2004 elections: rejecting the old "elit politik"

2004 elections: rejecting the old "elit politik"

Max Lane
Visiting Fellow, Asia research centre,
Murdoch University,
Murdoch WA
West Australia
m.lane@murdoch.edu.au

The 2004 election results show that the fundamental trend in
Indonesian politics has not been a nostalgic swing back to the
past but is towards a popular rejection of the old parties of the
"elit politik" (and of the business and military elite). Not a
single major elit politik party has increased its vote. Golkar,
despite its massive funding, its so-called "new image" and its
ability to get Akbar Tandjung off on his corruption conviction
will also probably see its votes drop slightly. The Insonesian
Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) vote will most likely
collapse from 33 percent in 1999 to around 20 percent.

Most crucially, in Indonesia's political, industrial and
economic centre, Jakarta, the PDI-P (13 percent) and GOLKAR (8
percent) votes collapsed. New players, the Prosperous Justice
Party (PKS)and Democratic Party (PD), scored huge votes of over
20 percent each. In fact it is possible that all the old
mainstream parties may not achieve much more than 30 percent
between them in Jakarta. Jakarta is where political change takes
place the fastest; where new trends start.

The Jakarta region, home to more than a ten million people, is
where economic change and decline is felt the most immediately on
a large scale, where unemployment, rising cost of living and
social stress is most intense and where media access and
political discussion is greatest. It is where the opposition
movement to Suharto took off, later spreading around the country
before climaxing on an even bigger scale back in Jakarta.

The huge votes for PKS and PD represented rejection of the old
and votes for the "new". They are indeed new players, with a new
and serious base in Jakarta and, given their 7 percent national
votes, a block of votes each in the House of Representatives
(DPR). But more important is their presence as new players, in a
time of increasing rejection of the old.

There was much pre-election talk of a nostalgic swing back to
the past based on a popular desire for "stability". Most people
are concerned about socio-economic stability, not political
stability. The Megawati government was a relatively stable
government pursuing a consistent set of economic and political
policies throughout its term of office. But these policies
resulted in socio-economic instability in the lives of ordinary
people: Employment uncertainty, price uncertainty, uncertainty of
access to medicines and hospitals and to higher and vocational
education.

At the present time, the causes of these uncertainties are not
perceived to be the absence of a "strong man" but of the
prevalence of culture of self-enrichment, and of rivalry of power
and resources, among the old parties. The consciousness about
this is clearly highest in Jakarta where information about
corruption and wealth disparities is most widely spread. All the
parties, old and new, have the same rhetoric on the issues, but
the old have the least credibility.

However, neither the PKS nor the PD and Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, have yet to show that they are in fact substantially
different from the old. At no time during the last five years has
Bambang Yudhoyono, for example, indicated any disagreement with
the basic social and economic strategy of the Megawati
government. The PKS, as part of the Reformation Faction, in the
parliament has supported most of the conservative bills the
government put to parliament, including the latest Privatisation
of Water Bill.

Rejection of the old parties will remain a fundamental feature
of Indonesian politics while they are unable to bring about an
end to deepening socio-economic instability in the peoples lives.
It is still unclear, however, how this trend will impact on the
presidential elections. First, the only visible presidential
candidate with any real prospect of being seen as something "new"
and "different" is Susilo. It is likely, however, that he will
enter into talks with major elements of the old parties, such as
GOLKAR. Whether he tries this or if he tries an alliance with the
National Awakening Party (PKB) of Abdurrahman Wahid, the
established party with some liberal credentials in some peoples
eyes, his ability to sell himself as something "new",
"different": And better will be severely weakened. The PKB is
also a party of compromise with the elit politik, despite
recruiting some outspoke NGO figures.

Second, one of the many failures of the New Order was its
inability to create any national unity among the domestic
political, business and military elite. As a result the elit
politik parties are more and more regionally based. This is also
one aspect of the emergence of the PD, whose leadership comes out
of one of the wings of the Jakarta middle classes. It is
uncertain whether it will have the machinery to project Susilo
with sufficient immediacy beyond Jakarta.

Third, there will be increased focus on Yudhoyono in terms of
him showing he has something different to offer in concrete
policies, not just "image". During this period, his record as a
senior general during the repressive years of Suharto will also
be brought to the fore again.

Meanwhile, PKS may have to fall behind support for a figure
from one of the existing old parties, such as Amien Rais from the
National Mandate Party (PAN). PAN's vote will also most likely
dropd down to below 7 percent.

It is a reflection of the political weaknesses of the
democratic sector, of so-called "civil society", that the search
for something new, for a party with solutions to the country's
crisis, has been limited to the PKS and PD, neither of which have
offered different social or economic programs to PDI-P or Golkar.
Preferences for appealing to old Sukarnoist symbols, or for
public lobbying on "rotten politicians" while waiting for 2009,
or for advocating an election boycott, or fear of partisanship
among NGOs and intellectuals held back what efforts were made to
put forward a party with a genuine alternative programme.

Without such a party with a clear alternative, genuinely "new"
policy platform, the people's search for something new and better
will be ultimately be frustrated.

Whether Susilo, or even some re-imaged leader from an old
party, can get away with presenting themselves as "new and
better" between now and the presidential election is unclear.
What is clear is that any new government sticking to the old
social and economic strategies will be unable to meet the
people's expectations.

It will not be long into 2005 that rejection of old parties
may turn into rejection of new government, especially in Jakarta.