Will our new-found freedom last?<\/p>\n
By Ignas Kleden<\/p>\n
This is the first of two articles on state and democracy.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The relationship between a strong government and
\ndemocracy in Indonesia is not very difficult to identify. If one
\ntakes the political development of the Old Order of Sukarno and
\nthe New Order of Soeharto into account the correlation is
\ndefinitely a negative one. This means the stronger the
\ngovernment, the weaker democracy, and conversely the weaker the
\ngovernment, the stronger democracy.<\/p>\n
More precisely: a strong president in Indonesia tends to
\nbecome a constraint to the development of democracy, whereas a
\nweak president tends to allow for more democratic initiatives
\nwithin society.<\/p>\n
This pattern could be observed during the two previous
\nregimes. Before 1959, Sukarno was more or less merely a symbolic
\npresident. The government was run according to the mechanism of
\nthe parliamentary system whereby political decisions resulted
\nfrom debates within parliament.<\/p>\n
The existence and the workings of cabinets were dependent upon
\nthe approval or disapproval of parliament. Political discussions,
\ndebates and even polemics took place quite often, many of which
\ndemonstrated very bright political intelligence and thoughtful
\ninsight of those who were involved.<\/p>\n
Political polemics in particular showed a resourceful language
\ngame and very witty rhetorical ingenuity which is still enjoyed
\nand even admired by many people to this day.<\/p>\n
The negative side of this situation was that democratic
\nfreedom was sometimes so overdone that there was no stable
\ngovernment which had enough time to get things done. Some
\ncabinets stayed in office even less than six months (to mention
\nsome examples, the Cabinet of Amir Sjarifuddin I lasted from July
\n3, 1947 until Nov. 11, 1947, the Cabinet of Amir Sjarifuddin II
\nfrom Nov. 11, 1947 to Jan. 29, 1948, the Cabinet of Soesanto from
\nDec. 20, 1949 to Jan. 21, 1950). Besides that, interparty rivalry
\nmore often than not resulted in protracted conflicts without a
\ncorresponding willingness and ability to compromise.<\/p>\n
To sum it up: the ability to differ was well developed but the
\ncapacity to come to a political consensus was miserable. In that
\nsense, political competition brought about the neglect of serious
\nimplementation of a well-planned economic policy, this leading
\nfinally to a near-destitute economic condition by the end of the
\nOld Order. Scarcity of basic foodstuffs, astronomical increase in
\ninflation and the corruption of political leaders became the
\norder of the day.<\/p>\n
The lack of the ability to compromise as well as the lengthy
\ndebate within the parliament concerning a new constitution
\nwithout ever finalizing it, left president Sukarno no other
\nchoice but to dissolve parliament and to put the 1945
\nConstitution into force.<\/p>\n
The government was run since then according to the
\npresidential system and Sukarno, who for 15 years had been merely
\na symbolic head of state, became the real powerholder who held so
\nmany offices: the head of state, the head of government, the
\nmilitary commander, the Great Leader of the Revolution and then
\nmore.<\/p>\n
The enforcement of the presidential system made the president
\nvery powerful and the political system more stable. However,
\ndemocracy started to suffer from a very obvious inclination
\ntoward authoritarian governance, whereby many political decisions
\nwere made according to the revolutionary mood of Sukarno, who
\nkept telling the people that the revolution was not yet
\ncompleted.<\/p>\n
Revolution became the general justification for any political
\naction of the president and a general apology for all
\nshortcomings within the government. Economic problems were viewed
\nby Sukarno as small technical questions which were in no way to
\nbe compared with the grandeur of a revolutionary cause.<\/p>\n
Political opponents and political critics of Sukarno were sent
\nto jail without due legal process, the crusading newspaper
\nIndonesia Raya was banned, and the political and diplomatic
\nrelations with Western countries and the United Nations worsened.<\/p>\n
Academics were denounced as text-book thinkers who could not
\nunderstand the course of revolution, while the Communist Party
\nsucceeded in coming into his favor. There was little focus on the
\neconomy and slowly but surely politics became "the chief
