A hostage comes home from RP, but at what price?

By Andreas Baenziger

SINGAPORE (DPA): Philippine President Joseph Estrada wants the hostage drama on Jolo solved by July 24, when he is due to travel to the United States, the former colonial masters of the islands and today the Philippines' most important trading partner.

The Anglo-Saxon public has shown little interest in the fate of the hostages on the god-forsaken island in the middle of the Celebes Sea since the only pair of hostages from the United States escaped. However, it would look bad for Estrada to have to appear in Washington with the albatross of an unsolved hostage drama around his neck.

The release of German hostage Renate Wallert on Monday raises hopes that Estrada may be able to achieve that goal himself. But this begs the question: if the President thinks he can dictate the timetable for a solution to the crisis, then why didn't he do so earlier?

The Filipinos and their president are not coming through this interminable drama with flying colors. The original 21 hostages -- from Germany, France, Finland, South Africa, Lebanon, Malaysia and the Philippines -- were taken hostage on Easter Monday, April 23, on the Malaysian island of Sipadan and then taken to the Philippine island of Jolo. This means the government has already had almost three months in which to look for a solution -- but so far, it hasn't found one.

Trying to reach some kind of agreement with half a dozen different groups of kidnappers, all of whom want a slice of the ransom-pie, can't be easy. Negotiations were made all the more difficult by the fact that the kidnappers wrapped themselves in an ideological cloak and have been behaving like the champions of the Islamic cause in a country which is 90 percent Catholic. From the very outset, it has been about nothing more than money.

Another problem was figuring out who should talk to whom about what. As tough as finding someone who could really speak for the kidnappers with authority, finding someone to negotiate for the hostages wasn't easy.

First of all it was Nur Misuari, governor of the autonomous Muslim Moro region, who had made his own peace with Manila in exchange for a form of pseudo-autonomy for the Muslim-dominated southern region. It soon proved to be a total waste of time to send him in to negotiate with gangs of kidnappers who consider him a traitor.

Then former Libyan ambassador to Manila Rajab Azzarouq appeared on the scene and proved to be a thoroughly effective negotiator on behalf of the kidnappers -- Libya, after all, had helped finance the Islamic rebellion in the south and trained many of its leaders. But what kind of influence could this not exactly unbiased character have on the government?

As Wallert was released, she was seen on the arm of presidential advisor, Robert Aventajado, who had himself been seen earlier stepping out of a helicopter on to the island of Jolo carrying two sacks (contents unknown).

The winner's medal will, in the end, have to go to the Philippine government. Its efforts, however, sometimes appear as if it wants to make a confusing situation even more complicated. The government has so far lacked both a goal and sufficient determination to bring the drama to a close.

This is thoroughly typical and could even be considered the trade mark of Estrada's presidency. The populist president who has recently been watching his popularity spiral downwards does not seem to know where his journey abroad is supposed to be taking him. He has lost the faith not only of his voters, the Philippines' poor majority, but also of the business world.

The hostage drama on Jolo has simply shown the whole world what the local population has long known: the president suffers from a lack of direction. A trip to the United States is still not going to compensate for this loss of faith even if all the hostages are released before he heads for Washington.

Steely determination, or rather a large dose of machismo, was brought to bear upon a different matter by Estrada recently -- the fight against the rebels in the south, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) when he dealt out a series of painful, significant military defeats and captured a number of its previously respected camps.

Estrada's attack succeeded in driving this adversary underground despite having around 15,000 guerrillas at its disposal -- a large-enough force to suggest it should be taken seriously and was probably a group better bargained with than attacked.

The result was a very positive reaction in the popularity polls in the Catholic north of the country for the president and his military victory. In parts of the Islamic south, however, peace gave way to further terror and insecurity.

An end to the hostage drama on Jolo, should it come soon, will probably result in further violence and criminal acts. Call the money that which was handed over what you will -- "development aid", "board and lodging" or simply "ransom money." Whatever you call it, the fact is, it's still going to terrorists.

The money will help them to make an already notoriously unstable region even more so. Joseph Lu, the head of the island of Jolo's administration, said at the beginning of the whole affair, "If 100 million pesos (about US$2.25 million) is paid out, then we have here another 100 million pesos' worth of problems."

Now it looks like being a lot more than 100 million pesos, and a whole heap of problems.