A dialog for Aceh
With the urgency growing by the day for the problems in Aceh to be properly addressed, Indonesians are putting their best hope for a conclusive solution in a seemingly simple word: dialog.
A dialog, according to one of the definitions given by the Merriam Webster's dictionary, is a discussion between representatives of parties to a conflict that is aimed at resolution.
In principle, it appears simple enough. Clearly, the conflict, which has been festering for several decades but of late has almost reached the level of an open rebellion, must be resolved without delay if the unity of the nation is to be preserved.
Obviously, too, a free and open dialog between the two sides is the only way to a settlement, since one almost 10 years of military force and oppression under past regimes has already proved to be totally ineffective -- not to say counterproductive -- in pacifying the rebellious sentiment of the Acehnese.
Unfortunately, there is nothing simple about the relationship that exists at present between the central government in Jakarta and this westernmost of the country's provinces. At the risk of oversimplifying a complex issue -- and one that has become increasingly more tangled with the passing of time -- it is probably correct to say the problem of Aceh is essentially one of shattered trust and a wounded sense of justice.
Aceh never was a region that outsiders found easy to subjugate. The Dutch, whose presence in the Indonesian archipelago lasted more than 300 years until World War II, fought long, bloody campaigns in the rebellious territory, only succeeding in "pacifying" the area shortly before the start of the war in the Pacific. After Indonesia became an independent country, an Islamic insurgency plagued the province for years before a negotiated settlement restored peace.
Although religious sentiments speak strongly among the staunchly Muslim Acehnese, it is the perceived unfair distribution of wealth that is the crux of the broad popular discontent. Aceh, with its vast natural resources, is one of the country's richest provinces. Considering the area's contribution to the national coffers, the Acehnese feel that they are receiving a vastly disproportionate measure of the returns for development.
Jakarta's initial mistake in responding to this growing discontent was to send troops in ever greater numbers to suppress the increasingly defiant protests. Untrained and unequipped to deal with problems that are in essence human and social in nature, it appears that many of the troops resorted to using brute force. The widespread human rights abuses that resulted from the strong-arm approach appear to have been the turning point in the present clamor for an independence referendum in Aceh.
As the situation stands at present, it would seem that, aside from an immediate East Timor-style referendum, a free and open dialog between Jakarta and the Acehnese indeed offers the best hope for a solution that benefits not only the Acehnese, but the Indonesian nation as a whole. Such an open dialog, however, presumes a willingness on the part of all parties involved to keep an open mind, to listen to each other and to find a commonly acceptable way out of the present difficulties.
To start with, there should be no preconditions. Most importantly, there must be a willingness on all sides to see that justice is done. This implies a willingness to accept full accountability for wrongs done in the past. For some, this is certain to be difficult to accept, but justice must be allowed to take its course if the problem of Aceh is to be resolved once and for all. For some in the Indonesian Military (TNI), the burden of truth in this case could be hard to bear. Yet, it is by making these sacrifices that they can prove their true commitment to the nation.
As for the government of President Abdurrahman Wahid, this could be the first and last chance it has to prove its mettle and win the full confidence of the nation and the world.