A moment of truth for political elite

By Richard W. Baker

HONOLULU, Hawaii (JP): Indonesia has just gone through another chaotic change of presidents -- its third in just over three years after only one in the preceding 30. But the transition, from elected president Abdurrahman Wahid to his vice president Megawati Sukarnoputri, is unlike the previous two in important respects. Thus far the action has occurred largely in the halls of power rather than the streets. An emergency session of the supreme people's assembly voted to end Abdurrahman's mandate, three years before the normal end of his term, and to install Megawati in his place.

Nevertheless, like all the previous cases, this transfer of power is taking place in emergency conditions, with Indonesia once again standing on the brink. Whether it is the brink of disaster or of a new beginning rests largely in the hands of the relatively small group of people who comprise the country's political elite.

The good news is that the political class seems committed to completing the current transfer of power in a peaceful manner. The bad news is that the performance of Indonesia's political elite in managing the country's affairs during 55 years of independence is not highly encouraging.

In the early post-revolutionary period, intense partisan infighting and maneuvering produced revolving-door governments and eventual paralysis that gave the very idea of parliamentary government a bad name. This was followed by a period of government by decree under Megawati's father Sukarno, mounting internal tensions and external adventurism that ended in the bloodbath of 1965 and the effective takeover by the army under Gen. Soeharto.

Soeharto's 32-year "New Order" government in turn was characterized by coercion, co-option and corruption of the political class and system.

Soeharto's departure in 1998 released a burst of new political energy. However, the elections of June 1999 returned to the legislature many of the old faces from the Soeharto era. Abdurrahman formed a broad coalition government following his election as president in October 1999, but personal and party rivalries soon reemerged and dominated his tumultuous tenure in office.

The immediate leadership change may have been negotiated without too much further chaos and conflict. But the really hard part is yet to come. The political leadership was currently unified primarily on the need to replace the president -- and to do so in a defensibly constitutional manner. On the record of past performance, this negative unity can easily once again give way to resumed opportunistic maneuvering for position, access and advantage under the successor government.

This is not the outcome that most Indonesians -- and Indonesia's friends -- would wish to see. Indonesia has capable professionals, skilled politicians, and genuine patriots. But it will take a display of discipline, selflessness, and focus on the needs of the nation such as arguably has not been seen since the darkest days of the independence struggle for the political class to come together and put the good of the country above personal agendas.

In short, Indonesia's political elite needs to raise its game. The country desperately needs it, and the usually apolitical majority of the population is increasingly demanding it.

The ideal start of a new day would be a gracious acceptance of defeat by Abdurrahman. By common agreement his failure as president was due at least as much to his own shortcomings as to the machinations of his opponents. But Abdurrahman resisted accepting the increasingly inevitable right to the end, attempting to declare a state of emergency and threatening that his followers would bring the whole house down if he were dismissed.

Regardless, Megawati should be magnanimous toward her one-time partner and now defeated rival, if only to close this chapter and limit continuing animosity on the part of Abdurrahman's supporters. And then she needs to get down to business.

Indonesia's problems are gargantuan -- including a bankrupt economy and serious communal and regional unrest. Megawati must make maximum use of the likely honeymoon period that will follow her succession to quickly install a credible team of ministers and set out a clear set of policies to deal with the most serious problems. She has a capable team of advisors who have been working with her for months to begin framing such policies.

But Megawati is still in many ways an unknown quantity, and success is far from assured. Foreign donors and investors will take a lot of convincing that the government has really turned over a new leaf and will seriously pursue an agenda of economic reform; this will require that Megawati temper the economic nationalism with which she has been identified in the past. Further, Megawati's rise to power has been facilitated by an alliance with the once-dominant military, whose heavy-handed approach to secessionist movements to date seems only to have exacerbated the problems. Megawati will need to restrain the military as well as to use its capabilities effectively where necessary.

If Megawati is to succeed, she will need a great deal of wisdom and a great deal of help. And her current allies in the political class will need to practice an unaccustomed degree of forbearance.

The writer is a senior fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii, in the United States and a former U.S. diplomat in Indonesia.