A moment of truth for political elite

A moment of truth for political elite

By Richard W. Baker

HONOLULU, Hawaii (JP): Indonesia has just gone through another
chaotic change of presidents -- its third in just over three
years after only one in the preceding 30. But the transition,
from elected president Abdurrahman Wahid to his vice president
Megawati Sukarnoputri, is unlike the previous two in important
respects. Thus far the action has occurred largely in the halls
of power rather than the streets. An emergency session of the
supreme people's assembly voted to end Abdurrahman's mandate,
three years before the normal end of his term, and to install
Megawati in his place.

Nevertheless, like all the previous cases, this transfer of
power is taking place in emergency conditions, with Indonesia
once again standing on the brink. Whether it is the brink of
disaster or of a new beginning rests largely in the hands of the
relatively small group of people who comprise the country's
political elite.

The good news is that the political class seems committed to
completing the current transfer of power in a peaceful manner.
The bad news is that the performance of Indonesia's political
elite in managing the country's affairs during 55 years of
independence is not highly encouraging.

In the early post-revolutionary period, intense partisan
infighting and maneuvering produced revolving-door governments
and eventual paralysis that gave the very idea of parliamentary
government a bad name. This was followed by a period of
government by decree under Megawati's father Sukarno, mounting
internal tensions and external adventurism that ended in the
bloodbath of 1965 and the effective takeover by the army under
Gen. Soeharto.

Soeharto's 32-year "New Order" government in turn was
characterized by coercion, co-option and corruption of the
political class and system.

Soeharto's departure in 1998 released a burst of new political
energy. However, the elections of June 1999 returned to the
legislature many of the old faces from the Soeharto era.
Abdurrahman formed a broad coalition government following his
election as president in October 1999, but personal and party
rivalries soon reemerged and dominated his tumultuous tenure in
office.

The immediate leadership change may have been negotiated
without too much further chaos and conflict. But the really hard
part is yet to come. The political leadership was currently
unified primarily on the need to replace the president -- and to
do so in a defensibly constitutional manner. On the record of
past performance, this negative unity can easily once again give
way to resumed opportunistic maneuvering for position, access and
advantage under the successor government.

This is not the outcome that most Indonesians -- and
Indonesia's friends -- would wish to see. Indonesia has capable
professionals, skilled politicians, and genuine patriots. But it
will take a display of discipline, selflessness, and focus on the
needs of the nation such as arguably has not been seen since the
darkest days of the independence struggle for the political class
to come together and put the good of the country above personal
agendas.

In short, Indonesia's political elite needs to raise its game.
The country desperately needs it, and the usually apolitical
majority of the population is increasingly demanding it.

The ideal start of a new day would be a gracious acceptance of
defeat by Abdurrahman. By common agreement his failure as president
was due at least as much to his own shortcomings as to the
machinations of his opponents. But Abdurrahman resisted accepting
the increasingly inevitable right to the end, attempting to
declare a state of emergency and threatening that his followers
would bring the whole house down if he were dismissed.

Regardless, Megawati should be magnanimous toward her one-time
partner and now defeated rival, if only to close this chapter and
limit continuing animosity on the part of Abdurrahman's supporters.
And then she needs to get down to business.

Indonesia's problems are gargantuan -- including a bankrupt
economy and serious communal and regional unrest. Megawati must
make maximum use of the likely honeymoon period that will follow
her succession to quickly install a credible team of ministers
and set out a clear set of policies to deal with the most serious
problems. She has a capable team of advisors who have been
working with her for months to begin framing such policies.

But Megawati is still in many ways an unknown quantity, and
success is far from assured. Foreign donors and investors will
take a lot of convincing that the government has really turned
over a new leaf and will seriously pursue an agenda of economic
reform; this will require that Megawati temper the economic
nationalism with which she has been identified in the past.
Further, Megawati's rise to power has been facilitated by an
alliance with the once-dominant military, whose heavy-handed
approach to secessionist movements to date seems only to have
exacerbated the problems. Megawati will need to restrain the
military as well as to use its capabilities effectively where
necessary.

If Megawati is to succeed, she will need a great deal of
wisdom and a great deal of help. And her current allies in the
political class will need to practice an unaccustomed degree of
forbearance.

The writer is a senior fellow at the East-West Center in
Honolulu, Hawaii, in the United States and a former U.S. diplomat
in Indonesia.