Winning the battle may cost Indonesia the Acehnese<\/p>\n
Kusnanto Anggoro, Senior Researcher, Centre of Strategic
\nand International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta<\/p>\n
Martial law has taken effect in Aceh. Under Presidential
\nDecree No. 28\/2003, signed by the President on Sunday night,
\nnewly installed Iskandar Muda Military Commander Maj. Gen. Endang
\nSuwarya is named the military ruler -- assisted by the Aceh
\ngovernor, provincial police chief and the chief of the provincial
\nprosecutor's office. Heavy emphasis on a military solution will
\ndominate the "integrated operation" for months to come.<\/p>\n
Interestingly, the government imposed martial law instead of a
\nstate of civil emergency. Also interesting is that the rule is
\napplicable to the whole of Aceh rather than to only the most
\nconflict-ridden areas: Pidie, Bireuen and North and East Aceh.
\nThe government should strike a balance between what is necessary
\nand what is sufficient with regard to intensity of conflict and
\nthe jurisdiction of the use of force.<\/p>\n
The government confronts many dilemmas. From the military
\npoint of view, for example, it would be well-nigh impossible for
\nthe government to send in a vast number of troops to Aceh while
\nimposing only a civil emergency there.<\/p>\n
Besides, the decision may also reveal the central government's
\ndistrust, if not disappointment, in the Aceh administration. The
\ndecision may also be a preventive strategy to anticipate a worst-
\ncase scenario of conflict escalation.<\/p>\n
Whatever the case, a political solution has not gone astray.
\nCoordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo
\nBambang Yudhoyono has stated clearly that martial law could be
\nrelaxed if the rebels stopped fighting and started disarming
\nwithin a week of the Tokyo meeting. Yet GAM leader Malik Mahmud
\nin Tokyo has already stated the movement's preparations for war.<\/p>\n
The windows of peace are closing. Nonetheless there is still
\nflexibility in the next six months, depending very much on what
\nhappens on the ground and, perhaps, also in the Paris Club. The
\nPresident, as supreme commander of the military, should formulate
\na comprehensive policy on counterinsurgency. Unfortunately, this
\nis perhaps the weakest link, as the government has been unable to
\ndevise a clear policy on Aceh.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, Aceh's martial law authorities must ensure that the
\noperations be carried out professionally. Not only should this
\noperation be in line with political objectives devised by the
\ngovernment but they also should adhere to a number of principles
\n-- minimum use of force, unity of command and flexible tactics.<\/p>\n
For these matters, the military rule in Aceh may provide legal
\nbases for military operations, but it does not resolve serious
\nproblems in a counterinsurgency strategy. Perhaps, we have all
\nreturned to square one. In a matter of days, there will be great
\ndemand for the government to devise a clear policy to respond to
\nwhat the military personnel may achieve on the ground.<\/p>\n
The regional commander in Aceh, as regional authority of the
\nmilitary rule, has enormous power. According to the draconian
\n1959 State of Emergency Act, especially article 25 to article 34,
\nhe may curtail public space and take tough measures, starting
\nfrom controlling postal equipment, regulating the export and
\nimport of goods, confiscation of goods, to arresting and
\ndetaining people.<\/p>\n
However, the commander should be extremely cautious. Jerome
\nNapoleon of Westphalia -- Napoleon Bonaparte's brother -- reminds
\nus, "one can do anything with bayonets -- except sit on them."
\nThe commander must be aware of his mandate, defined ambiguously
\nas restoring public order and security in Article 24(1)), to win
\nback the hearts and minds of the Acehnese, the key to which is
\nestablishing a responsive local government. It remains to be seen
\nwhether the commander is capable of all this without using brute
\nforce.<\/p>\n
The question of the military's credibility is even more
\nserious. In the last four decades, there has emerged a saying
\nthat the Indonesian Military (TNI) is capable of anything but
\nwinning a war. It lost in East Timor. It made things worse in
\nPapua and was trapped in a stalemate in Aceh. The reasonable
\nsuccess in weakening GAM in the late 1970s did not last long.<\/p>\n
Indonesian generals must not be too optimistic. They cannot be
\na Sun Tzu, who believed that "a general can penetrate the mist of
\nthe immediate future sufficiently well to know if he will be
\nvictorious". They have to be as cautious as Karl von Clausewitz,
\nwho argued that "the fog of war" and "human fallibilities" allow
\nfor no certainty of victory. Thus, political and military
\nintelligence should take the lead before military operations.<\/p>\n
As an asymmetric war, in which two opposing parties run a
\nsimilar strategic objective but possess unequal military
\nstrength, insurgency wars have their own logic. First, agility is
\neven more crucial than bayonets and bullets. Second, right is
\nmuch more important than might. Third, and more importantly, in a
\nstrategic sense, military force is necessary, but a "political
\nbuckshot" could well be decisive to win the war.<\/p>\n
Indeed, it remains to be seen whether the TNI is capable of
\nbrazening out GAM's hit-and-run strategy. Conventional
\ncounterguerilla warfare, simply by emphasizing an offensive
\nstrategy, will never work. Egyptian Gamal Abdel Nasser lost in
\nYemen to a few thousand barefoot Yemeni guerrillas, despite the
\nsupport of 40,000 modern troops, Russian tanks and Russian jets.<\/p>\n
Everybody knows that might is no substitute for right. More
\nimportantly, in counterinsurgency, strength appears to be an
\nirrelevant instrument to win battle, let alone restore peace. The
\nDutch were unable to defeat Indonesian patriots. The Russians
\nfailed to seize the Chechens. The great Indian army failed to
\novercome the Naga -- a backward people of 500,000 on the
\nnortheastern frontier of India.<\/p>\n
Indeed, there are no easy shortcuts to solving insurgencies.
\nBy definition, everybody would seek a military solution to such
\nproblems. The insurgency problem is military only in a secondary
\nsense, and a policy addressing complex political and social
\naspects in a primary sense. Using excessive force has always been
\nprecarious.<\/p>\n
After all, what is needed is a well-conceived
\ncounterinsurgency policy. In the Philippines, success emerged in
\nthe early 1950s, once defense minister Ramon Magsaysay presided
\nover the reorganization of the Philippine security apparatus. In
\nThailand, Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond adopted a broad
\npolitical strategy to neutralize the communist insurgents and
\nreclaim remote areas and the people from their control.<\/p>\n
The military should change its own hearts and minds first. It
\nmust rely on a defensive strategy, instead of an offensive one
\nthat would more likely produce excessive civilian casualties. The
\nnet effect of the Manuel Roxas government's "iron fist" campaign
\nin the Philippines during the late 1940s was that the rebel Huk
\nmovement probably more than doubled in size.<\/p>\n
Moreover, the tactical objectives of the military operations
\nare to neutralize the insurgence and\/or reclaim territory and the
\npeople. All of these are aimed to provide room for maneuver for
\nthe government to run its policy effectively and return to a
\npolitical solution, such as an offer to promise to accord them
\nrespect and security, and unconditional amnesty.<\/p>\n
Anything can go wrong in a military operation. The TNI is
\nrestoring its image and will not go for a defeat in Aceh. But the
\ngenerals should learn from the French army, who were capable of
\ndefeating the Algerian guerrillas -- at the expense of the French
\nbeing the second-most hated country in the world in the 1960s.<\/p>\n
No reasonable Indonesian would meet the cost of winning a
\nmilitary operation that loses the people of Aceh. A responsive
\ngovernment hardly sells out its credentials to the continuous use
\nof brute force.<\/p>\n
The writer lectures in Strategic and Security Studies at the
\npostgraduate studies program, University of Indonesia.<\/p>",
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