Will the student movement succeed?<\/p>\n
By Olle Tornquist<\/p>\n
OSLO (JP): Almost every day, I am asked two questions. The
\nfirst is terribly hard to answer in a manner both brief and
\nacademically considered: what's happening to democratization in
\nIndonesia?<\/p>\n
Soeharto's authoritarian state development project is
\ndisintegrating. It is difficult to make prognoses about the
\nfuture on the basis of the situation that prevailed before the
\ncrisis began.<\/p>\n
Moreover, we can no longer content ourselves with analyzing
\nthe struggle within the elite at the central level. And having
\nsaid that, we know too little about the elements which are now
\nbecoming most important: developments on the local level, both in
\nthe Jakarta area and out in the provinces; the dynamic in the new
\nmass-based forms of politics; and the various actors' politics of
\ndemocratization. We will have to return to these matters at a
\nlater time.<\/p>\n
The second question is tricky as well, but more restricted.
\nAnd since I was not able to take on the first, I'll try my hand
\nat supplying a quick answer to the second: will the students
\nsucceed?<\/p>\n
The answer depends, of course, on what it is they really want.
\nMany claim that they do not know themselves. Yet the students
\nhave three fundamental demands. First, they want to put Soeharto
\nand his henchmen on trial, and to hold them politically,
\neconomically and morally responsible.<\/p>\n
Second, they want to put an end to the military's dwi-fungsi
\n(dual function), its right to political and economic (as well as
\nmilitary) power, and to hold it accountable for the assaults,
\ntorture and murders committed by its members (among whose victims
\nstudents also figured).<\/p>\n
Third, the students are calling for truly free and fair
\nelections, as well as the democratization of a great many state
\ninstitutions. On these questions they have met with considerable
\nsuccess, not least in their criticism of the military. But they
\nhave only made it halfway.<\/p>\n
For this reason, in the view of most of the students,
\nachieving real results on all of these fronts requires that the
\npresent regime, consisting as it does for the most part of
\nSoeharto's old associates, be replaced by a transitional
\ngovernment. Otherwise, the entire process of \"reformasi\" will be
\nbotched.<\/p>\n
So will they succeed in this? Hardly. During the great
\ndemonstrations of November, some students actually made it all
\nthe way to the parliament building, and they could have gone
\ninside. But they lacked broad support -- including from the
\nmoderate opposition leaders, one of whom was not to be disturbed
\nwhile taking a rest. So the students went home instead. Putting
\nthe point simply, they are confronted with three great obstacles,
\nand I believe they will only be able to surmount one of them.<\/p>\n
The first challenge is presented by the campaign against them
\nwhich portrays them as immature muddleheads who mainly cause
\ntraffic problems with all their demonstrations, and who want to
\nbring down the old order but have no program for what to put in
\nits place. There is, to be sure, something to this.<\/p>\n
In Jakarta I am often reminded of the student movement of 30
\nyears ago in Europe. The latter too was not just pronouncedly
\npolitical; it was cultural and anti-authoritarian as well. Yet
\nthat was nothing to despise; indeed, it was probably that which
\nhad the greatest significance in the long run.<\/p>\n
In addition, there is among today's Indonesian students a
\nstill greater and more hopeful and dynamic power which issues
\nfrom the fact that they are not just breaking with authoritarian
\nstructures: they are also rediscovering history, which was
\nforbidden, and opening up their society, which was closed.<\/p>\n
The students are the weeds that break suddenly through the
\nasphalt and burst into full bloom: beautiful but disordered. And
\nthey are not, most assuredly, naive or muddleheaded.<\/p>\n
Great numbers of them read, discuss, analyze, and come to
\ndemocratic decisions. Never, I dare say, have I encountered
\nstudents with such questioning minds and such a thirst for
\nknowledge as those who, December last, took me off in an old
\nborrowed taxi to meet with a larger group of young leaders from
\nvarious campuses, and who then insisted on a six-hour marathon
\nlecture on the political situation and the historical background.<\/p>\n
The hour grew late, yet it seemed to me that the gathering
\nburned like a beacon in the Jakarta night. In the long run, the
\nstudents have history on their side. When the dawn broke,
\nhowever, it was still over the Jakarta of today, and that makes
\nthings harder.<\/p>\n
The second problem faced by the students is the fact that as
\ngood as all established forces are trying to tame and use them.
