2019: Deadline for democracy in Indonesia

Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, Washington

As anticipation grows in the lead-up to the Sept. 20 presidential runoff, one of the pertinent questions that we need to ask ourselves is as follows: Does the advent of direct, free and fair presidential and legislative elections secure the future of the democratic system in Indonesia?

The short answer is "no".

Elections are a necessary ingredient, but insufficient in themselves to ensure the consolidation of democracy.

Despite the elections, democracy here is still at the transitional stage. It would be naive to say that democracy has been consolidated.

We will be able to say that consolidation has occurred only when democratic processes and institutions become "the only game in town". As long as people continue to resort to extra- constitutional means in their efforts to obtain power, it cannot be said that our democracy has evolved as such.

Unfortunately, while the concept of democracy has entered into the national psyche, at this juncture it has yet to prevail as the predominant culture of Indonesian society -- what Henry Kissinger described as the "defining national experience".

Democracy has prospered because it is has been seen as an alternative to the bad times during the latter Soeharto years.

It has not reached the unquestionable apex of primary conviction attained by such things as Islam and prostration to community elders.

Studies of emerging democracies in Latin America show that it takes about two elections before there is a reversion to authoritarianism. Consequently, the next 10 to 15 years (two to three elections), will test the depth of democracy's roots here.

There are three likely outcomes which could emerge in Indonesia at the end of this formative period.

The first sees the establishment of a deep democracy and election of successive nationalist-secular administrations.

Under this scenario, a plural civil society matures allowing for democracy to be consolidated, and ensuring that it is not just a passing fad.

The elected administrations do not have to work miracles to achieve this. The key is whether democracy is made relevant to society. Whether people feel their elected leaders can bring stability and a just prosperity.

The economy may grow at a lethargic pace, but at least there is recognition that basic welfare is being tended to and the civil service is carrying out its minimum duties without unduly taxing the community.

If these events come to pass, democratic tenets will be solidified in our traditionally paternalistic culture.

The second scenario is the rise of non-secular elements via the electoral process as voters seek alternatives and look to "less-liberal" options to the pluralistic nation state.

Heralding this would be years of indigent and teetering democracy. People get sick of the incumbent major powers -- usually nationalist status quo elements like Golkar and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle -- who pervert democratic processes during a time of economic stagnation.

People see them as having no commitment to reform as compromises are made to suit political expedience.

The civil service decays as corruption reaches Olympic levels.

Meanwhile, "smaller" parties, such as the Prosperous Justice Party, for example, after carefully distancing themselves from the decaying hegemony, enhance their images as "clean" parties lead by "honest" figures. They become an attractive option for mainstream voters seeking a civilian alternative.

The dilemma is that these small parties, despite their pluralistic claims, were at birth essentially sectarian in nature, leaning toward some form of fundamentalism.

This is not to say that their emergence will cause Indonesia to become an Islamic state. Leaders of these parties are shrewd enough to know that slogans such as Islamic sharia are too divisive.

But the likelihood is that national laws will be subverted by exclusively Islamic tenets, thus causing an erosion of the secular character of the state.

The irony of democratic freedoms is that they bring with them the opportunity for greater intolerance.

The third scenario is "benevolent" authoritarianism.

The rise of a pseudo-democratic regime propped up by a military that justifies its role by claiming that it is the vanguard of sundry propagandist icons -- Pancasila, unity, etc -- and slogans of stability and welfare.

The predominant features that would serve as the precursors of such a regression would be decentralization run amok combined with growing separatist threats.

The government would also be seen ineffective as the bureaucracy becomes further bogged down in corruption. Frustration would be brought to the boil by a legal system that could usually be rented but not bought.

With the economy at a standstill and civilian leaders failing to provide leadership, disillusionment sets in as people begin to question the value of democracy. Intuitively, the people revert to predisposed illusions of Soeharto-style stability and security.

It is important to note that even under such a regime, the facade of democracy would be retained. A coup d'etat is not an option. Power would be obtained and sustained by subverting democratic institutions and manipulating laws, effectively creating a shallow democracy.

We shall have to wait until 2019, perhaps sooner, to know which scenario prevails.

Hence, while we may be euphoric over the success of the recent elections, it is worth bearing in mind that elections do not a democracy make.

Meidyatama Suryodiningrat is a staff writer for The Jakarta Post.