A hostage comes home from RP, but at what price?

A hostage comes home from RP, but at what price?

By Andreas Baenziger

SINGAPORE (DPA): Philippine President Joseph Estrada wants the
hostage drama on Jolo solved by July 24, when he is due to travel
to the United States, the former colonial masters of the islands
and today the Philippines' most important trading partner.

The Anglo-Saxon public has shown little interest in the fate
of the hostages on the god-forsaken island in the middle of the
Celebes Sea since the only pair of hostages from the United
States escaped. However, it would look bad for Estrada to have to
appear in Washington with the albatross of an unsolved hostage
drama around his neck.

The release of German hostage Renate Wallert on Monday raises
hopes that Estrada may be able to achieve that goal himself. But
this begs the question: if the President thinks he can dictate
the timetable for a solution to the crisis, then why didn't he do
so earlier?

The Filipinos and their president are not coming through this
interminable drama with flying colors. The original 21 hostages
-- from Germany, France, Finland, South Africa, Lebanon, Malaysia
and the Philippines -- were taken hostage on Easter Monday, April
23, on the Malaysian island of Sipadan and then taken to the
Philippine island of Jolo. This means the government has already
had almost three months in which to look for a solution -- but so
far, it hasn't found one.

Trying to reach some kind of agreement with half a dozen
different groups of kidnappers, all of whom want a slice of the
ransom-pie, can't be easy. Negotiations were made all the more
difficult by the fact that the kidnappers wrapped themselves in
an ideological cloak and have been behaving like the champions of
the Islamic cause in a country which is 90 percent Catholic. From
the very outset, it has been about nothing more than money.

Another problem was figuring out who should talk to whom about
what. As tough as finding someone who could really speak for the
kidnappers with authority, finding someone to negotiate for the
hostages wasn't easy.

First of all it was Nur Misuari, governor of the autonomous
Muslim Moro region, who had made his own peace with Manila in
exchange for a form of pseudo-autonomy for the Muslim-dominated
southern region. It soon proved to be a total waste of time to
send him in to negotiate with gangs of kidnappers who consider
him a traitor.

Then former Libyan ambassador to Manila Rajab Azzarouq
appeared on the scene and proved to be a thoroughly effective
negotiator on behalf of the kidnappers -- Libya, after all, had
helped finance the Islamic rebellion in the south and trained
many of its leaders. But what kind of influence could this not
exactly unbiased character have on the government?

As Wallert was released, she was seen on the arm of
presidential advisor, Robert Aventajado, who had himself been
seen earlier stepping out of a helicopter on to the island of
Jolo carrying two sacks (contents unknown).

The winner's medal will, in the end, have to go to the
Philippine government. Its efforts, however, sometimes appear as
if it wants to make a confusing situation even more complicated.
The government has so far lacked both a goal and sufficient
determination to bring the drama to a close.

This is thoroughly typical and could even be considered the
trade mark of Estrada's presidency. The populist president who
has recently been watching his popularity spiral downwards does
not seem to know where his journey abroad is supposed to be
taking him. He has lost the faith not only of his voters, the
Philippines' poor majority, but also of the business world.

The hostage drama on Jolo has simply shown the whole world
what the local population has long known: the president suffers
from a lack of direction. A trip to the United States is still
not going to compensate for this loss of faith even if all the
hostages are released before he heads for Washington.

Steely determination, or rather a large dose of machismo, was
brought to bear upon a different matter by Estrada recently --
the fight against the rebels in the south, the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) when he dealt out a series of painful,
significant military defeats and captured a number of its
previously respected camps.

Estrada's attack succeeded in driving this adversary
underground despite having around 15,000 guerrillas at its
disposal -- a large-enough force to suggest it should be taken
seriously and was probably a group better bargained with than
attacked.

The result was a very positive reaction in the popularity
polls in the Catholic north of the country for the president and
his military victory. In parts of the Islamic south, however,
peace gave way to further terror and insecurity.

An end to the hostage drama on Jolo, should it come soon, will
probably result in further violence and criminal acts. Call the
money that which was handed over what you will -- "development
aid", "board and lodging" or simply "ransom money." Whatever you
call it, the fact is, it's still going to terrorists.

The money will help them to make an already notoriously
unstable region even more so. Joseph Lu, the head of the island
of Jolo's administration, said at the beginning of the whole
affair, "If 100 million pesos (about US$2.25 million) is paid
out, then we have here another 100 million pesos' worth of
problems."

Now it looks like being a lot more than 100 million pesos, and
a whole heap of problems.