Year 2000 'blows winds of harmony to ASEAN-10'<\/p>\n
The following is an interview with Dr. Michael Leifer,
\nprofessor of international relations at the London School of
\nEconomics and Political Science about ASEAN-10. The interview was
\nheld during the Roundtable Asia Pacific meeting in Kuala Lumpur
\nlast week.<\/p>\n
Question: By accepting Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia ASEAN is
\nsaid to have achieved its long cherished dream or vision. What is
\nyour opinion?<\/p>\n
Answer: I really don't think it makes any difference whether
\nyou call it a dream or a vision or whether you say that the
\nbeginning of this issue comes from basic pragmatic matters.<\/p>\n
There were several reasons why the ASEAN governments thought
\nit made make sense to expand and I think the key factor is not so
\nmuch a vision.<\/p>\n
In 1995 it was possible to include Vietnam and that really was
\na historic turning point because, if one looks back, there had
\nbeen division within Southeast Asia... Vietnam, Laos, and
\nCambodia were polarized from Myanmar which stood to one side.<\/p>\n
And once the problem of reconciling with Vietnam was overcome,
\nit was as if a logjam had been broken and with certainty and a
\ncomprehensive policy of engagement in place, it was logical to
\nbring together all the Southeast Asian countries.<\/p>\n
And then we could realize the dream because the dream is...
\nwell, the millennium is coming up in the year 2000 and there is a
\ncertain harmony associated with the dream, plus ASEAN clearly
\nneeds to strengthen its identity because it has to deal in a
\nwider regional context with major Asia Pacific powers.<\/p>\n
So clearly, if you can have ten countries speaking together
\nwith one voice then it is good for the corporate identity and
\nstanding of ASEAN.<\/p>\n
Q: Is the formation of ASEAN-10 a strategic necessity?<\/p>\n
A: I see it as a response to a strategic reality and the
\nstrategic reality is the fusion between Southeast Asia and
\nNortheast Asia as a result of a new pattern of power after the
\nend of the Cold War. So I think it is a response on the part of
\nAsia to cope with a new strategic reality.<\/p>\n
Q: What are the challenges of ASEAN-10?<\/p>\n
A: The challenges are that by promoting the ASEAN Regional Forum
\n(ARF), ASEAN has compromised on the Zone of Peace and Neutrality
\n(ZOPFAN) principle because the idea of this zone is to try to
\nexclude the major external powers, or at least not allow them to
\ndetermine the order within the region.<\/p>\n
Now, it is not possible to do that. In political life you can
\nnot do that. But to the extent that ASEAN develops a stronger
\ncorporate identity, increasing its scale in a coherence sense,
\nthen it helps ASEAN try and sustain the spirit of the zone within
\na wider strategic framework.<\/p>\n
In other words, it is intended to give ASEAN a greater ability
\nto engage in regional Southeast Asian self determination.<\/p>\n
Q: What do you think of the concept of ZOPFAN?<\/p>\n
A: I don't think the concept of ZOPFAN applies in its original
\nsense. Changes have taken place which means that you can not
\ndemarcate the balance of the region in any precise linear sense.<\/p>\n
While ZOPFAN was a signal to outside powers that they should
\nnot intervene, the very nature of the ARF makes them a party to
\nthe management of regional security matters not just in Northeast
\nAsia but also in Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n
But by expanding to include 10 countries, ASEAN is
\ndemonstrating that they are an effective diplomatic community
\nwhich can at least maintain some kind of proximation to the idea
\nof ZOPFAN. The idea of ZOPFAN can be reconciled with the
\nexpanding framework of a multilateral security dialog.<\/p>\n
Q: The institutionalization of foreign intervention through ARF
\nwas mentioned in the roundtable discussion...<\/p>\n
A: I used that phrase because intervention is not just one
\nthing. It can take a variety of forms. When the U.S. established
\nits Radio Free Asia broadcast then you could say that was a form
\nof foreign intervention.<\/p>\n
So it does not have to be blatant military intervention. By
\nmaking a major Asia Pacific power a party to a multilateral
\nsecurity dialog which links Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, it
\nis possible to argue that at the very least in a diplomatic
\nsense, it institutionalizes external intervention and therefore
\nchallenges the ZOPFAN concept.<\/p>\n
Q: Do you see this foreign intervention as positive or negative?<\/p>\n
A: That remains to be seen. For example, if Southeast Asian
\ncountries are concerned about sea-lane's freedom of passage
\nsecurity and if this is challenged by active intervention, it
\ncould be considered positive.<\/p>\n
But you cannot prejudge it or over generalize the issue. It
\ndepends on the circumstances and it depends on whose interests
\nare affected. It may well be it could even work in the interest
\nof ASEAN in some sectors. The number of ASEAN countries,
\nincluding Indonesia, provided limited facilities for the American
\nnavy and you could call this active intervention but intervention
\nitself is not necessarily related to who is disadvantaged. So it
\ndepends on the circumstances and the interests involved.<\/p>\n
Q: Domestic issues were raised at the roundtable as something
\nthat could affect ASEAN-10's performance, including those of
\nIndonesia which just ended its most violent general election.
