A Balkan intifada in Kosovo?

LONDON: The violence on Feb. 28 and March 1, 1998 in Serbia's restive province of Kosovo, which claimed at least 20 lives, is likely to be a watershed for the region. Any hope that the unrest might have been isolated was shattered by a full-scale Serbian military assault on March 5. The violence followed a steadily increasing pattern of tension over recent months which had already resulted in 12 fatalities in 1998.

Western governments are concerned that the bloodshed might lead to a broader regional conflict. Consequently, they are intensifying their efforts to bring Serbia's ruling authorities and Kosovo's separatist leadership to the negotiating table. Although there had been signs of some diplomatic progress, the violence makes a political settlement far more difficult. The risks of a further escalation of unrest are now considerable, and there is a strong possibility that the violence could spill over into neighboring Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).

The President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Slobodan Milosevic, has been under increasing pressure to resolve the Kosovo problem, following the decline of his influence in the Bosnian Serb republic, in Montenegro and in Serbia itself. He has essentially been faced with three options:

* preserve the status quo;

* negotiate with the ethnic Albanian leadership; or

* launch a concerted military offensive.

President Milosevic's usual pattern of behavior has been to delay action or to intensify a crisis that he can later claim credit for resolving. However, international diplomats hope that Milosevic will be willing to reach a negotiated settlement as a step towards the removal of U.S. financial sanctions. Washington has emphasized that a warning made by former U.S. president George Bush to Milosevic in December 1992 about the unacceptability of using military force in Kosovo still applies. Within the narrow confines of Serbian nationalist politics, however, Milosevic has little room for maneuver and has probably ruled out a political settlement.

The killings have further undermined the position of Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the main ethnic Albanian party. He was already under pressure to abandon his policy of non-confrontation and adopt a more aggressive stance. Rugova -- who was appointed president of the self-styled 'Republic of Kosovo' after the locally organized 1992 elections -- has tried to build a parallel state that is independent of Belgrade. His efforts to avoid potentially inflammatory protests are generally credited with preserving Kosovo's uneasy peace.

However, Rugova has lost control of Kosovo's more radical government-in-exile, led from Bonn by 'Prime Minister' Bujar Bukoshi. His position is also undermined by militant student activists pressing for a return of ethnic Albanians to Pristina University. Since October, police officers have used tear gas and batons to break up numerous rallies. Student leaders have called for another demonstration on March 13, and for the first time they have urged people to join them on the streets.

Most of the recent killings have occurred in or near the area of Drenica, a triangle of rugged countryside in central Kosovo. Populated almost entirely by ethnic Albanians, Drenica is fertile recruiting ground for the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK). The UCK is believed to be funded and backed by radical Albanian exiles in Germany and Switzerland, and its military command may consist of former Yugoslav Army officers who fought against Serb forces during the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia.

Although the UCK is armed with weapons smuggled from Albania, the group is probably unable, in the short term, to withstand a major assault by well-equipped Serbian police forces. It is clear that such a move has been under consideration for some time. For instance, the Secretary-General of Serbia's ruling Socialist Party, Gorica Gajevic, warned on Jan. 22, 1998 that the 'activities of Albanian extremists should be suppressed by all means'.

Reports of an army and police build-up in Kosovo were widespread following the killings on Feb. 28 and March 1. A full- scale military incursion by Serbian forces into Drenica risks inflicting serious civilian casualties, and could lead to a wider uprising among Kosovo's increasingly disenchanted Albanian population. There appears to be no prominent politician ready to lead such an insurrection, although broad public support in Kosovo would be guaranteed.

An estimated 90 percent of Kosovo's two million people are ethnic Albanians. Unemployment among Albanians is extremely high following the dismissal of thousands of state-sector workers in the early 1990s. There is widespread police repression in the form of arrests, searches and the arbitrary imposition of fines. In 1997, at least two Albanians died in police custody, probably as a result of torture, and the trials of Albanians accused of having links to the UCK or allied groups were denounced as miscarriages of justice by both the UN human-rights rapporteur, Elizabeth Rehn, and the U.S. State Department.

