2005: End of the beginning for Susilo
2005: End of the beginning for Susilo
Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, Jakarta
If 2004 was the year of voting frequently, then 2005 could be
a year of many frustrations. After the highs and the promises,
inevitably comes disappointment. That is not to say that the
administration will perform sub-par, but no executive could meet
the weight of (unrealistic) expectations in 100 or 1,000 days.
To paraphrase the immortal words of Churchill, this is not the
beginning of the end for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 2005 is,
however, the end of the beginning.
This is not a make or break year for the president, but it
will set the tone and mood -- confidence or pessimism,
consolidation or the dissolution of power -- for the middle of
his term in office.
Susilo's popularity in 2005 will, it is predicted, drop
further from the highs of 2004. Even if the government sustains
macroeconomic stability, the quixotical sudden improvements in
welfare will not occur. Instead "tough-love" policies -- such as
further reductions of fuel subsidies -- must be adopted, and
populist policies, like those in the labor market, phased out.
Policies that are economically necessary, albeit unpopular
with everyday consumers.
Though these policies predominantly effect the minority urban
population and not the majority of disadvantaged Indonesians who
could eventually benefit from the reallocation of subsidies, the
short-term dilemma is that of population centers -- like Jakarta
-- where politics is more likely to muster up street protests and
unrest.
In high politics, the tsunami catastrophe will initially
subdue the traditional fractiousness of party politics. In the
coming weeks, restraint and accommodation will contain political
wrangling. Powerful people will scramble to market their concerns
about the tragedy, taking turns to visit the ravaged province,
and arranging photo-ops at donation ceremonies.
Once they are confident little more publicity can be milked
from the tragedy, it will be "business as usual" and new
challenges will be posed for Indonesia's first democratically
elected president.
The shifting power balance in the House of Representatives,
after the rise of Vice President Jusuf Kalla as Golkar leader,
brings a new dimension to the way that politics is played out in
the capital. The change in Golkar's leadership spelt the formal
end of the opposition Nationhood Coalition.
Nevertheless, despite the power of the central board to
discipline its members -- including the right to recall
recalcitrant legislators -- it is hard to imagine the large
Golkar faction being free of dissent.
There is bound to be rebellion within party ranks in the
coming 18 months if Kalla brings the party too close too fast in
alignment with the executive.
For longer-term interests, Susilo too needs to wield his
influence in the shaping of these new alliances to ensure that
the new legislative constellation is not overwhelmed by Kalla.
Another unique aspect that will challenge traditional players
is the advent of direct elections at provincial/regental levels
starting mid-2005.
Not all these elections will be of significance, but the
leadership of many regions will be fiercely fought over by
national-level players, due to the bounty these regions promise
to bring. Regions such as Riau, East Kalimantan and Papua, for
example, will attract major players from Jakarta seeking to
influence proceedings.
Major political parties and their central boards in Jakarta no
longer hold the same kind of sway they did in the past, simply
because they no longer have the "resources" to keep branch levels
in line. In fact, it is often the other way round with regencies
supplementing funds for party activities in Jakarta.
That is why there is so much at stake in these local
elections -- for the parties and their business networks.
The government too needs to establish -- at the very least -- an
amicable working relationship with these new locally elected
officials. Beyond the humanitarian issues facing victims of the
tragedy in northern Sumatra, the post-disaster relief and
reconstruction in Aceh poses a new trip wire for Susilo's young
administration.
If in two months stories of starvation and destitution
continue to emerge out of Aceh, severe criticism will rain down
on the government.
Predictable charges of the government's ineptitude and the
embezzlement of aid funds will hang over the administration.
Susilo would do well to avoid what currently looks like a
rather innocuous scenario.
People throughout Indonesia reacted with deep grief to the
tragedy in Aceh. Failure to show positive progress in relieving
the victims' anguish will incense a nation, who for much of
January 2005, and perhaps beyond, will continue to mourn. It is
this sort of sentiment that spurs profound distrust in a
government and endures till the next election.