\nFor one thing, President Habibie, Gen. Wiranto, the Armed Forces
\ncommander and their cohorts in the regime are doing their best to
\nkeep control and to acquire new legitimacy by directing the
\nreform process from above, and by marginalizing radicals like the
\nstudents.<\/p>\n
In addition, the leaders of the moderate opposition (such as
\nAbdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Soekarnoputri, Amien Rais and the
\nSultan of Yogyakarta) are taking advantage of the fact that the
\nstudents are putting pressure on the regime.<\/p>\n
This enables the moderate leaders to compromise with the
\nweakened establishment, and to carry out cautious changes at a
\ntranquil pace. The moderates are also trying to tame the
\nstudents, so as to be able to contest the upcoming elections with
\na minimum of disturbance.<\/p>\n
The students are at a loss as to how to deal with this. They
\ntried to build a broad and radical movement behind the moderate
\nleaders, just as the students of the 1940s prevailed upon
\nnationalist leaders like Sukarno to proclaim the country's
\nindependence, and to refuse any compromise with the colonial
\noverlords. This time, however, their overtures were rebuffed.<\/p>\n
The students are now faced, consequently, with a third
\nproblem: that of formulating a political program of their own,
\nand building an independent political base. This is the hardest
\nchallenge of all.<\/p>\n
Today the students function as a substitute for the broad
\norganizations among the middle and lower classes which are
\nmissing. They lack a politics of their own, however, for linking
\ntheir demonstrations both with the concerns of ordinary people
\nand with the established political institutions, where
\nnegotiations are conducted and decisions made.<\/p>\n
Changing this will be difficult, for the weakness of the
\nstudents is also their strength. Their strength lies in
\nindependence, integrity, and a lack of self-interest at a time
\nwhen most everything is dominated by new and old bosses within
\npolitics, the economy, and the armed forces.<\/p>\n
Largely gone now is the approach of the earlier students,
\nwhich was to ally themselves with critics in the military, the
\npolitical system, and the intellectual upper crust. Even the pro-
\ndemocratic elite of yesterday now complains that the students do
\nnot always listen to them and do not follow their advice.<\/p>\n
Yet if this is a strength it is also a weakness, for what will
\nserve as the base for the students' demands? What are the social
\nmoorings for their politics?<\/p>\n
In order to protect their independence, as well as to avoid
\nprovocateurs and undisciplined masses of people, they even
\nhesitate to allow \"ordinary people\" to take part in the
\ndemonstrations and to demand their rights and defend their
\ninterests.<\/p>\n
In the same way, it is both a strength and a weakness that the
\nstudents lack a cohesive organization with a distinct and
\nencompassing leadership structure. It is networks that rule the
\nroost here. This means there is no top figure to seize or co-opt.
\nIt also means it is possible to adjust to local conditions and to
\nmake use of the new vitality.<\/p>\n
At the same time, however, this loose organizational pattern
\nmakes it hard for the students to reach out beyond their own
\ngroup, to mobilize people on a broad basis, or to reach common
\ndecisions over long-term questions.<\/p>\n
At present, the students are only able to unite behind
\nresounding demands which are simple enough to be proclaimed on
\nthe streets and in the squares. One result of this is that the
\nactual negotiations and decisions are anyway left to the elite
\nand its allies.<\/p>\n
Another is that the questions and demands raised by the
\nstudents are not always so relevant for ordinary people, whose
\nfirst concern is whether or not democracy will lead to more jobs
\nand food. Not even those questions on which the students are most
\nknowledgeable, and which others find difficult to master,
\ncomplicated things such as the election laws and their
\nimplementation, make it on to the agenda. These are not suitable
\nfor the parliament of the street either.<\/p>\n
Worst of all, the students do not know how to relate to the
\ncoming elections. If we form a party, they say, we will be
\ndivided, and our independence and moral force will be lost. And
\nif we concentrate our resources on political education and
\nelectoral oversight, many add, we will risk legitimizing not just
\na few good new forces, but also all those old villains who will
\nassuredly be elected too.<\/p>\n
So even if the students have nothing against elections, their
\nefforts are likely to prove irrelevant when election fever
\nspreads, and people realize that \"villains or not -- the only
\nones we have to vote for are the politicians of today and their
\nparties.\"<\/p>\n
So if the regime succeeds in keeping control over the reform
\nprocess, and the moderate politicians place their bets on a
\ncompromise with the establishment, which is the most likely
\noutcome, notwithstanding all the turbulence, the students will be
\nthrown upon their own resources. And these resources are, to be
\nsure, substantial and promising in many ways.<\/p>\n
But the students' strength is also their weakness, as seen in
\nthe lack of a connection between the concerns of ordinary people,
\nthe actions of the students, and the established political
\ninstitutions.<\/p>\n
Hence, the admonitory conclusion here is that if the student
\nmovement does not succeed in creating such a connection, for
\ninstance in the form of a second liberation movement rooted in
\nthe interests of ordinary people, and devoted to the achievement
\nof successive and deepened democratization both before and after
\nthe elections, it will most likely end up as a collection of
\nfragmented pressure groups. While elected bosses attend to the
\nmaking of policy and the exercise of power.<\/p>\n
This, of course, is much better than yesterday's authoritarian
\nexploitation and the present unrest on the verge of breakdown,
\nbut it is hardly the best breeding ground for stable and deepened
\ndemocracy.<\/p>\n
The writer is professor of politics and development at
\nUniversity of Oslo, Norway.<\/p>",
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