A jumble of purposes of syariah law in Aceh

A jumble of purposes of syariah law in Aceh

Kirsten E. Schulze, Senior Lecturer, International History,
London School of Economics

Like most other aspects in the conflict in Aceh, the debate on
the Islamic syariah law has become highly politicized. On the one
extreme, it has been hailed as a mechanism for conflict
resolution by Aceh's political elite. On the other, it has been
dismissed by the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) as a political tool of
Jakarta. Some segments of the Acehnese population have criticized
it as a means to silence women, while others have welcomed it as
a true reflection of Acehnese culture.

The majority of the ulema hope it will in the long-run lead to
a higher level of morality -- an end to corruption, extortion,
crime, drug abuse, and prostitution.

This politicization has not only confused the debate on
syariah to the extent that its focus seems to have become the
jilbab, it has also dangerously obscured the causes of the
conflict in Aceh which is not about religion but sovereignty.

The syariah may have been what some Acehnese were fighting for
under Teungku Daud Beureueh but it certainly is not what GAM is
fighting for. GAM is being driven by the desire for independence
rather than a misinterpreted jihad or an Islamic agenda.

Seeing the syariah as a way to bring GAM back into the fold
has no real prospects, especially since GAM is highly suspicious
that the syariah is being used to turn a vertical conflict into a
horizontal one. The belief that the syariah is in some way a
mechanism for conflict resolution is thus fundamentally
misguided. As is the notion that the syariah is an alternative to
full democratization or political dialogue.

The syariah law, in a normative sense, of course, like every
other ethically based blueprint for society and like every other
religious framework for the interaction between man and God, does
promote peace and condemns the use of force. But even in non-
conflict situations, societies governed by the syariah are not
totally free of violence and corruption. The challenge in
conflict situations is all the greater.

Aceh's modernist ulema are especially willing to embrace this
challenge, which is why they supported the inclusion of the
syariah into the autonomy package. But unlike the politicians
who are seeking a quick solution through Islamic symbols such as
the jilbab or Arabic script on street signs, the ulema are
pursuing a long-term educational approach.

Interesting here is not just the contrast between the
politicians focusing on symbols while the ulema are focusing on
substance, but that while the politicians see the syariah as a
way of dealing with GAM, the ulema see the syariah as a way of
dealing with the shortcomings of the politicians.

Their ultimate aim is for the syariah to produce clean
governance, social justice, economic equality and ultimately
prosperity for all the people of Aceh. They also see the syariah
as more in line with the traditional forms of governance as
represented by Acehnese custom, or adat. Thus the syariah has
become a way of reforming the politicians and the system.

The main problem for the ulema is one of implementation --
where and how the syariah should be applied. Again many of the
challenges are obvious. For instance, who will enforce its legal
aspects? Some ulema are doubtful whether the police which has not
been able to maintain law and order in Aceh in the framework of
national law will be any more successful in the framework of
Islamic law. Most of the ulema are painfully aware that the
police has as little moral authority as the politicians.

In fact, the educational approach, rather than focusing on
punishment, reveals that the syariah is again a way of dealing
with an inadequate system by hoping that accountability to God in
this life or the hereafter will produce what the lack of respect
for the police has not -- an end to an essentially lawless
society.

Difficult issues of law enforcement, new judges, or mechanisms
for zakat distribution of zakat (mandatory alms) are compounded
at a national level, which raises the question whether the
syariah was not too hastily introduced. This is especially so in
light of the argument that most Acehnese were already living by
the principles of the syariah and that its formal introduction in
that sense has not made a significant difference.

The key question at the national level is, of course, whether
the syariah is compatible with Indonesia's constitution. In a
practical sense this may result in cases tried under the syariah
in Aceh being appealed to the Supreme Court under national law.
If the Supreme Court upholds the validity of the syariah it has
effectively undermined national law, and if it doesn't the
syariah in Aceh isn't worth the paper it was written on.

More fundamentally, the misguided notion of the syariah as a
conflict resolution mechanism ultimately aimed at emsuring the
unity and integrity of Indonesia, contains the danger of the
achieving the opposite.

The syariah in Aceh has set a precedent. What will prevent
parts of Sulawesi, Sumatra or Kalimantan from demanding the same
right? However, should the syariah indeed become more widespread
and even officially included into the Constitution it is doubtful
that other parts of Indonesia, especially East Nusa Tenggara and
Bali, will just acquiesce.

Beyond doubt, the syariah in Aceh has raised more questions
than it has answered. And it certainly is not an answer to the
conflict between GAM and Indonesia.

The conflict is not about religion but about sovereignty.
Neither is the syariah an alternative to dialog with GAM.
However, substantive negotiations, based on good will and clear
commitment by all sides may provide a real avenue for dealing
with the true causes of the conflict.

Dr. Kirsten E. Schulze is writing a book on conflict and
democratization in Indonesia.