A new political constellation?

A new political constellation?

By F. Aziez

BANDUNG (JP): American political scientist R. William Liddle
gives an interesting analysis of the Indonesian party system in
the May 20 edition of Republika. In his Party system in
Indonesia: Mirror or Bridge?', he bases his analysis on an
article written by Bahtiar Effendy which uses Geertz's conception
framework of political streams, dividing Indonesian society into
groups of santri, or devout Muslims, and priyayi/abangan, those
Muslims who hold beliefs in which their faith and rituals are
mixed with Hinduism-Buddhism and animism (Geertz seems to
disregard other religions in the society).

Liddle sets out his analysis from the actual political context
in which Habibie was a noted figure in the Indonesian Muslim
Intellectuals Association (ICMI), which was founded in 1990. He
is now enjoying the fruits of his membership in that santri-
oriented group. ICMI accommodates santri intellectuals,
especially the modernists, who were ignored and suspected during
the first two decades of Soeharto's administration, but embraced
during the last. ICMI was even given the chance to dominate
Golkar -- the then ruling and privileged party -- until the fall
of the regime. In the post-Soeharto era, following its victory
over non-ICMI Golkar members in the middle of 1998, ICMI still
dominates the giant party.

Liddle's analysis moves on with the question of how Habibie
may obtain electoral support from parties other than Golkar. The
answer lies in the fact that Habibie is a santri and is from
outside Java. It leads to Liddle's view on the party system in
Indonesia. According to him, Indonesia's current political system
can be explained with the two major constellations of parties in
terms of their political cultures. The first constellation
circles around divisive forces, which is often euphemistically
called "primordialism". It is something which confronts two
groups: the santri political culture group (led by Golkar and
Habibie) vis-a-vis the abangan/priyayi political culture group,
led by Megawati Soekarnoputri's Indonesian Democratic Party of
Struggle (PDI Perjuangan). In this case, Islamic parties outside
Golkar tend to support Habibie and his Golkar.

The second constellation centers around pure political reasons
which confront two major groups: the "status-quo" group (led by
Golkar) versus the "reformist" group, led by a coalition of the
National Awakening Party or PAN, PDI Perjuangan and the National
Awakening Party or PKB. This constellation does not reflect
sectarianism; instead, it embraces or shelters both santri and
abangan groups, from Java or outside Java. This is especially
transparent in the case of the "reformist" group, since it unites
abangan parties, like PDI Perjuangan, modernist santri parties
like PAN and traditionalist santri parties like PKB. The major
voters of PDI Perjuangan and PKB commonly live in Central and
East Java, but the two parties are also well-represented outside
Java, like in Bali and North Sumatra for PDI Perjuangan, and
Kalimantan and Sulawesi for PKB. As for PAN, its major catchment
areas are provinces other than Central and East Java.

The "status-quo" group -- Liddle prefers to call them the
"conservative" group to avoid insulting the senses -- is actually
"pan-primordialist" or nationalist. Since its birth, Golkar's
ideology has been "development", instead of Islam. Its members
are mostly government employees and soldiers, representing all
ethnic, religion and geographic groups. And, despite ICMI's
domination and the United Development Party's (PPP) potential
support, Golkar's identity has not experienced changes.

Liddle goes on speculating that should Indonesians wish to see
a stable and democratic political atmosphere in the future,
attempts must be made to work out the second alternative: a
political constellation based on pure political conflicts. He
sees this constellation more like a bridge than a mirror, in the
sense that this type of constellation is more dynamic and can
help transpose Indonesians from the current total crisis to a
political framework which can overcome any current and future
problems.

In Liddle's view, the first alternative, the constellation
based on divisive forces, will not help Indonesians much to come
out of the current or future crisis. It reflects reality as it
is, but does not offer much help except patterns of escalating
conflict.

Many of Liddle's views are undeniable. However, some points
needs careful attention, especially in terms of their
oversimplification and missing elements.

First of all, borrowing Geertz's conception of religion
sentiments, Liddle assumes that two groups now stand on different
ground of the syncretic Muslims, represented by PDI-Perjuangan,
and the santri, represented by Habibie's Golkar.

