YLBHI: An asset or a national threat?<\/p>\n
The Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI), one of the best
\nknown non-government organizations in Indonesia, celebrated its
\n24th anniversary last week. Sociologist Kastorius Sinaga argues
\nthat whoever sees it as a threat is actually the destabilizing
\nfactor.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Unlike previous anniversaries, the celebration
\nof the YLBHI anniversary appeared to be overshadowed by
\nunfavorable conditions. An increase of political pressure,
\nranging from prohibition of its members to speak at seminars,
\nintimidation of some of its vocal staff, to the imposition of
\nunduly complicated procedures for obtaining the necessary permits
\nto organize meetings, have frustrated its activists.<\/p>\n
This leads to critical questions. Is the foundation actually a
\nthreat to national political stability? Or does it contribute to
\nthe interest of political development in this country? I think
\nsuch questions are relevant now in line with our efforts to solve
\nmisunderstandings which have probably emerged between the
\ngovernment and the foundation in particular, and human rights
\nactivists in general.<\/p>\n
The foundation was founded in 1971 when ten lawyers joined
\noutstanding intellects and journalists to launch a pilot project
\non legal aid for poor people in Jakarta. They proved to be an
\nunusually effective blend: the lawyers provided professional
\nlegal skills, the intellects a \"think tank\" for social problems
\nand the journalists were responsible for the function of public
\nexposition.<\/p>\n
Since the beginning, the foundation has operated under very
\nchallenging circumstances. Particularly in Jakarta, which was
\nrapidly developing into a modern metropolis, conflicts in various
\nfields increased between the government and society, particularly
\nwith those living around developed areas. In the 1980s the
\nfoundation expanded to other regions due to a strong belief that
\nlegal cases outside Java would increase constantly. Now the
\nfoundation has 13 branch offices in the provinces which provide
\nlegal assistance free of charge to thousands of poor and
\npowerless people, like farmers, laborers, petty traders, becak
\ndrivers and uneducated people. Since many individual cases, like
\narbitrary labor disputes, land conflicts and subversive cases,
\nemerged due to a particular government policy and regulation, the
\nfoundation shifted its emphasis of legal aid from \"individual\" to
\n\"collective structural\" legal aid. This shift has led the
\nfoundation to directly confront government policies.<\/p>\n
In handling collective cases, the foundation adopts two
\nstrategies simultaneously. The first is litigation, leading to a
\nrange of formal juridical activities to defend the rights of
\nclients in court. Juridical accusation and plea on behalf of
\nclients are normally postulated on the bases of positive
\njuridical principles. Misuse of authority, authoritarian behavior
\nof the state apparatus, intimidation supported by the military
\n(particularly in land eviction cases) are also prosecuted in the
\nname of the law. Such litigation activities in turn draw
\nattention to the problems related to the execution of power. In
\nother words, juridical cases were broadened to represent general
\npolitical issues or problems.<\/p>\n
The second strategy is composed of non-litigation activities
\nranging from independent fact finding which enables the
\nfoundation's lawyers to include in their plea a clear public
\nstatement concerning any politically repressive methods used by
\nthe state, assisting and mobilizing the clients to the House of
\nRepresentatives or respective ministry in order to gain political
\nrecognition of their problem, to building networks with student
\ngroups and other NGOs both domestic and international. In short,
\nthe non-litigation activities function to promote sweeping
\nchanges in fundamental social conditions by initiating widespread
\npublic concern for the plea of the clients.<\/p>\n
With such activities, we should consider that the foundation
\nhas actually helped to maintain political stability in this
\ncountry. Firstly, through juridical processes (litigation
\nactivities), the government has actually been indirectly assisted
\nby the foundation to cope with the conflicting situation between
\nthe people and the government. The reason is that the protracted
\nsocial and political conflicts have been \"narrowed\" to a mere
\njuridical conflict where the government is automatically in the
\ndominant position. Secondly, by allowing the presence of the
\nfoundation and its non-litigation activities, Indonesia will be
\nseen by the world community as a more open and democratic state.
\nThirdly and more interestingly is that the oppositionist
\ncharacter of the foundation will gradually empower the status-quo
\nposition of the state, since the latter will be indirectly helped
\nto better understand the course of conflicts emerging from the
\n\"grassroots\" and subsequently can choose a more suitable solution
\nto the conflicts. With these three arguments, I think, whoever
\nsees the foundation as a potential threat to national political
\nstability is actually the party itself which jeopardizes this
\nstability.<\/p>\n
The writer is a lecturer at the Postgraduate Program of Social
\nSciences in the University of Indonesia, Jakarta.<\/p>",
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