The West fears that an uprising in Kosovo could lead to a wider regional conflict involving Albania and FYROM. Ethnic Albanians comprise about a quarter of Macedonia's total population and there have been incidents of unrest in the west of the country. FYROM President Kiro Gligorov suggested on Jan. 22 that the international community should create a corridor allowing an expected 200,000-400,000 refugees to pass from Kosovo through FYROM to Albania. FYROM's fragility has been underlined by the continuing presence of the 750-strong UN Preventive Deployment Force, whose mandate expires on 31 August 1998.

Albanian Prime Minister Fatos Nano does not support Rugova's demand for total independence. Given Albania's dependence on foreign aid, it is unlikely that Nano would encourage the country's security forces to become involved in an insurrection in Kosovo. However, Nano's control over Albania does not extend to the north of the country, where the UCK has acquired weapons and recruited supporters. Even Nano's government has warned that it would be forced to 'act as one nation' should outright war break out in Kosovo.

Albania has called for the convening of a 'Dayton-style' international conference to resolve the crisis. The December 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina was effectively imposed on the Bosnian Serbs after NATO intervened in the conflict. However, Belgrade is not in such a weak position, despite the continued imposition of U.S. financial sanctions. Furthermore, the possible failure of an international conference could exacerbate the problem.

Western governments agree that Kosovo should not become an independent state. In December 1997, France and Germany jointly proposed that the province should be granted an unspecified 'special status' within the FRY. UK Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Tony Lloyd said on Feb. 5 that the European Union (EU) supported the concept of broad autonomy for Kosovo.

These suggestions imply that Kosovo should be awarded the same status that it held from 1974-1989. Both Milosevic and Rugova have rejected this idea, although diplomats believe that the LDK leader could be persuaded to accept a compromise if he was given international guarantees.

A number of senior diplomats visited Kosovo in February 1998, including the U.S. charge d'affaires to Belgrade, Richard Miles, as well as ambassadors from Germany and the UK. The senior U.S. envoy to the Balkans, Robert Gelbard, traveled to Pristina for the first time on Feb. 22, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's High Commissioner for National Minorities, Max Van der Stoel, has been granted a visa by Belgrade.

Western governments have repeatedly called on Milosevic and Rugova to open negotiations. Milosevic has rejected external involvement, insisting that the Kosovo issue is an internal affair. The two leaders have never met and need to overcome domestic opposition before starting talks.

There is also a possibility that the stalled negotiations on the return of Albanian students to Pristina University could be revived. Rugova and Milosevic signed an agreement on Sept. 1, 1996 to resolve the matter, but it has not been implemented. The Rome-based St Egidio community -- which has considerable conflict-mediation experience -- is reported to be making some progress on the issue. Resolving this problem would be an important first step in rebuilding confidence. But major obstacles remain, notably the fundamental issue of whether returning students would recognize the Yugoslav state or their own 'republic'. All of this is now made much more difficult by the recent violence.

Parliamentary and presidential polls are to be held in Kosovo on March 22, 1998, and like the 1992 elections, they will be outside official Yugoslav structures. Although Rugova has twice postponed elections, he has come under increasing pressure to take action. The separatist Kosovo parliament, elected in 1992, has never met because of intervention by the Serbian authorities.

Belgrade considers the polls to be illegal. Milosevic only allowed the 1992 elections to proceed because he did not want the war in the former Yugoslavia to spread to Kosovo. Gelbard has urged him to do the same again, emphasizing that the polls are not a threat to the Serbian authorities. If Milosevic does not agree, he risks causing wider unrest and further undermining Rugova, who is essential to containing the violence.

The international community is keen that Rugova remains influential. He does not face any serious opposition in the presidential poll, but the LDK could fare badly in the parliamentary contest against parties demanding a more robust approach to Milosevic. Nevertheless, even a partial victory for Rugova is unlikely to prevent the UCK from persisting with its low-intensity war, with tacit support from parties opposed to the LDK.

The situation is now extremely dangerous. Given Milosevic's unwillingness to open negotiations, a slide into even more widespread violence seems inevitable. That would further undermine Rugova's position and intensify the chances of the violence spreading outside Kosovo. The likelihood of the international community being confronted with another major war in the Balkans is very high.