This is a rather oversimplified and misleading conception.
First, the abangan circle is actually more characterized by its
secularistic features, such as their loose commitments to
religious teachings, although because of this many of them
practice syncretic Islam, instead of by syncretism, a term
usually applied to the santri group. Abangan is sometimes also
associated to a social class; they often identify themselves as
"orang pinggiran" or marginalized people.

Secondly, when talking about syncretism, Muslims' perception
will directly go to the Muslims dichotomy into traditionalists
and modernists. The traditionalist Muslim term usually refers to
those whose faith and rituals are to a certain degree influenced
by Hinduism-Buddhism and animism , while the modernist term, on
the other hand, refers to those whose faith and rituals are
strictly based on Islamic teachings (Al Qur'an and Assunnah). But
both groups have strong commitments to Islam and are faithful
followers of their religion.

If we put this into a political framework, a much different
picture will result. Megawati's PDI Perjuangan, characterized
more by its secularism (to which Golkar also belongs) rather than
by its syncretism, is on the other side of Hamzah's religion PPP,
to which PBB and other religion parties belong. But since
Golkar's Habibie is a noted devoted Muslim, some religion-
affiliated parties lacking distinguished presidential candidates
will tend to align with Golkar.

This is, of course, a much more realistic picture,
particularly if we take empirical evidence into account. The
history witnessed that during the New Order era the government-
backed PDI (not PDI-Perjuangan) was a close partner of Golkar in
many political discourses, leaving PPP struggling alone. This
framework however experience slight reconstructions after the
fall of Soeharto and his New Order government.

Liddle's analysis of the Muslim basis of political parties can
in fact be scrutinized by further fragmentation. By so doing we
will have five rather than two poles (santri vs abangan): (1)
national traditionalist santri (represented by PKB), (2)
religious traditionalist santri (represented by PKU), (3)
national modernist santri (exemplified by PAN), (4) religion
modernist santri (exemplified PBB), and (5) religion pan-
primordialist santri (represented by PPP). Poles (1) and (2) have
a common religion stream basis of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), poles (3)
and (4) have the common religion basis of Muhammadiyah and other
modernist religion organizations, and (5) has both religion
streams basis, NU and Muhammadiyah.

Because the latest trend in political contexts slants to pure
political assumptions, the polarization patterns among the santri
tend to change from "modernist" and "traditionalist" to
"national" and "religion" features. It is not surprising then if
we see that PKB and PAN now step on converging "national" paths,
while PBB and PKU, on the other side, slide on the same
"religion" tracks.

What about PPP? Since the fall of Soeharto, PPP has
strengthened its religious identity by, for instance, changing
its logo into the Kaaba and philosophy into Islam. It has even
built a coalition with other religion-based parties like the
Muslim Community Awakening Party (PKU) and the Nahdlatul Umat
Party (PNU). Accordingly, it would be difficult for us to say
that the tendency of PPP, PKU, and PNU to nominate Habibie for
the next presidency is because of "national" arguments. They
choose Habibie rather for his "religion" aspects and (probably)
their lack of representative figure.

Finally, we should say that confronting santri vs abangan or
even "modernist" vs "traditionalist" in the actual context is not
anymore relevant and contains definitive misconceptions. The
current trend in political constellation is in fact not based on
the above grounds, but on the "national" and "religion" grounds
instead.

Moreover, beyond the sectarian basis, we have a more
comprehensive and realistic picture reflected in Liddle's second
constellation: "reformist" vs "status quo", which encompasses any
primordial discrepancies but pure political considerations.

The joint communique of PAN (national modernist), PDI
Perjuangan (abangan/secularist), and PKB (national
traditionalist) -- representing the "reformist" group to
intercept Golkar (secularist) and its associates representing the
"status quo" group on its winning path -- clearly justifies the
progressing reconstruction of political constellations.

One can only hope that the reconstruction process will bring
Indonesia out of this prolonged crisis and head it toward firm
political and economic stability.

The writer is a lecturer at Muhammadiyah University in
Purwokerto, Central Java.