\ncommander" of all other sectors of life. Art and literature were
\nin great difficulty because Sukarno, who was under the militant
\ninfluence of members of the communist-leaning People's Cultural
\nInstitute (Lekra), was made to believe that there was no
\nworthwhile art and literature.<\/p>\n
Every cultural activity should be dedicated to the cause of
\nrevolution as well to the interests of the people. Those who
\ntried to defend freedom of expression in art and literature lost
\ntheir jobs and were dismissed from their positions at
\nuniversities. Politics became the main sector, to which every
\nother sector should adjust itself.<\/p>\n
Revolutionary rhetoric turned out to be very effective in
\nmobilizing people, but certainly was not able to meet their basic
\nneeds.<\/p>\n
The worsening economic condition, the arbitrariness of Sukarno
\nin exercising his power, the absence of political and social
\ncontrol, the widening moral decadence of people around Sukarno,
\nthe political insecurity which increased in accordance with the
\nincreasing maneuvers of the Communist Party, as well as the
\nrivalry between the Army and the leftist social forces became
\nfinally too great a burden for the Sukarno regime.<\/p>\n
When students and the Army started to say "No" to the regime,
\nSukarno could not withstand the resurgence and was forced to quit
\nhis powerful position.<\/p>\n
The end of Sukarno's strong government opened the door to
\ndemocratic initiatives. The Indonesian press regained its freedom
\nof expression and started carrying out its job accordingly.
\nStudents were allowed to voice their opinions and criticism.<\/p>\n
Political rallies and demonstrations had not yet been
\nprohibited whereas student leaders were still allowed to meet
\nthen president Soeharto and discuss the political and economic
\nsituation with him face to face.<\/p>\n
The relatively democratic situation lasted during the years in
\nwhich Soeharto had yet to learn about economic affairs from
\nexperts and technocrats, as well as learn many things about
\npolitical affairs from civilian politicians. In those years he
\nalso was doing his best to consolidate political support from the
\nmilitary, from students and from society in general.<\/p>\n
Soeharto's democratic attitude lasted until early 1970, when
\nstudents started waging demonstrations against corruption in
\ngeneral and against the plan to build Taman Mini Indonesia Indah
\nin particular.<\/p>\n
According to the students, the idea of Taman Mini was not bad,
\nbut the time for realizing it was inappropriate. There were still
\nso many economic and political problems that should be given
\npriority. All funds and forces should be used cleverly according
\nto the degree of urgency.<\/p>\n
The protest against the plan of Taman Mini seemed to embarrass
\nSoeharto very much, since the woman behind the proposal was Mrs.
\nSoeharto herself. Soeharto made a speech in which he made it very
\nclear that any action taken against the first lady implied action
\nagainst him, and that he would not hesitate to take strong
\nmeasures in response to that.<\/p>\n
The said speech became a kind of political revelation to the
\nstudents, who suddenly were enlightened about the real nature of
\npower which tended to corrupt its holder.<\/p>\n
The worsening relationship between Soeharto and the students,
\nwho previously were his faithful political supporters, was
\ndefinitely broken and terminated in the Malari affair in January
\n1974. It was a time of escalating student protest against the
\ndomination of foreign capital, especially that from Japan.
\nStudents went to the streets again, but they could not keep
\neverything under control. Proyek Senen, the main business center
\nin Central Jakarta was set on fire.<\/p>\n
Some student leaders were arrested and sent to jail along with
\nsome politicians, intellectuals, professionals and academics who
\nwere accused of helping mastermind the whole incident. The
\nSoeharto government became more and more wary of the students and
\nof any critical action, while the students bitterly said goodbye
\nto the hopes they out in Soeharto and his regime. President
\nSoeharto started to rule with a heavy hand, and the initial hope
\nfor a comeback of democracy turned out to be nothing but a mere
\nseductive mirage.<\/p>\n
The writer is a sociologist based in Jakarta.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/will-our-new-found-freedom-last-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }