A case of cautious optimism about the new MPR speaker
By Hidayat Jati
JAKARTA (JP): The dynamics of Indonesian politics, a force unleashed in great momentum after the country was struck by the financial crisis in late 1997, continues to surprise observers and players alike. The latest instance came with the victory of Amien Rais, the speaker of the strongly pluralistic and progressive National Mandate Party (PAN), in the race for the leadership of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), the highest constitutional body in the country. Many observers and players find this victory pleasantly surprising, while many others, including those in PAN, find it disturbing.
Those who like and trust Amien believe that he will use his new power to promote democratization and pluralism while combating corruption. In a nutshell, he will use the MPR leadership to bolster the reformasi movement.
But in contrast, those who found his victory disturbing, or even threatening, fear that Amien has deserted his party's platform and may even use his position to reelect President Habibie, an old acquaintance who was supposed to be the political enemy of the National Mandate Party.
Such diverging reactions stem from two key factors: Amien's behavior in politics, which have taken several major U-turns, and the peculiarity of the mechanism of the Assembly itself. Although these two factors are not entirely justifiable, they will inevitably haunt Amien's leadership of the MPR and all his future political actions.
But let us first examine the facts. Amien came to victory even though his party only secured 7.3 percent of the available elected seats in the general elections. More surprisingly, he participated in the MPR leadership race only at the last minute, since his new found political partner and former political nemesis, Abdurrahman Wahid, failed to secure endorsement from the nonelected group appointees.
Amien's victory was possible, first of all, because the mechanism of the Assembly allows parties and politicians to make all sorts of deals and compromises to achieve their political objectives. Naturally, the outcome of such deals will not necessarily mirror the results of the general election. This key factor is perfectly legal, and should be well understood by Assembly's participants.
In this sense, no observers or politicians should be overwhelmed by the outcome. But at the same time, it is hard to deny the irony that Amien was able to capitalize on the slippery political mechanism allowed by the 1945 Constitution, which he had vowed to amend, while Megawati Soekarnoputri, who sanctified the Constitution, fell victim to such a mechanism.
Of course, one may also argue, that the Assembly's mechanism is not perfectly democratic in the sense that the popular may be compromised or even betrayed by the maneuvers at the Assembly. But such an argument is only truly valid in the case of the presidential election. Most voters during June's general election, of which almost all had no prior experience in a real democratic election, were clearly not thinking about the MPR leadership race when exercising their right. This was because virtually all contesting political parties openly and uncompromisingly advertised themselves as future occupiers of the presidential office.
The legitimacy of the MPR leadership race was further sealed by the voting mechanism and the fact that the process was covered by live television. The process, done through voting, was democratic in the widest sense of the word since most Assembly members voted for Amien. The preceding deals and compromises do not negate the quality of the outcome of the process.
The other controversial factor surrounding Amien's victory is his avenue of maneuvering. It is here that Amien will have to be more convincing to his critics. Amien won because he was clearly supported by the discredited Golkar Party, the party of the disgraced Soeharto and his handpicked successor, Habibie. Amien, who ran in the June election on the back of a pluralist platform, also became the speaker of the MPR because of his leadership in the "axis force", an alliance between Islamic parties. It is here that some, including those inside PAN's leadership, feared that a betrayal of the reformasi and pluralist ideas might have taken place.
To some degree, the fears are justified. But one must also be cautious. Has Amien Rais, since he declared his intention to mobilize the axis force, stated any clear signs that he is abandoning pluralism or supporting President B.J. Habibie's reelection? The answer is a strong "no". Has he attacked any minorities group the way he did in the early 1990's? Again, the answer is strongly negative. To be sure, Amien's maneuvering with the Islamic forces, as well as Golkar, has resurrected the stigma which was stuck on him for being a sectarian politician. But this is almost the same as condemning a man with a guilty verdict before a trial.
Amien's maneuvering with the axis force and Golkar was done to ensure his political survival by using all the available means. In principle, such maneuvering is not much different than survival using available means. In principle, such maneuvering is not much different to what Megawati supposedly did by smoothing the way for Golkar veteran Ginandjar Kartasasmita, the long-time Soeharto employee, to become an MPR member. It is also not much different to the constant communication that human rights campaigner Marzuki Darusman must have apparently had with the military. What is it about us that makes it so easy to condemn Amien's maneuvering and condone others?
Golkar indeed poses a problem. Despite being a disgraced political grouping, it has managed to secure the second largest vote at 22.4 percent in the general election. No one can afford to ignore this party. But most observers know that Golkar is facing a severe internal problem, more so than other parties, because it is tied to an unpopular incumbent. It would be very tempting for all the politicians to ally with the incumbent's would-be traitors within Golkar. It should be noted that it was Kwik Kian Gie, the leader of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan), known for his high moral standing, who first coined the phrase "white" and "black" Golkar. We may not like it, but Akbar Tandjung has become the most desired man in the legislature.
Maybe we are just not used to political compromises. In the thirty-two years of Soeharto's reign, politicians were nothing but political accessories. Negotiations were kept to a minimum since it was the order of the great leader or his armed followers that mattered. Once he was gone, desperately needed political changes were brought about by student demonstrations, which were noble actions requiring courage and conviction -- and the very minimum of compromises. To negotiate has become a sin in post- Soeharto Indonesia, regardless of the reality that the political scene is widely fragmented.
But now Amien has secured a strategic position. He must now start delivering his promises. We shall see whether he will struggle within the MPR so that the highest legislative body will create a number of decrees that will truly forward the "reformasi" movement. We shall soon see whether Amien will use his position to amend the 1945 Constitution to create a real pluralist democracy, to eliminate the excessive political privilege of the military and create new laws to fight corruption and the human rights abuse allegedly committed by the Soeharto and Habibie governments. Only then should we cast our real judgment. From now on, we should allow Amien Rais to do his work.
The writer is a PAN voter who has no official positions in the party or in any Islamic organizations.