100 days for new research and technology minister

Sulfikar Amir, Troy, New York

The announcement of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's Cabinet, just before midnight on Oct. 20, turned out to be an anticlimax. The United Indonesia Cabinet, as it is called, seems to have disappointed some people as its composition was conceived based more on political considerations than on professionalism. Some old faces are back, but in different positions. But, to be fair, the new Cabinet is not so appalling when one considers the appointments case by case.

The appointment of Kusmayanto Kadiman, who was named State Minister of Research and Technology, is quite historical. He is the first State Minister of Research and Technology to be affiliated with the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), the most prominent technical university in the country. Holding a doctorate in control engineering from the Australian National University, Kadiman started his academic career from down below, before heading to the ITB's department of Control Physics Engineering.

In 2001, he was elected as the first rector of ITB. Under his three-year leadership, the ITB has flourished, physically as well as academically. From Kadiman's background, he is without a doubt the right person for the position.

Recently, President Susilo summoned his Cabinet ministers to design their 100-days programs. He also urged every minister to use "shock therapy" to show their commitment to clean governance, and to maintain public trust in his presidency. What kind of opportunity would this give the State Minister of Research and Technology? Is there any shock therapy that would stimulate scientific and technological activity in the country within 100 days?

Given that we have been dependent on imported technology for years, developing our own technology is compulsory. Yet, developing technology is not a job that can be completed within 100 days. It took centuries for the United States to gain technological superiority, such as we witness today. Countries like Japan and South Korea took at least several decades to master Western technology, let alone developing their own.

As a newly appointed minister, Kadiman is certainly eager to create attractive programs to keep up with the new Cabinet's pace. On the one hand, this is a good opportunity for him to show to the public that he is capable of the job. But on the other hand, this could easily be a "trap" to create instant technological-development programs based on technologists' interests, which only produce short-term benefits exclusively for technologists, instead of long-term advantages for society at large. For this, Kadiman should be aware that creating technology in the lab is totally different from manufacturing technology that benefits society.

To avoid such a trap, the first thing the minister could do is to replace the old paradigm -- I call it Habibiesm -- which has occupied the orientation of national technology policy for years. In a nutshell, Habibiesm comprises three problematic views that hinder technology policy from being grounded socially and culturally.

First, Habibiesm heavily relies on the assumption that technology determines social change, ignoring the fact that technology is a social product.

Second, the major motivation of technology development is the pursuit of prestige. Although B.J. Habibie is no longer in office, the tendency to pursue technological prestige is still alive. The problem is that what gives prestige to the country in the eyes of technologists is not what people really need.

Third, technological development is severely dominated by the government. This issue is not about how much money is spent by the government on the development of technology, but the government's domination in determining what, and how, technology is developed.

In an interview, Kadiman said that he would focus on enhancing the triple-helix coordination, or using his term "ABG", which stands for Academics, Business and Government. This is a good indication that he is aware of the significance of structural conditions in stimulating technology development. But to do such a job is not that easy. As a control engineer, Kadiman realizes that control requires power. So the question is, how much power is actually in Kadiman's hands, to allows him to implement his agenda of "controlling" these three groups of interest?

We know that in previous governments, the seat that Kadiman holds was treated merely as commodity for political exchange between the president and their political supporters. But this is no longer the case as Kadiman is not linked to any political group, which shows that President Susilo understands that research and technology should be handled by the right person.

The shame of the matter is that the ministerial position does not come with sufficient power to influence other sectors' policies, namely industry, education, and telecommunications, whereas the success of technology policy always involves the engagement of other government agencies.

This is a dilemma for Kadiman, because, while he is politically free, he is also politically weak. Besides, given that President Susilo seemed to have no specific technology agenda during his presidential campaign, it is difficult for Kadiman to gain strong political support from the president, such as that which Habibie enjoyed from Soeharto.

Within this condition, my suggestion is that the minister should restructure technological institutions. The goal of such institutional reengineering would be to exchange resources with other departments in order to make them more efficient, more integrated and more productive.

Finally, all of this demands an intensive approach to other ministers and related government agencies. Nevertheless, technology development always involves politics, which should not be avoided but embraced. Thus, the 100-days program of the minister should comprise political lobbying.

The writer is a PhD candidate in Science and Technology Studies at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Troy, New York.