{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1499884,
        "msgid": "wiranto-golkar-party-and-fear-of-militarism-1447893297",
        "date": "2004-04-27 00:00:00",
        "title": "Wiranto, Golkar Party and fear of militarism",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Wiranto, Golkar Party and fear of militarism Indra J. Piliang, Jakarta The general election of 2004 is the first golden gate leading to civilian supremacy as well as sovereignty, after the past dominance of a hybrid regime combining authoritarianism and democracy. Besides, it is also part of the effort to phase out political veterans so far limitedly controlling the top of Indonesia's power pyramid.",
        "content": "<p>Wiranto, Golkar Party and fear of militarism<\/p>\n<p>Indra J. Piliang, Jakarta<\/p>\n<p>The general election of 2004 is the first golden gate leading<br>\nto civilian supremacy as well as sovereignty, after the past<br>\ndominance of a hybrid regime combining authoritarianism and<br>\ndemocracy. Besides, it is also part of the effort to phase out<br>\npolitical veterans so far limitedly controlling the top of<br>\nIndonesia's power pyramid.<\/p>\n<p>Meanwhile, the opportunity is open for the process of<br>\npolitical regeneration and at the same time recruitment of new<br>\npolitical leaders, with new visions of leadership. In the context<br>\nof change, the election serves as a driving force of political<br>\ninstitutionalization to promote reform principles for public<br>\ninterests.<\/p>\n<p>In terms of leadership, the election is a medium to secure<br>\nleaders capable of boosting political stability while<br>\nincorporating cultural affiliations and elements of leadership<br>\ninto the institutional political system. Indonesia requires<br>\nfigures having not only strong personal character but also the<br>\nability to convince people of the policy to be pursued.<\/p>\n<p>This ideal, however, is difficult to achieve. The monopoly of<br>\npower in the hands of Sukarno and Soeharto for over 50 years of<br>\nIndonesian independence created stagnation in leadership<br>\nregeneration and competition.<\/p>\n<p>So far, the most important source of leaders has comprised<br>\nintellectuals, civilian politicians and military figures.<br>\nCivilian politicians and intellectuals held sway in the first 20<br>\nyears of the republic.<\/p>\n<p>The next 30 years saw the military's political control over<br>\nall government levels, leaving only limited areas to civilians in<br>\npolitical parties, campuses and ideologically crammed<br>\nsocial\/religious organizations.<\/p>\n<p>As a consequence, government power only circulated around<br>\nSoeharto. Sadly, this power kept growing to the extent that<br>\nSoeharto found it hard to control, covering political, economic<br>\nand even intellectual spheres. Those whom wished to become<br>\nprofessors had to obtain Soeharto's approval and signature.<br>\nIndonesia finally underwent intellectual, political and economic<br>\ndegradation as a result of the declining skill of Soeharto in<br>\nmaneuvering his big power.<\/p>\n<p>The portrait of political leaders over the last five years has<br>\nindicated their weak and low-quality leadership performance. The<br>\npolitical elite have served merely as a cosmetic of democracy<br>\ninstead of carrying out its true essence.<\/p>\n<p>Indonesia's failure to get rid of the present multi-<br>\ndimensional crisis is virtually due to the inferior quality of<br>\nthe current leadership. Hardly any effort has won public<br>\nconfidence through detailed explanations about past and future<br>\npolicies, while inter-agency coordination is ineffective.<\/p>\n<p>It is this very dimension that could be noticed in Wiranto's<br>\nvictory over Akbar Tandjung in the Golkar Party's national<br>\nconvention on April 20.<\/p>\n<p>Akbar failed to gain support from Golkar politicians because<br>\nhe belongs to the country's political elite, as speaker of the<br>\nHouse of Representatives (DPR) with a poor institutional<br>\nperformance. With this awareness among regental\/municipal boards,<br>\nthey cast more votes for Wiranto and Aburizal Bakrie in the first<br>\nround of the candidate election. Akbar's first-round lead was<br>\nconsiderably helped by 18 votes from the central board and over<br>\n45 from provincial boards.<\/p>\n<p>Golkar Party politicians, known for their perseverance and<br>\neven their better performance (in certain cases) in the DPR and<br>\nregional legislatures than other parties, of course made profound<br>\nconsideration of the consequences of their choice in this<br>\nconvention. They elected a Golkar presidential nominee rather<br>\nthan party leader. In making Akbar the loser, they actually still<br>\nhave high respect for Akbar because under his leadership the<br>\nGolkar Party will remain consolidated.<\/p>\n<p>The biggest question over the last few days has been: Why<br>\nWiranto? The Golkar Party apparently overlooked the subjective<br>\nfactor in Wiranto's track record. This party might not consider<br>\nhis track record a national problem, because when Wiranto was<br>\nmilitary commander, Golkar was also dominant in legislative and<br>\nexecutive institutions.<\/p>\n<p>It means that even if Wiranto was seen as flawed, the mistake<br>\nwas shared collectively in the House and the executive body.<br>\nGolkar's courage to choose Wiranto was naturally in the spirit of<br>\nits contention that the various subjective issues affecting<br>\nWiranto constituted a collective problem.<\/p>\n<p>The other matter arousing the anxiety of pro-democracy<br>\nactivists is the possible return of militarism through the legal<br>\nand constitutional path of democracy, i.e. general elections.<br>\nThis fear is certainly reasonable because the past 30 years of<br>\nmilitarism brought leadership regeneration, scientific<br>\ndevelopments and democratization to a standstill.<\/p>\n<p>Press freedom, the transition from military to civilian<br>\nsupremacy and institutionalization of civilian rights will be at<br>\nstake if militarism becomes widespread. The trauma of lost<br>\nfreedom of speech keeps haunting all those once victimized by<br>\nmilitarism.<\/p>\n<p>Wiranto and of course Golkar Party supporting him should<br>\ntherefore present a platform and outlines of their presidential<br>\nworking program for handling such public apprehensions. Moreover,<br>\nthe biggest trauma of militarism is the failure to resolve the<br>\nissues of Aceh and Papua peacefully.<\/p>\n<p>Martial law in Aceh, which has claimed human victims on both<br>\nsides and impoverished Aceh people, should be included in the<br>\nprogram with a pledge for peaceful settlement. As long as these<br>\ncommitments to humanity remain unfulfilled, Wiranto and the<br>\nGolkar Party will be seen as a political structure rising from<br>\nthe ashes, but with very slim hope for further transformation.<\/p>\n<p>The writer is political analyst, Center for Strategic and<br>\nInternational Studies.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/wiranto-golkar-party-and-fear-of-militarism-1447893297",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}