A long road ahead to resuming U.S.-RI military ties

A long road ahead to resuming U.S.-RI military ties

A number of problems feature in the controversy surrounding
the resumption of U.S.-Indonesian military ties, writes Dr.
Kusnanto Anggoro, senior researcher at the Centre for Strategic
and International Studies and lecturer in the postgraduate
studies program at the University of Indonesia, Jakarta.

JAKARTA (JP): Military ties are expected to be a test in the
relations between the United States and Indonesia. The ties were
curtailed in the 1990s and then suspended because of the
Indonesian Military's (TNI) involvement in the East Timor debacle
in 1999. The relations have been extremely limited ever since,
though the TNI was invited to observe Cobra Gold and the Navy
participated in the exercises of Cooperative and Readiness Afloat
Training.

Washington has recently signaled an early resumption of closer
military ties with the TNI. Changes in Washington and Jakarta
have made the benefits of a stable Indonesia far outweigh
concerns about the military's human rights violations. East Timor
is no longer part of Indonesia. Still, new concerns have emerged
in the White House about a more assertive China and about
prolonged instability in Indonesia.

There still remains a big question mark as to when the plan
for closer military ties can eventually take off. The White House
may touch off a bitter fight with Congress which has in place
restrictions on what Washington can do with TNI. The Leahy
Amendment on limitations on assistance to security forces
requires Jakarta's commitment to investigations and prosecution
of members of the TNI and militia responsible for human rights
violations in Indonesia and East Timor. This remains unfulfilled.
Two generals have been declared suspects; none have been sent to
court.

Meanwhile, the scope of cooperation is no less problematic. At
the bureaucratic level, there still appears a split between the
Pentagon and the U.S. State Department. The former wants swift
moves to reestablish closer ties with the Indonesian Military.
The latter favors a more cautious course in light of the
intensification of repression and violence in Indonesia. This
would surely close down the possibility of an early resumption of
ties.

Under the circumstances, the Bush government must approach the
Indonesian government with caution and this would include
progress on accountability for human right abuses. That East
Timor has now split from Indonesia may not necessarily change the
minds of many in Washington. Even a strong proponent of an
earlier resumption of military cooperation such as Adm. Denis
Blair, the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, demands "to see
good behavior" from the (Indonesian) military in Aceh and Irian
Jaya.

It would be wrong to argue that the resumption of military
ties is only a matter of time. A "sooner or later" argument does
not resolve the dilemma that Americans face in their military-to-
military cooperation, which in fact has never been an effective
instrument of foreign policy. Events during the late years of the
Soeharto regime and the East Timor debacle, were strong evidence
that Washington could not use the widely touted "leverage" that
military assistance and ties allegedly provide to rein in the
Indonesian Military.

Military cooperation with Indonesia will continue to be
constrained by a patchwork of existing American regulations,
bureaucratic politics and vulnerability to hostile public
opinion. A challenge for Washington is to find legitimate and
justified military assistance to Indonesia. Selling of defensive
weapons and/or nonlethal spare parts may be tolerable in certain
circumstances. But no one would accept the U.S. military training
their Indonesian counterpart in a broad range of lethal tactics,
including "advanced sniper techniques" and "psychological
operations".

Instead, they may be able to assist the TNI in developing
roles and missions appropriate not only to their more democratic
policy but also to a more interdependent world. As such, devising
modern military doctrines and strategies to guide the Indonesian
Military in multilateral cooperation and/or in cooperative
management of transnational issues would be of great importance.
It may also be useful for the U.S. military to enlighten the TNI
on the importance of transparency and accountability in defense
and security policy.

Regardless of such technical considerations, reengagement with
TNI would only benefit the people of Indonesia if it does not
undercut civilian control over the military. In fact, this is the
greatest challenge. Washington should understand that Indonesia's
defense and security policy making are still in the hands of
military personnel, including retired as well as officers-turned
politicians. The post-Soeharto regime has largely failed to
"civilianize" the defense ministry, despite having a civilian
defense minister.

Worse still, civilian members of the legislature are not well
versed in the subject of defense and security. Most journalists,
academics and activists are interested more in vague issues of
military politics and a purist moral view of human rights. As a
result, there is no serious attempt by civilians at defining the
practical mechanism and instruments for democratic control of the
armed forces. It will be a long time before civilians can use
their leverage to rein in the military.

If the Bush government is to re-establish their ties with the
TNI, they must also complement this with programs to empower
civilians.