{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1108490,
        "msgid": "will-philippines-agreement-end-the-mindanao-terror-1447893297",
        "date": "2001-08-11 00:00:00",
        "title": "Will Philippines agreement end the Mindanao terror?",
        "author": null,
        "source": "THE STRAITS TIMES",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Will Philippines agreement end the Mindanao terror? SINGAPORE: Abu Sayyaf kidnaps, beheadings and million-dollar Libyan pay-offs have been staple news out of the southern Philippines in the past two years. It will take monumental will and good security organization to change the region's image from one of endemic brigandage to one of hope and repair.",
        "content": "<p>Will Philippines agreement end the Mindanao terror?<\/p>\n<p>SINGAPORE: Abu Sayyaf kidnaps, beheadings and million-dollar<br>\nLibyan pay-offs have been staple news out of the southern<br>\nPhilippines in the past two years. It will take monumental will<br>\nand good security organization to change the region&apos;s image from<br>\none of endemic brigandage to one of hope and repair. Mindanao,<br>\nthe large southern island coveted by Muslims, has seen three<br>\ndecades of warfare and some 120,000 deaths over a political cause<br>\nthat Muslim activists themselves are squabbling over.<\/p>\n<p>On Tuesday in Kuala Lumpur, under Malaysian and Libyan<br>\nsponsorship, representatives of the Philippine government and the<br>\nMoro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) signed a truce that seeks<br>\nnominally to end the MILF&apos;s armed struggle. As significantly, the<br>\nMILF on the same day signed a deal that reunited itself with the<br>\nMoro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the parent movement from<br>\nwhich it split in 1978 over disagreements about how to achieve<br>\nIslamic political supremacy in the south.<\/p>\n<p>On the face of it, these are substantial concessions by all<br>\nparties involved, a tacit acceptance that the military approach<br>\nhas brought them no nearer their objective 30 years after<br>\nPresident Ferdinand Marcos&apos;s declaration of martial law energized<br>\nthe Muslim rebellion. For the Manila government, preserving<br>\nterritorial integrity has come at a terrible price. The south has<br>\nbeen left to degenerate, partly by design and partly out of<br>\noperational necessity, until it is today a blot on the record.<br>\nFor the rebels, self-rule in four provinces granted to the MNLF<br>\nby President Fidel Ramos in 1996 turned out to be a Pyrrhic<br>\nvictory as Muslim unity was in tatters.<\/p>\n<p>In hindsight, the breakaway MILF under Hashim Salamat made a<br>\nstrategic error when it declined the Aquino government&apos;s offer of<br>\ntalks after Marcos was deposed in 1986. The MILF was to wander in<br>\nthe wilderness for another decade until it belatedly agreed to<br>\nnegotiations in 1997. The Abu Sayyaf, another splinter group from<br>\nthe MNLF, was meantime doing its best to dishonor the movement&apos;s<br>\naims by turning to kidnap for ransom.<\/p>\n<p>The big question that arises is how much the Kuala Lumpur<br>\nagreement can contribute to the attainment of peace between the<br>\nCatholic whole and a Muslim rump. This may be getting ahead of<br>\nthe plot. Perhaps the smarter question to ask is: Will the<br>\nceasefire hold? Agreements made during the Ramos presidency were<br>\nfrequently broken. Then came President Joseph Estrada, with more<br>\ntruce violations. On the eve of the Kuala Lumpur signing, MILF<br>\noperatives ambushed a security unit in Cotabato, with one<br>\ngovernment soldier killed. This time, the truce is to be<br>\nmonitored by representatives of the Organization of the Islamic<br>\nConference, including Malaysia and Indonesia. Might this exert a<br>\nrestraining influence on the protagonists?<\/p>\n<p>But the key to a Mindanao settlement remains economic<br>\nrehabilitation. Development projects and provision of basic<br>\nservices have been circumscribed, lately because of Abu Sayyaf<br>\nbandit activity. Now, another round of talks with the MILF is<br>\nscheduled next month to discuss a program of development in areas<br>\nmost damaged by the conflict. If plans and promises are carried<br>\nto fruition and the ceasefire holds, there is no reason to<br>\nsuppose Mindanao will remain a backwater. The Abu Sayyaf is now<br>\nthe only rebel force that remains. If the reconciliation of the<br>\nMNLF and MILF bears out, the few hundred Abu Sayyaf operatives<br>\ncan be contained more easily. But, this being the Philippines,<br>\nnothing can be assumed.<\/p>\n<p>-- The Straits Times\/Asia News Network<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/will-philippines-agreement-end-the-mindanao-terror-1447893297",
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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