Workers visible only during strikes<\/p>\n
By Fauzi Abdullah<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): As was reported, officials of the Medan office
\nof the Ministry of Manpower and the military have been touring
\nfactories in the wake of the April strike in order to oversee the
\nenforcement of some regulations.<\/p>\n
The North Sumatra governor has also issued a recommendation to
\nthe ministry regarding an increase of minimum wages from Rp 3,100
\nto Rp 3,750 beginning Aug. 1. The last minimum wage hike in the
\nregion took place on April 1, 1993 when wages were increased by
\n21 percent from Rp 2,550 to Rp 3,100 (Kompas March 23, 1994).<\/p>\n
It took the big strike to nudge the governor into recommending
\nthe increase. And very recently some parliament members also
\nspoke about the need to increase the minimum wages. In addition,
\nit has also been reported that enforcement of regulations,
\nespecially with regard to the minimum wage, has been very lax. Up
\nto April, 31 percent of all companies in Medan paid their workers
\nless than the minimum required, according to official data
\n(Tempo, April 30, 1994).<\/p>\n
These facts give rise to several questions, among them that of
\nthe \"invisibility\" of workers as a segment of society with
\ninterests of their own. The situation described above indicates
\nthat workers gain visibility only when they display their anger
\nby launching strikes. This is true not only for Medan or North
\nSumatra, but is also indicative of the impact of overall labor
\npolicy in the New Order era.<\/p>\n
Let us look at some changes that have occurred in certain
\nregulations. Act No. 123\/1964 on Termination of Employment in
\nPrivate Undertakings, for example, has in a way been changed by
\nMinister of Manpower Regulation No. 04\/1986 on Termination of
\nEmployment, and on severance allowances and compensation.<\/p>\n
A few articles in the ministerial regulation contradict the
\nact. Article 11 of the act, for example, obliges both parties,
\nworkers and employers, to maintain the status quo. Both parties
\nare obliged to perform their respective duties until the
\nRegional\/National Committee on Labor Disputes decides upon the
\ncase.<\/p>\n
Article 13 of the ministerial regulation, however, grants the
\nemployers the right to suspend workers even before the Committee
\ndecides upon the case. The employer can thus change the status
\nquo. This kind of change took place without much open protest at
\nthat time.<\/p>\n
Unlike an act, which should go through parliament and because
\nof that through an open discussion in order to be ratified, the
\nministerial regulation went through a closed debate in the
\nNational Tripartite Body before it was put into effect.<\/p>\n
Another example is the minimum wage decision. We can compare
\nthis decision with higher norms in the hierarchy of law in
\nIndonesia to ascertain that such a decision is consistent with
\nthe letter and spirit of the law. Article Three of Act Number
\n14\/1969 on The Basic Provision Respecting Manpower stipulates:
\n\"All manpower shall be entitled to employment and an income
\nconsistent with human dignity.\"<\/p>\n
The elucidation of Government Regulation No. 8\/1981 on the
\nprotection of wages further elaborates its meaning: \"This
\ngovernment regulation basically stipulates the protection of
\nwages in general, having its origin in the function of wage,
\nwhich must be able to secure the life of the worker and his
\nfamily.\" We may judge for ourselves whether Rp 3,800 in Jakarta,
\nBogor, Tangerang and Bekasi, or Rp 3,100 in Medan is \"an income
\nconsistent with human dignity\" or \"is able to secure the life of
\nthe worker and his family\".<\/p>\n
In terms of the process of determining the level of minimum
\nwages, for example, there is no chance for workers to voice what
\nthey want or even to know the reason for the decision. This
\nclosed nature of the process is institutionalized already by the
\nMinister of Manpower's regulation formulated in 1971.<\/p>\n
If companies want to postpone the implementation of the
\nminimum wage regulation, they do not have to negotiate with
\nworkers in their own factories. It is enough for them to get the
\napproval from the Ministry of Manpower.<\/p>\n
The illustrations above show quite clearly that SPSI (formerly
\nFBSI) is severely constrained in voicing the workers' interests.
\nSPSI is one of the members of the tripartite body in which the
\ndraft for Ministerial Regulation no. 04\/86 was discussed. Its
\nvoice to protect the interests of workers was not heard. The same
\nis true for the Regional\/National Council for the Investigation
\nof Wages. No voice was heard, no clear efforts were seen made to
\nraise the minimum wages. What was heard was a statement published
\nin the press, saying that the real wages of workers were not
\nincreasing. It is unclear what SPSI as a trade union did about
\nit. The voice of SPSI was not heard either when the Minister of
\nManpower, Sudomo, in his decision No. 1109\/1986 decided, among
\nother things, to allow management to initiate the formation of
\nSPSI units in factories.<\/p>\n
The situation now is different from the time when the
\nindustrialization process began in the early 1970s. After more
\nthan 20 years of industrialization, the share of the
\nmanufacturing sector in the economy has increased substantially,
\nthe number of industrial workers has grown, as has the concern of
\nthe international community regarding human rights, and
\nespecially workers' rights. The problem is whether it is still
\npossible to claim industrial peace by letting one party (the
\nemployers) get stronger while at the same time keeping the other
\nparty (the workers) invisible.<\/p>",
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