Mon, 03 Jan 2005

2005: End of the beginning for Susilo

Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, Jakarta

If 2004 was the year of voting frequently, then 2005 could be a year of many frustrations. After the highs and the promises, inevitably comes disappointment. That is not to say that the administration will perform sub-par, but no executive could meet the weight of (unrealistic) expectations in 100 or 1,000 days.

To paraphrase the immortal words of Churchill, this is not the beginning of the end for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 2005 is, however, the end of the beginning.

This is not a make or break year for the president, but it will set the tone and mood -- confidence or pessimism, consolidation or the dissolution of power -- for the middle of his term in office.

Susilo's popularity in 2005 will, it is predicted, drop further from the highs of 2004. Even if the government sustains macroeconomic stability, the quixotical sudden improvements in welfare will not occur. Instead "tough-love" policies -- such as further reductions of fuel subsidies -- must be adopted, and populist policies, like those in the labor market, phased out.

Policies that are economically necessary, albeit unpopular with everyday consumers.

Though these policies predominantly effect the minority urban population and not the majority of disadvantaged Indonesians who could eventually benefit from the reallocation of subsidies, the short-term dilemma is that of population centers -- like Jakarta -- where politics is more likely to muster up street protests and unrest.

In high politics, the tsunami catastrophe will initially subdue the traditional fractiousness of party politics. In the coming weeks, restraint and accommodation will contain political wrangling. Powerful people will scramble to market their concerns about the tragedy, taking turns to visit the ravaged province, and arranging photo-ops at donation ceremonies.

Once they are confident little more publicity can be milked from the tragedy, it will be "business as usual" and new challenges will be posed for Indonesia's first democratically elected president.

The shifting power balance in the House of Representatives, after the rise of Vice President Jusuf Kalla as Golkar leader, brings a new dimension to the way that politics is played out in the capital. The change in Golkar's leadership spelt the formal end of the opposition Nationhood Coalition.

Nevertheless, despite the power of the central board to discipline its members -- including the right to recall recalcitrant legislators -- it is hard to imagine the large Golkar faction being free of dissent.

There is bound to be rebellion within party ranks in the coming 18 months if Kalla brings the party too close too fast in alignment with the executive.

For longer-term interests, Susilo too needs to wield his influence in the shaping of these new alliances to ensure that the new legislative constellation is not overwhelmed by Kalla.

Another unique aspect that will challenge traditional players is the advent of direct elections at provincial/regental levels starting mid-2005.

Not all these elections will be of significance, but the leadership of many regions will be fiercely fought over by national-level players, due to the bounty these regions promise to bring. Regions such as Riau, East Kalimantan and Papua, for example, will attract major players from Jakarta seeking to influence proceedings.

Major political parties and their central boards in Jakarta no longer hold the same kind of sway they did in the past, simply because they no longer have the "resources" to keep branch levels in line. In fact, it is often the other way round with regencies supplementing funds for party activities in Jakarta.

That is why there is so much at stake in these local elections -- for the parties and their business networks. The government too needs to establish -- at the very least -- an amicable working relationship with these new locally elected officials. Beyond the humanitarian issues facing victims of the tragedy in northern Sumatra, the post-disaster relief and reconstruction in Aceh poses a new trip wire for Susilo's young administration.

If in two months stories of starvation and destitution continue to emerge out of Aceh, severe criticism will rain down on the government.

Predictable charges of the government's ineptitude and the embezzlement of aid funds will hang over the administration.

Susilo would do well to avoid what currently looks like a rather innocuous scenario.

People throughout Indonesia reacted with deep grief to the tragedy in Aceh. Failure to show positive progress in relieving the victims' anguish will incense a nation, who for much of January 2005, and perhaps beyond, will continue to mourn. It is this sort of sentiment that spurs profound distrust in a government and endures till the next election.