A new NATO for a new Europe?

By Anak Agung Banyu Perwira

BANDUNG (JP): The end of the Cold War at first offered the prospect of a Europe unified and freed from division. It gradually became clear that Europe was still divided; not into two halves, but into several regions at different stages of development.

Parts of Western Europe had reached a phase of social and economic development in which the requirements of governance had outgrown the nation-state. Parts of Eastern Europe, in contrast, were in phase of new state-building. The Balkans had returned to an anarchic state system reminiscent of the early 20th century. The breakdown of the Cold War structure thus produced in Europe a new system of international relations of considerable complexity.

The main problems of European security, therefore, exist in the eastern part of the continent. This has raised the question of what role NATO, as the only still-extant functioning European security system, could play in the resolution of these problems. The new security risks were primarily those of fragmentation and nationalist conflicts, in place of conflict between blocs. This presented a fresh challenge to security institutions which had been adapted to Cold War situations.

NATO had been a powerful institution in the Cold War era, and it remained one of the main multilateral institutions through which the U.S. exercised its influence in Europe. But in the absence of immediate threats, it was difficult for NATO to sustain its role. The strength of Atlanticism was declining in Germany, and the U.S. was becoming less willing to shoulder a large part of the defense burden for the Europeans.

Pressure from the French and German governments for a European defense structure split European states into those which wished to retain NATO and those which wished to develop a new European defense identity.

The management of military security has two aspects. The first concerns policies to meet threats and risks to security, the second concerns institutions.

To deal with the second aspect first, four main institutions appear to have survived the Cold War and may play a role in the future of European security: NATO, the Western European Union (WEU), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the European Community (EC).

Whether these institutions are in competition with each other or whether they can complement each other is still unclear. The role of these institutions may be portrayed in terms of overlapping circles of interest. Each institution covers certain areas and membership patterns, some of which may be unique to that institution but others of which may be shared with one or more other institutions.

This analogy is helpful in conceptualizing the degree of overlap in terms of interests coupled with the uniqueness of each institution. But it implies that this provides a satisfactory coverage of security issues within a framework of complementary institutions.

One other point is worth noting concerning these security institutions. None of them are new bodies, all being products in some form of the Cold War. That they were created to satisfy the requirements of the Cold War does not necessarily mean that they are inappropriate for post-Cold War Europe, but it does raise questions over their future relevance. NATO has been attempting to develop more of a political focus, though it has failed to expand its membership beyond its Cold War origins.

The WEU has been attempting to raise its profile as the distinctively European military institution and may act as a bridge between NATO and the EC. The CSCE has been attempting to gain a more active role in European security and particularly in conflict management, but appears to be severely handicapped by the general requirements for unanimity in its decision-making.

Finally, the EC is edging towards a common military policy as of Common Foreign and Security Policy, but the process is not set in concrete and, given the number of problems likely to be encountered, may easily be derailed. Therefore, this evolutionary process has yet to arrive at a satisfactory outcome, while no new institutions have emerged to manage military security in Europe.

The second major aspect of the management of military security concerns strategies and policies adopted to meet threats and risks in post-Cold War Europe. The difficulty in planning the security scenarios for post-Cold War Europe has led to two identifiable trends: an emphasis upon flexibility and the continued development of existing strategic approaches rather than creation of new ones.

The main debate about strategic roles and approaches of NATO is dominated by three different school of thought. First, the most conservative school argues that NATO's integrated structure should be preserved but the alliance's internal distribution of political influence should be altered.

The second school argues that NATO should take the process of change one step further by creating a West European defense identity under the auspices of the EC and the WEU.

In theory, a West European security pillar would allow these nations to better coordinate their defense efforts and to jointly conduct military operations when NATO is not an appropriate vehicle. A good example is the manner in which the WEU helped coordinate West European naval operations in the Persian Gulf crisis of the late 1980s. This plan is not intended to replace NATO, but rather envisions that this pillar would not affect Western Europe's commitment to NATO's integrated command.

The third school calls for NATO's integrated military command to be entirely disestablished and for the West European nations to refrain from banding together to develop a military substitute for NATO.

To sum up, it has been widely observed that NATO would have to become less military and `more political' in order to adjust to the changes in Europe. In the past, NATO was important as both the political voice and the military institution of a North Atlantic alliance confronting Soviet power.

In the post-Cold War period, both of these functions will decline in importance. The end of the confrontation with the Soviet Union lowers the profile of military security and lessens the need for Europe's security to be served by an Atlantic voice. Its political role will also be reduced by the consolidations of the CSCE as the security forum for what were previously classified as East-West relations.

In the post-Cold War era, Europe will increasingly find its own political voice in the European Community, and this development can not but reduce the political weight of NATO in world politics. Furthermore, as the importance of military security issues declines, the political security role of the EC will rise. This shift from military to politically-based security will ease the transition of the EC into the previously sensitive security area.

In several ways, therefore, NATO's military and political roles will both decline, but this does not mean that the alliance will become unimportant. In the military sphere, its principal tasks will be to maintain the security of Europe and to provide continuity in military coordination within Europe.

The writer is a graduate of Lancaster University in United Kingdom and a lecturer at the Department of International Relations at Parahyangan Catholic University in Bandung.