A lesson from Palu
What many Indonesians had feared for weeks has become reality: A national congress organized by the government-backed Soerjadi faction of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) that opened in Palu, Central Sulawesi, on Tuesday has resulted in violence. Supporters of the party's ousted leader, Megawati Soekarnoputri, had descended on the city from near and far for the specific purpose of obstructing the meeting. At least 17 people, including a few police officers, have been reported injured over the last two days, compelling the congress' organizers to cut the meeting short by no less than two days from its scheduled five days.
The rift in PDI began with the ouster of Megawati as the party's chairwoman in 1996 by a rival faction led by Soerjadi in a government-backed congress in Medan. The conflict has since continued to smolder, flaring up occasionally and unsettling the nation's political arena. Although the government has persisted in recognizing only Soerjadi as the party's legitimate leader, such allegiance is not shared by the majority of Indonesians. Instead of waning as a result of her removal, Megawati's popularity has soared among the masses. She is perceived as not only the legitimate, democratically elected leader of the party, but a victim of gross injustice perpetrated by the government.
The violence in Palu is the latest flare-up in this drawn-out conflict, sparked by what Megawati supporters see as an act of provocation by the Soerjadi camp. Under the circumstances, the easiest and most tempting thing to do is to try to blame the two camps within the party for causing the trouble. The difficulty, though, is that both groups have their own argument to justify their stance. The Soerjadi camp considers itself as the only legitimate representative of the party since it has government recognition. The Megawati camp, on the other hand, can rightly argue that the 1996 Medan congress was invalid since it was held in violation of party statutes, even though it enjoyed the blessings of the government.
The peculiar element in all this is the part being played by the Habibie administration. Wanting as it is in public confidence, the government had an excellent chance at its inception to demonstrate its statesmanship by admitting and correcting the injustice carried out against Megawati by the old regime. Instead, the Habibie administration chose to cling to what it refers to as the "legality principle" -- a formal legality created merely by the unilateral recognition from an authoritarian regime -- in total disregard of prevailing realities.
Whether we like it or not, the fact cannot be denied that apart from being lawfully and democratically elected in a party congress, Megawati has the trust of the majority of Indonesians. The crushing defeat suffered by PDI under Soerjadi in the last general election is a telling example of Megawati's political stature in the country.
If more proof is needed, a survey held last month by the University of Indonesia's department of social and political sciences, in conjunction with the Soegeng Sarjadi Syndicated research group, showed that out of a random sample of 1,000 people, 11.3 percent of the respondents chose Megawati as the next president -- only slightly below Amien Rais, who scored 12.8 percent. In comparison, President Habibie only garnered 8.2 percent.
Another recent poll, held by private television station RCTI, had Megawati outperform all of the other potential candidates with 38 percent of the respondents supporting her.
Considering all of this, the government's persistence in denying Megawati her rightful place in politics is difficult to comprehend. Unfortunately, the impression this might create is that the Habibie administration is unable to cast off the fears that the old regime had regarding Megawati: that is that she is a threat to the preservation of the status quo. Unless this is true, surely it will be in the government's interest to start adopting a more sensible attitude and administer justice where justice is due.