2004 elections: rejecting the old "elit politik"

Max Lane Visiting Fellow, Asia research centre, Murdoch University, Murdoch WA West Australia m.lane@murdoch.edu.au

The 2004 election results show that the fundamental trend in Indonesian politics has not been a nostalgic swing back to the past but is towards a popular rejection of the old parties of the "elit politik" (and of the business and military elite). Not a single major elit politik party has increased its vote. Golkar, despite its massive funding, its so-called "new image" and its ability to get Akbar Tandjung off on his corruption conviction will also probably see its votes drop slightly. The Insonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) vote will most likely collapse from 33 percent in 1999 to around 20 percent.

Most crucially, in Indonesia's political, industrial and economic centre, Jakarta, the PDI-P (13 percent) and GOLKAR (8 percent) votes collapsed. New players, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)and Democratic Party (PD), scored huge votes of over 20 percent each. In fact it is possible that all the old mainstream parties may not achieve much more than 30 percent between them in Jakarta. Jakarta is where political change takes place the fastest; where new trends start.

The Jakarta region, home to more than a ten million people, is where economic change and decline is felt the most immediately on a large scale, where unemployment, rising cost of living and social stress is most intense and where media access and political discussion is greatest. It is where the opposition movement to Suharto took off, later spreading around the country before climaxing on an even bigger scale back in Jakarta.

The huge votes for PKS and PD represented rejection of the old and votes for the "new". They are indeed new players, with a new and serious base in Jakarta and, given their 7 percent national votes, a block of votes each in the House of Representatives (DPR). But more important is their presence as new players, in a time of increasing rejection of the old.

There was much pre-election talk of a nostalgic swing back to the past based on a popular desire for "stability". Most people are concerned about socio-economic stability, not political stability. The Megawati government was a relatively stable government pursuing a consistent set of economic and political policies throughout its term of office. But these policies resulted in socio-economic instability in the lives of ordinary people: Employment uncertainty, price uncertainty, uncertainty of access to medicines and hospitals and to higher and vocational education.

At the present time, the causes of these uncertainties are not perceived to be the absence of a "strong man" but of the prevalence of culture of self-enrichment, and of rivalry of power and resources, among the old parties. The consciousness about this is clearly highest in Jakarta where information about corruption and wealth disparities is most widely spread. All the parties, old and new, have the same rhetoric on the issues, but the old have the least credibility.

However, neither the PKS nor the PD and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, have yet to show that they are in fact substantially different from the old. At no time during the last five years has Bambang Yudhoyono, for example, indicated any disagreement with the basic social and economic strategy of the Megawati government. The PKS, as part of the Reformation Faction, in the parliament has supported most of the conservative bills the government put to parliament, including the latest Privatisation of Water Bill.

Rejection of the old parties will remain a fundamental feature of Indonesian politics while they are unable to bring about an end to deepening socio-economic instability in the peoples lives. It is still unclear, however, how this trend will impact on the presidential elections. First, the only visible presidential candidate with any real prospect of being seen as something "new" and "different" is Susilo. It is likely, however, that he will enter into talks with major elements of the old parties, such as GOLKAR. Whether he tries this or if he tries an alliance with the National Awakening Party (PKB) of Abdurrahman Wahid, the established party with some liberal credentials in some peoples eyes, his ability to sell himself as something "new", "different": And better will be severely weakened. The PKB is also a party of compromise with the elit politik, despite recruiting some outspoke NGO figures.

Second, one of the many failures of the New Order was its inability to create any national unity among the domestic political, business and military elite. As a result the elit politik parties are more and more regionally based. This is also one aspect of the emergence of the PD, whose leadership comes out of one of the wings of the Jakarta middle classes. It is uncertain whether it will have the machinery to project Susilo with sufficient immediacy beyond Jakarta.

Third, there will be increased focus on Yudhoyono in terms of him showing he has something different to offer in concrete policies, not just "image". During this period, his record as a senior general during the repressive years of Suharto will also be brought to the fore again.

Meanwhile, PKS may have to fall behind support for a figure from one of the existing old parties, such as Amien Rais from the National Mandate Party (PAN). PAN's vote will also most likely dropd down to below 7 percent.

It is a reflection of the political weaknesses of the democratic sector, of so-called "civil society", that the search for something new, for a party with solutions to the country's crisis, has been limited to the PKS and PD, neither of which have offered different social or economic programs to PDI-P or Golkar. Preferences for appealing to old Sukarnoist symbols, or for public lobbying on "rotten politicians" while waiting for 2009, or for advocating an election boycott, or fear of partisanship among NGOs and intellectuals held back what efforts were made to put forward a party with a genuine alternative programme.

Without such a party with a clear alternative, genuinely "new" policy platform, the people's search for something new and better will be ultimately be frustrated.

Whether Susilo, or even some re-imaged leader from an old party, can get away with presenting themselves as "new and better" between now and the presidential election is unclear. What is clear is that any new government sticking to the old social and economic strategies will be unable to meet the people's expectations.

It will not be long into 2005 that rejection of old parties may turn into rejection of new government, especially in Jakarta.