A long road ahead to resuming U.S.-RI military ties

A number of problems feature in the controversy surrounding the resumption of U.S.-Indonesian military ties, writes Dr. Kusnanto Anggoro, senior researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and lecturer in the postgraduate studies program at the University of Indonesia, Jakarta.

JAKARTA (JP): Military ties are expected to be a test in the relations between the United States and Indonesia. The ties were curtailed in the 1990s and then suspended because of the Indonesian Military's (TNI) involvement in the East Timor debacle in 1999. The relations have been extremely limited ever since, though the TNI was invited to observe Cobra Gold and the Navy participated in the exercises of Cooperative and Readiness Afloat Training.

Washington has recently signaled an early resumption of closer military ties with the TNI. Changes in Washington and Jakarta have made the benefits of a stable Indonesia far outweigh concerns about the military's human rights violations. East Timor is no longer part of Indonesia. Still, new concerns have emerged in the White House about a more assertive China and about prolonged instability in Indonesia.

There still remains a big question mark as to when the plan for closer military ties can eventually take off. The White House may touch off a bitter fight with Congress which has in place restrictions on what Washington can do with TNI. The Leahy Amendment on limitations on assistance to security forces requires Jakarta's commitment to investigations and prosecution of members of the TNI and militia responsible for human rights violations in Indonesia and East Timor. This remains unfulfilled. Two generals have been declared suspects; none have been sent to court.

Meanwhile, the scope of cooperation is no less problematic. At the bureaucratic level, there still appears a split between the Pentagon and the U.S. State Department. The former wants swift moves to reestablish closer ties with the Indonesian Military. The latter favors a more cautious course in light of the intensification of repression and violence in Indonesia. This would surely close down the possibility of an early resumption of ties.

Under the circumstances, the Bush government must approach the Indonesian government with caution and this would include progress on accountability for human right abuses. That East Timor has now split from Indonesia may not necessarily change the minds of many in Washington. Even a strong proponent of an earlier resumption of military cooperation such as Adm. Denis Blair, the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, demands "to see good behavior" from the (Indonesian) military in Aceh and Irian Jaya.

It would be wrong to argue that the resumption of military ties is only a matter of time. A "sooner or later" argument does not resolve the dilemma that Americans face in their military-to- military cooperation, which in fact has never been an effective instrument of foreign policy. Events during the late years of the Soeharto regime and the East Timor debacle, were strong evidence that Washington could not use the widely touted "leverage" that military assistance and ties allegedly provide to rein in the Indonesian Military.

Military cooperation with Indonesia will continue to be constrained by a patchwork of existing American regulations, bureaucratic politics and vulnerability to hostile public opinion. A challenge for Washington is to find legitimate and justified military assistance to Indonesia. Selling of defensive weapons and/or nonlethal spare parts may be tolerable in certain circumstances. But no one would accept the U.S. military training their Indonesian counterpart in a broad range of lethal tactics, including "advanced sniper techniques" and "psychological operations".

Instead, they may be able to assist the TNI in developing roles and missions appropriate not only to their more democratic policy but also to a more interdependent world. As such, devising modern military doctrines and strategies to guide the Indonesian Military in multilateral cooperation and/or in cooperative management of transnational issues would be of great importance. It may also be useful for the U.S. military to enlighten the TNI on the importance of transparency and accountability in defense and security policy.

Regardless of such technical considerations, reengagement with TNI would only benefit the people of Indonesia if it does not undercut civilian control over the military. In fact, this is the greatest challenge. Washington should understand that Indonesia's defense and security policy making are still in the hands of military personnel, including retired as well as officers-turned politicians. The post-Soeharto regime has largely failed to "civilianize" the defense ministry, despite having a civilian defense minister.

Worse still, civilian members of the legislature are not well versed in the subject of defense and security. Most journalists, academics and activists are interested more in vague issues of military politics and a purist moral view of human rights. As a result, there is no serious attempt by civilians at defining the practical mechanism and instruments for democratic control of the armed forces. It will be a long time before civilians can use their leverage to rein in the military.

If the Bush government is to re-establish their ties with the TNI, they must also complement this with programs to empower civilians.