\nWhat do you think?<\/p>\n
A: I don't see domestic issues being a major factor within the
\nASEAN framework and there is some significant spill over. In the
\ncase of Myanmar, the most evident problem is that its problems
\ncould spill over into Thailand. Refugees, smuggling, and drugs
\nare the kind of things that attract attention.<\/p>\n
The problems that Indonesia has experienced recently should
\nnot affect the relationship between Indonesia and other ASEAN
\ncountries.<\/p>\n
I think what concerns other countries is the future of
\nIndonesia because Indonesia has been the core of ASEAN. Without
\nIndonesia's commitment, ASEAN would have been nothing so what
\nthey are concerned about is political change in Indonesia and
\nwhether or not Indonesia's commitment continues in the same way.<\/p>\n
Economic factors is obviously a sensitive issue to ASEAN. But
\nI think most ASEAN governments are flexible concerning this issue
\nand with political will they are able to strengthen political
\nstability.<\/p>\n
Q: If the future of Indonesia is so important to ASEAN, what are
\nthe chances of smooth political change?<\/p>\n
A: I can't give you a precise answer but I think it depends on
\nwho is elected by the People's Consultative Assembly as vice
\npresident, on the resilience of the Armed Forces (ABRI) and the
\nfuture cooperation between the person who is acceptable to
\nPresident Soeharto, the assembly and ABRI as the vice president.
\nI think this is the key to the future. I think that cooperation
\nis crucial.<\/p>\n
Q: In the roundtable discussion, it was suggested that ASEAN set
\nup a new mechanism to facilitate deeper dialog among member
\ncountries...<\/p>\n
A: There are two issues here. One, it is hard to deepen the
\ncommitment of ASEAN among the countries and you can do that by
\ndeveloping other common institutions so that you can involve
\ndifferent generations, different constituencies and
\nparliamentarians.<\/p>\n
But I think there is one fundamental principle that can't be
\nviolated. Once you have any kind of open discussion on domestic
\nproblems then that sets up structural tension.<\/p>\n
If you accept a country into ASEAN and there are problems then
\nthe only way of dealing with those problems is in the quiet Asian
\nway, not publicly.<\/p>\n
If you allow the issue to become public then there is the
\npotential for confrontation. And that's to be avoided. I think
\nthat would be institutionally destructive for ASEAN.<\/p>\n
Q: But if everything is not done in public then the West would
\ncontinue criticizing ASEAN...<\/p>\n
A: It does depend on the effect. If it is possible to show
\nthrough private dialog that some progress has been made, then I
\nthink Western governments are not that stupid to not know what's
\ngoing on. If they do that, they are capable of making progress.
\nThe bottom line is whether it is possible to suggest change and
\nwhether western governments will acknowledge changes have taken
\nplace.<\/p>\n
If nothing happens and the situation gets worse then obviously
\nthey are going to react. Western governments tend to react to
\nevents in countries like Myanmar.<\/p>\n
Q: How big is the drive of economic advantage in the formation of
\nASEAN-10?<\/p>\n
A: I don't have that information, I only know about it in general
\nterms. Obviously there are business opportunities which
\nbusinesspeople in several ASEAN countries have taken advantage
\nof. I'm not in a position to know to what extent these business
\ninterests are linked to government policies. (hbk)<\/p>",
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