A closer look at appeals to review Aceh's martial law

Imanuddin Razak, Staff Writer, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta, iman@thejakartapost.com

Politics is the art or science concerned with guiding or influencing governmental policy. Politics is also the art or science concerned with winning and holding control over a government.

Both are among definitions stipulated in the Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary. And perhaps both definitions could explain the reason behind last Monday's maneuver by the House of Representatives (DPR) to call for a thorough evaluation of the implementation of martial law in the restive province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, so as to determine future policies in the province.

The call comes just weeks before martial law is due to expire on Nov. 19. It also comes after widespread allegations of abuses committed by government troops and the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) rebels.

President Megawati Soekarnoputri signed a decree on May 19 imposing martial law on Aceh for six months, thereby providing the legal infrastructure needed for the Indonesian Military (TNI) to launch an all-out war against GAM.

Based on Presidential Decree No. 28/2003 issued on May 19, the province of Aceh was placed under martial law for six months, with the possibility of an extension.

While observers and activists have suggested that the military offensive in Aceh be halted, TNI chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto has said that the military wants an extension of martial law in Aceh, without mentioning a specific timeframe.

The legislative body's first maneuver was followed by a second on Wednesday, when House leaders suggested that President Megawati consult with legislators before extending martial law in the country's westernmost province.

"We hope the government will ask for confirmation from the House (for the extension of martial law), because the Aceh problem is a national problem, not only the problem of the government," House Speaker Akbar Tandjung said.

The House's measure sounded commonplace and simple as it showed what the legislative body was supposed to do, i.e., monitoring and controlling the government, especially its policies.

Aside from the questionable constitutional debate on whether the President must consult the House prior to imposing or extending the implementation of martial law in Aceh, the above measure of the House could seriously impact the ruling government, especially in the face of the next general elections.

As an "opposition" to the ruling government and also as part of the country's law-making bodies, the House has the power to dictate to the government -- the holder of the mandate given by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), in which the House is part of it -- in its policies.

The failure of the ruling government to comply with the House's request could lead to trouble for the government during the plenary session of the MPR which hears the President's/government's accountability speech.

And such a failure of the ruling government, dominated by the winner of the 1999 general elections -- the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) -- to perform the tasks mandated or ordered by the law-making body could be a negative factor for the party chaired by Megawati, in its bid for next year's general elections.

As part of the rules of the game in Indonesian politics, the ruling government must comply with the House's orders. If the orders are ignored, the government must bear the costs.

Worse, the failure to address the latest issue will add to the munitions which the House can fire at the plenary session of the MPR, which will mark the end of the President's five-year tenure.

The ruling government could indeed challenge the rules, ignoring the House's calls by lobbying legislators from other political parties (through PDI Perjuangan legislators) to avoid trouble for Megawati and her government in the plenary session.

As it will likely be impossible to gain support and set up a strong coalition with Muslim-oriented political parties, due to their different political platforms, PDI Perjuangan could attempt to form a coalition with the second largest political party -- Golkar -- in an attempt to secure majority votes to nullify any moves against the ruling government.

However, it will not be that easy to persuade Golkar to join the band as the latter is striving hard to restore its tarnished image (related to its past links with the New Order/Soeharto regime). Any obvious political compromise or deal may hamper its election bid next year.

Last weekend's clash among supporters of PDI Perjuangan and Golkar in Buleleng, Bali --in which two Golkar supporters were killed -- is also not an easy obstacle to be settled in such a short period of time, ahead of the May 2004 election.

Also, such a move would require the extra effort and resources of PDI Perjuangan, as other parties, including Golkar, are eager for as many votes as possible in next year's election. Any unpopular move, i.e. vote buying in the MPR plenary session, especially when it's then leaked to the media, will be a blow to their election bid.

To some analysts, the House's maneuvers could also be seen as preventing Megawati and her Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle from leniency when dealing with the TNI, which will permanently quit its active involvement in politics -- in the House and the Assembly -- beginning next year.

The public and the House have been observing Megawati's policies, which according to them, have frequently favored the TNI. The latest controversial case was the purchase of four Russian Sukhoi jet-fighters, which was made upon the approval of the President but without the House's consent.