China is not relying solely on fighter jets, warships, and military\nexercises to pressure Taiwan. Beijing is increasingly expanding its\npolitical and information approaches to bring the population of the\nself-governing island closer to mainland China without necessarily\nresorting to open warfare first.<\/p>\n
One of the clearest examples was seen when Kuomintang (KMT) Chairman\nCheng Li-wuhan visited China in April 2026. Cheng received a high-level\nreception, visited Chinese technology hubs, and ultimately met directly\nwith Chinese President Xi Jinping.<\/p>\n
This meeting held significant political weight as the KMT is Taiwan\u2019s\nmain opposition party and traditionally adopts a more open approach to\ncross-Strait relations compared to the ruling Democratic Progressive\nParty (DPP).<\/p>\n
During the meeting on 10 April, Xi stated that Beijing is willing to\nexpand relations with parties, groups, and various elements of Taiwanese\nsociety, provided they are based on the 1992 Consensus and the rejection\nof Taiwanese independence. Beijing describes this approach as a path\ntowards cross-Strait peace and the improvement of the welfare of both\nsides.<\/p>\n
However, the Taiwanese government views this with suspicion. The\nMainland Affairs Council (MAC) has previously warned Taiwanese political\nfigures against becoming instruments of Beijing\u2019s \u2018United Front\u2019\nstrategy, which Taipei claims aims to fracture Taiwanese society and\nintegrate it into a \u2018One China\u2019 political framework.<\/p>\n
Cheng as a New Bridge<\/p>\n
Cheng has become a pivotal figure in cross-Strait political strategy\ndue to his unusual background. He began his political career as a\npro-democracy student activist supporting Taiwanese independence. Cheng\nlater left the DPP in the early 2000s to join the KMT, before evolving\nover the years into a supporter of closer ties with Beijing.<\/p>\n
Ahead of his visit to China, Cheng emphasised that KMT policy remains\nbased on two principles: upholding the 1992 Consensus and opposing\nTaiwanese independence. According to Cheng, cross-Strait dialogue is\nnecessary to demonstrate to the Taiwanese people and the world that\nBeijing-Taipei relations do not have to end in war.<\/p>\n
Cheng also sought to reject the binary choice between Washington and\nBeijing. \u201cWhy can\u2019t I choose both? Why must I choose one?\u201d he remarked\nregarding the question of whether he is more pro-China or pro-America,\nas reported by The Wall Street Journal on Monday, 21 September 2026.\nCheng stated that Taiwan continues to value its relationship with the\nUnited States, but described mainland China as part of a familial\nbond.<\/p>\n
The KMT has denied that closer ties with Beijing mean the party is\nsubservient to China. The party maintains that its policy is oriented\ntowards Taiwan\u2019s interests, the peace and stability of the Taiwan\nStrait, and the protection of the democracy and way of life of the\nTaiwanese people.<\/p>\n
When the DPP government subsequently criticised the results of\nCheng\u2019s visit, the KMT reaffirmed that cross-Strait dialogue is intended\nto reduce the risk of conflict. The KMT accused the government of being\ntoo ideological in its view of interactions with Beijing.<\/p>\n
Beijing Does Not Rely Solely on Military Might<\/p>\n
Relations with the KMT are only one part of a broader picture. China\ncontinues to maintain military pressure around Taiwan. However,\nTaiwanese security reports indicate that this pressure runs alongside\noperations in the political, information, cyber, economic, cultural, and\nsocial media spheres.<\/p>\n
Taiwan\u2019s Ministry of Defence refers to these activities as a\ncombination of military pressure and \u2018cognitive warfare\u2019. According to\nTaipei, Beijing uses propaganda, social media, cyberattacks, and various\nnon-military instruments to influence public perception and exacerbate\ninternal divisions.<\/p>\n
Taiwan\u2019s National Security Bureau (NSB) stated that in 2025, it\ndiscovered more than 45,000 fake or suspicious social media accounts\ninvolved in the spread of information linked to Chinese operations. This\nfigure increased from approximately 28,000 accounts the previous\nyear.<\/p>\n
These operations do not always consist of overt calls for Taiwan to\njoin China. Some instead aim to increase distrust towards the Taiwanese\ngovernment, highlight the island\u2019s military weaknesses, or spread the\nidea that the United States would ultimately abandon Taiwan if a\nconflict with China were to break out.<\/p>\n
The Wall Street Journal reported on Tuesday, 22 September 2026, the\nexistence of fake AI-based videos that Taiwanese officials have linked\nto China. The videos manipulated conversations between President Lai\nChing-te and Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim with narratives suggesting\nthat Washington might one day abandon Taiwan, while Beijing has\nconsistently denied involvement in disinformation campaigns against the\nisland.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/without-attacking-china-seeks-to-bring-taiwan-closer-1790078083", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }