political context in which Habibie was a noted figure in the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI), which was founded in 1990. He is now enjoying the fruits of his membership in that santri- oriented group. ICMI accommodates santri intellectuals, especially the modernists, who were ignored and suspected during the first two decades of Soeharto's administration, but embraced during the last. ICMI was even given the chance to dominate Golkar -- the then ruling and privileged party -- until the fall of the regime. In the post-Soeharto era, following its victory over non-ICMI Golkar members in the middle of 1998, ICMI still dominates the giant party.

Liddle's analysis moves on with the question of how Habibie may obtain electoral support from parties other than Golkar. The answer lies in the fact that Habibie is a santri and is from outside Java. It leads to Liddle's view on the party system in Indonesia. According to him, Indonesia's current political system can be explained with the two major constellations of parties in terms of their political cultures. The first constellation circles around divisive forces, which is often euphemistically called "primordialism". It is something which confronts two groups: the santri political culture group (led by Golkar and Habibie) vis-a-vis the abangan/priyayi political culture group, led by Megawati Soekarnoputri's Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan). In this case, Islamic parties outside Golkar tend to support Habibie and his Golkar.

The second constellation centers around pure political reasons which confront two major groups: the "status-quo" group (led by Golkar) versus the "reformist" group, led by a coalition of the National Awakening Party or PAN, PDI Perjuangan and the National Awakening Party or PKB. This constellation does not reflect sectarianism; instead, it embraces or shelters both santri and abangan groups, from Java or outside Java. This is especially transparent in the case of the "reformist" group, since it unites abangan parties, like PDI Perjuangan, modernist santri parties like PAN and traditionalist santri parties like PKB. The major voters of PDI Perjuangan and PKB commonly live in Central and East Java, but the two parties are also well-represented outside Java, like in Bali and North Sumatra for PDI Perjuangan, and Kalimantan and Sulawesi for PKB. As for PAN, its major catchment areas are provinces other than Central and East Java.

The "status-quo" group -- Liddle prefers to call them the "conservative" group to avoid insulting the senses -- is actually "pan-primordialist" or nationalist. Since its birth, Golkar's ideology has been "development", instead of Islam. Its members are mostly government employees and soldiers, representing all ethnic, religion and geographic groups. And, despite ICMI's domination and the United Development Party's (PPP) potential support, Golkar's identity has not experienced changes.

Liddle goes on speculating that should Indonesians wish to see a stable and democratic political atmosphere in the future, attempts must be made to work out the second alternative: a political constellation based on pure political conflicts. He sees this constellation more like a bridge than a mirror, in the sense that this type of constellation is more dynamic and can help transpose Indonesians from the current total crisis to a political framework which can overcome any current and future problems.

In Liddle's view, the first alternative, the constellation based on divisive forces, will not help Indonesians much to come out of the current or future crisis. It reflects reality as it is, but does not offer much help except patterns of escalating conflict.

Many of Liddle's views are undeniable. However, some points needs careful attention, especially in terms of their oversimplification and missing elements.

First of all, borrowing Geertz's conception of religion sentiments, Liddle assumes that two groups now stand on different ground of the syncretic Muslims, represented by PDI-Perjuangan, and the santri, represented by Habibie's Golkar.

This is a rather oversimplified and misleading conception. First, the abangan circle is actually more characterized by its secularistic features, such as their loose commitments to religious teachings, although because of this many of them practice syncretic Islam, instead of by syncretism, a term usually applied to the santri group. Abangan is sometimes also associated to a social class; they often identify themselves as "orang pinggiran" or marginalized people.

Secondly, when talking about syncretism, Muslims' perception will directly go to the Muslims dichotomy into traditionalists and modernists. The traditionalist Muslim term usually refers to those whose faith and rituals are to a certain degree influenced by Hinduism-Buddhism and animism , while the modernist term, on the other hand, refers to those whose faith and rituals are strictly based on Islamic teachings (Al Qur'an and Assunnah). But both groups have strong commitments to Islam and are faithful followers of their religion.

If we put this into a political framework, a much different picture will result. Megawati's PDI Perjuangan, characterized more by its secularism (to which Golkar also belongs) rather than by its syncretism, is on the other side of Hamzah's religion PPP, to which PBB and other religion parties belong. But since Golkar's Habibie is a noted devoted Muslim, some religion- affiliated parties lacking distinguished presidential candidates will tend to align with Golkar.

This is, of course, a much more realistic picture, particularly if we take empirical evidence into account. The history witnessed that during the New Order era the government- backed PDI (not PDI-Perjuangan) was a close partner of Golkar in many political discourses, leaving PPP struggling alone. This framework however experience slight reconstructions after the fall of Soeharto and his New Order government.

Liddle's analysis of the Muslim basis of political parties can in fact be scrutinized by further fragmentation. By so doing we will have five rather than two poles (santri vs abangan): (1) national traditionalist santri (represented by PKB), (2) religious traditionalist santri (represented by PKU), (3) national modernist santri (exemplified by PAN), (4) religion modernist santri (exemplified PBB), and (5) religion pan- primordialist santri (represented by PPP). Poles (1) and (2) have a common religion stream basis of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), poles (3) and (4) have the common religion basis of Muhammadiyah and other modernist religion organizations, and (5) has both religion streams basis, NU and Muhammadiyah.

Because the latest trend in political contexts slants to pure political assumptions, the polarization patterns among the santri tend to change from "modernist" and "traditionalist" to "national" and "religion" features. It is not surprising then if we see that PKB and PAN now step on converging "national" paths, while PBB and PKU, on the other side, slide on the same "religion" tracks.

What about PPP? Since the fall of Soeharto, PPP has strengthened its religious identity by, for instance, changing its logo into the Kaaba and philosophy into Islam. It has even built a coalition with other religion-based parties like the Muslim Community Awakening Party (PKU) and the Nahdlatul Umat Party (PNU). Accordingly, it would be difficult for us to say that the tendency of PPP, PKU, and PNU to nominate Habibie for the next presidency is because of "national" arguments. They choose Habibie rather for his "religion" aspects and (probably) their lack of representative figure.

Finally, we should say that confronting santri vs abangan or even "modernist" vs "traditionalist" in the actual context is not anymore relevant and contains definitive misconceptions. The current trend in political constellation is in fact not based on the above grounds, but on the "national" and "religion" grounds instead.

Moreover, beyond the sectarian basis, we have a more comprehensive and realistic picture reflected in Liddle's second constellation: "reformist" vs "status quo", which encompasses any primordial discrepancies but pure political considerations.

The joint communique of PAN (national modernist), PDI Perjuangan (abangan/secularist), and PKB (national traditionalist) -- representing the "reformist" group to intercept Golkar (secularist) and its associates representing the "status quo" group on its winning path -- clearly justifies the progressing reconstruction of political constellations.

One can only hope that the reconstruction process will bring Indonesia out of this prolonged crisis and head it toward firm political and economic stability.

The writer is a lecturer at Muhammadiyah University in Purwokerto, Central Java.